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This dissertation focuses on the relationship between the Abbasid caliphate and the Jews 
of medieval Baghdad. I use medieval Arabic chronicles as well as Judeo-Arabic and Hebrew 
documents preserved in the Cairo Geniza to re-evaluate the role of Jews and Jewish institutions 
in medieval Islamic political life. At the beginning of the tenth century, the descendants of the 
original redactors of the Babylonian Talmud, the geonim of Sura and Pumbedita, relocated to the 
Abbasid imperial capital of Baghdad and promoted the authority of the Babylonian Talmud. 
They positioned themselves as halakhic arbiters for Jewish communities throughout the Islamic 
world, and over the next 300 years, most of world Jewry came to accept the Babylonian Talmud 
as authoritative, even as they questioned the exact claims to Halakhic supremacy that the geonim 
made. My dissertation contends that these seemingly internal Jewish communal conflicts cannot 
be understood in isolation from the Islamic political context in which they occurred.  
 
Scholars of Islamic and Jewish history have long assumed that non-Muslims in the 
Islamic world lived in closed, autonomous communities and thus played a largely static and 
negligible role in Islamic political history. By contrast, I find not only that Jews were embedded 
in a wide variety of social organizations in Abbasid Baghdad that included political 
administration, but also that Jewish officials engaged in mutually-beneficial patron-client 
relationships with Muslim courtiers. Throughout centuries of Abbasid rule, rabbinic leaders, 
including the Babylonian geonim, appealed to their allies within the Islamic government to 
advance their claims to authority over their co-religionists. Indeed, they often deployed Islamic 
state power against their fellow Jews. In identifying and tracing a reciprocal relationship between 
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elite rabbinic Jews and the Abbasid state over time, my dissertation re-conceptualizes the 
methods deployed in the exercise of medieval rabbinic authority. 
 
The dissertation is structured chronologically. The first four chapters examine 
developments in Jewish communal and political life under each successive Islamic regime in 
Baghdad: the Abbasid caliphs al-Muqtadir and al-Qāhir (c. 890-945; chapter 1); the Shiite Buyid 
Emirs who ruled in the name of the Abbasid caliphs and presided over a period of political 
fragmentation (c. 945-1055; chapter 2); the Sunni Seljuq Sultans who deposed the Buyids and 
competed with the Abbasid caliphs to re-assert centralized Sunni authority (c. 1055-1157; 
chapter 3); and the later Abbasid caliphs who defeated the Seljuqs and ruled the city 
independently until the Mongol conquest (1158-1258; chapter 4). Chapter 5 examines how the 
changing relationship between the Babylonian geonim and Jewish communities in the 
Mediterranean during the eleventh and twelfth centuries impacted the construction of 
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In 928, the Jewish exilarch in Baghdad, David b. Zakkay, appointed Sa ʿadya b. Yosef al-
Fayyūmī as Gaon, or leader of the Yeshiva of Sura in Baghdad, a center of legal authority for 
Jews from throughout the Islamic world and beyond. He chose Sa ʿadya in recognition of his 
erudition and the forcefulness with which he defended Babylonian Rabbinic Judaism against its 
many rivals. 
But just two years later, a dispute broke out between the two men. According to the 
Judeo-Arabic chronicle of Natan ha-Bavli (c. 950s) later translated into Hebrew, the conflict 
began when two men under the exilarch’s jurisdiction were engaged in a legal dispute with each 
other over their inheritance. They came to an agreement to divide the money and donate a 
portion of it to the exilarch. The exilarch wanted the geonim to sign off on the agreement. 
Sa ̒adya, however, refused to do so. The exilarch was incensed at Sa ̒adya’s refusal to sign, and 
the conflict escalated. One of Sa ʿadya’s supporters threw his shoe at the exilarch’s son. In 
retaliation, the exilarch excommunicated Sa ̒adya and appointed a different gaon in his place. 
Meanwhile, Sa ʿadya appointed the exilarch’s brother as a counter-exilarch. The conflict 
essentially divided Baghdad’s Rabbanite Jews into two rival factions. According to Natan, “All 
of the rich men of Baghdad and the students of the yeshiva and the courtiers supported Rav 
Sa ̒adya with bribes and by advocating his cause in front of the king (the Abbasid caliph) and his 
ministers and his advisors.”1  
                                                          
1 Neubauer, MJC, II, 80. 
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Why did prominent rabbinic leaders invite the Muslim authorities to intervene in what 
was seemingly an internal Jewish conflict? Who were these “rich men” who bribed the king, his 
ministers, and his advisors on behalf of their rabbinic allies? And what can this tell us, more 
broadly, about the relationship between political power and the exercise of rabbinic authority in 
the medieval Islamic world? This dissertation seeks to answer these questions by tracing the 
relationship between Jews and the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad over a period of 350 years. 
 
Historical Background 
Iraq (Bavel) was home to one of the most ancient and significant Jewish communities in 
the Near East. Jews had resided in Iraq continuously since the Babylonian exile of 586 BCE. 
After the Roman destruction of Jerusalem and the failure of the Bar Kokhba revolt in 136 CE, it 
became the center of the development of rabbinic Judaism. Rabbis within Iraq attracted disciples, 
to whom they transmitted oral traditions, and these disciples in turn passed on the traditions to 
their students. Sometime between 450 and 600, these more informal circles of disciples around 
individual rabbis transformed into hierarchical “academies” called yeshivot (sing: yeshiva/ 
Aramaic: metivta), the most prominent of which were located in Sura and Pumbedita. This 
organizational change coincided with the writing down of the earlier traditions and their 
redaction into what would become known as the Babylonian Talmud.2  
By the year 500 CE, the Jewish population of Iraq had reached a peak of as many as two 
million Jews, making it the largest and most concentrated population of Jews in the world.3 The 
majority of Jews were laborers involved in agriculture, and most were quite poor, although a 
                                                          
2 Jeffrey Rubenstein, “The Rise of the Babylonian Rabbinic Academy: A Reexamination of the Talmudic 
Evidence,” JSIJ 1 (2002), 55-68. 
3 Michael Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 308. 
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small minority developed a great deal of wealth through long-distance trade. Some of these 
wealthy Jews conducted themselves like Persian officials.4  
The most important of these Jewish officials was the exilarch (resh galuta), the scion of 
an aristocratic family whom the Sasanians (r. 224-651) recognized as the head of the Jewish 
community and its representative at court. The exilarch collected taxes on behalf of the Persian 
authorities and otherwise supervised Jewish communal affairs.5 Rabbinic Jews legitimated the 
exilarch by ascribing to him Davidic descent, giving his very rule messianic implications. As 
living heirs to the House of David, even in exile, they represented the personification of the 
biblical verse, “the scepter does not depart from Judah” (Gen. 49:10).6 Nevertheless, the exilarch 
was one of many figures competing for authority over Babylonia’s Jews. 
 Some of the rabbis also held positions in the exilarch’s administration. This likely 
facilitated the spread of the “rabbinic way of life” among other segments of the population. A 
rabbinic market inspector, for example, enforced rabbinic dietary restrictions, while rabbinic 
judges applied Talmudic law to daily life.7 At the same time, many rabbis characterized the 
exilarch in distinctly negative terms and criticized his rule; they described him as negligent in his 
religious observance and corrupted through his close association with Persian culture. Some 
questioned the very notion of a Jewish “king” from a theological perspective, arguing that Jews 
could not have a king until the coming of the messiah and their return to the Land of Israel.8 
In 651, the Muslims conquered Iraq, bringing centuries of Persian rule to an end. The 
Umayyad Caliphate established its capital in Damascus and ruled over an empire stretching from 
                                                          
4 Morony, Iraq, 311. 
5 Morony, Iraq, 316 
6 Morony, Iraq, 317. 
7 Morony, Iraq, 319. 




Spain in the west to Central Asia in the east. In 750, the Abbasid Dynasty successfully overthrew 
the Umayyads, and in 762, they transferred the imperial capital from Damascus and established a 
new city, Baghdad, as their capital about 30 kilometers from the former Persian capital city of 
Ctesiphon. This meant that Iraq transitioned from being a provincial territory to the heart of the 
Islamic Empire. The Jewish exilarch and the Nestorian Christian patriarch relocated to Baghdad 
and received official recognition from the Abbasid State.9 By the end of the ninth century, some 
wealthy Jewish merchants came to hold positions as bankers (jahbadhs) at the Abbasid court, 
serving as money-changers and using their connections to long-distance mercantile credit 
networks to advance loans to the state. Jews continued to serve as Abbasid financial 
administrators in Baghdad until the Mongol conquest of 1258. 
The Abbasid political transformation did not necessarily have an immediate impact on 
most of Iraq’s Jews. Although some moved to Baghdad, the vast majority remained in more rural 
areas, continued to work as tenant farmers, and communicated primarily in their native Aramaic, 
not the imperial language of Arabic. The rabbinic yeshivot, now presided over by officials 
known as geonim, remained in Sura and Pumbedita, as well. Yet they were now at the heart of a 
large empire, and they seem to have used connections with long-distance merchants to spread 
their religious message and accrue loyalists throughout the empire. They promoted themselves as 
the guardians of the most authentic Jewish tradition in the world, claiming that rival rabbinic 
traditions, such as those of the Yeshivot of Palestine, had been corrupted or lost due to Byzantine 
persecution.10  
                                                          
9 Historians have assumed that the establishment of Baghdad led to a large Jewish migration from rural parts of Iraq 
to economic opportunities in the new capital. More recently, Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman has challenged this 
assumption, calling attention to the various economic developments in rural Iraq during this period and cautioning 
historians from making demographic claims based on a small quantity of evidence. Ackerman-Lieberman, 
“Revisiting Jewish Occupational Choice and Urbanization in Iraq under the Early Abbasids,” Jewish History 29 
(2015), 113-135. 
10 Brody, Geonim, 113-116. 
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At the end of the ninth and beginning of the tenth century, the rabbinic yeshivot relocated 
to the imperial capital of Baghdad, where they would remain for the next four centuries. The 
cultural implications of this were enormous. Jews affiliated with the yeshivot came to 
communicate in Arabic, rather than their ancestral Aramaic. Rabbinic leaders, including the 
geonim, composed works of philosophy, theology, grammar, and religious law in Arabic along 
the model of contemporaneous Arabic and Islamic texts. The rabbis even came to share a legal 
vocabulary with their Muslim contemporaries. 
But this move would also have major political implications for the Jewish community. 
The primary institutions of Jewish communal leadership, the exilarchate and the geonic yeshivot, 
now resided together in the Abbasid imperial capital, along with a group of Jewish government 
officials. Their interactions with each other and with the Abbasid State over the next 350 years 
form the subject of this dissertation. 
 
Scope 
This dissertation constitutes the first monograph-length study of the relationship between 
the Jews of Baghdad and the Abbasid State. It begins in 908, when the Abbasid caliph al-
Muqtadir came to power. During his reign, Jews began holding new kinds of government 
positions in greater numbers than they had previously. Around this time, both the Yeshiva of 
Sura and the Yeshiva of Pumbedita relocated to Baghdad. This dissertation concludes in 1258, 
when the Mongol conquest of Baghdad brought 500 years of Abbasid rule in the city to an end.  
I focus on Baghdad due to the city’s centrality for medieval Judaism and Islam. Baghdad 
was home to some of the most enduring Jewish religious and communal institutions in the 
middle ages, including the descendants of the redactors of the Babylonian Talmud, the geonim, 
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who played a formative role in the construction and development of post-Talmudic rabbinic 
Judaism and positioned themselves as legal arbiters for Jewish communities throughout the 
Islamic world. Consequently, many documents composed by Jewish elites in Baghdad were 
preserved in the Cairo Geniza, a storeroom for used manuscripts in the Ben Ezra Synagogue of 
Fustat (old Cairo), and they constitute the largest extant corpus of documents from Abbasid 
Baghdad. No such documentary cache has survived from Baghdad’s East Syriac Christian 
community, also called Nestorians, the city’s other significant non-Muslim group. The survival 
of so much Jewish historiographic, literary, legal, and documentary material from Abbasid 
Baghdad in the Cairo Geniza allows us to study the political life of non-Muslims in their own 
words—and even their own handwriting. 
As the seat of the Sunni Abbasid caliph, Baghdad served as the imperial capital of the 
Eastern Islamic world for over 600 years until the Mongol conquest in 1258, and it played a 
formative role in the development of Islamic governing institutions and ideologies. During the 
three hundred years this dissertation examines, Baghdad was governed according to four distinct 
Islamic political organizations: the Abbasid caliphs Al-Muqtadir and Al-Qāhir (c. 908-945); the 
Shiite-Buyid Emirs who ruled in the name of the Abbasid caliphs (c. 945-1055); the Sunni-
Seljuq Sultans who deposed the Buyids (1055-1157); and the later Abbasid caliphs (1160-1258). 
This makes it an ideal setting for investigating the impact of changes in Islamic political life, 
particularly the centralization, fragmentation, and revitalization of the Caliphate, on non-
Muslims. Moreover, Baghdad was a magnet for Muslim scholars and jurists from all over the 
Islamic world; these scholars recorded the major events that took place in the city in historical 
chronicles, many of which were published in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a result, 






Scholars of Jewish and rabbinic studies have long understood the “classical geonic era” 
in Babylonia (c. 650-1040) as crucial for explaining the development of Jewish religious culture 
and law (Halakha).11 The geonic era bridges the gap between the writing of the Talmud in Late 
Antiquity and the rabbinic culture of the middle ages, when the Talmud was accepted as 
authoritative throughout the Jewish world. During the past 150 years, scholars have published 
texts from the geniza that revolutionized our understanding of the intellectual and cultural world 
of the Babylonian geonim, their followers in communities across the Mediterranean, and their 
rivals, including the Palestinian geonim, Karaites, and other groups.12 Still, the majority of the 
scholarship on the geonic era follows normative rabbinic-halakhic narratives, assuming that the 
Babylonian yeshivot ceased playing a meaningful role in rabbinic history after the middle of the 
eleventh century when communities in the western Mediterranean emerged as the new “centers” 
of halakhic authority. 
Fewer scholars have approached the geonic material from the standpoint of social or 
political rather than halakhic history. Those scholars who did attempt such an analysis followed a 
dominant paradigm in Jewish Studies which assumed that the medieval Jewish community 
constituted an autonomous corporate, self-governing body largely separated from its Muslim and 
                                                          
11 Heinrich Graetz was the first modern scholar to identify the geonic era in this manner. See Graetz, History of the 
Jews (Philadelphia: JPS, 1894), Vol. III, 86-187.    
12 For the most up-to-date synthesis of the scholarship on the geonim, see Robert Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia 
and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture (Yale: Yale UP, 1998; 2013), especially the updated bibliography in the 
paperback edition. On the relations between the Babylonian yeshivot and local communities, see Menahem Ben 
Sasson, The Emergence of the Local Jewish Community in the Muslim World: Qayrawan, 800-1057 (in Hebrew) 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), 401-425.  
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Christian neighbors.13 As Jacob Mann, the first true social historian of the geonic era wrote, 
“Apart from the political and economic conditions that were on the whole controlled by his 
Gentile masters, with now and then a high Jewish official…protecting actively Jewish interests, 
the Jew lived his own communal life in devotion to his traditional ideals and practices.”14  
Salo Baron was the first modern Jewish historian to describe the Jews of the middle ages 
as political actors. Although he did not dispute the notion that Jews formed an autonomous, 
corporate unit, as early as 1928 he argued that Jews engaged in political relations with gentile 
rulers; they made themselves useful to kings in exchange for royal protection. In this regard, 
Jews were not lowly serfs but privileged servants of monarchs. 
If Baron thought about what Jews meant to gentile rulers, Yosef Hayyim Yerushalmi 
considered what this “royal alliance” meant for the Jews, themselves. In 2002, he argued that 
throughout Jewish history in the diaspora, Jews always placed their faith in the hands of 
monarchs. Yerushalmi contended that Jews continued to believe in this “myth of the royal 
alliance” even during times of royal persecution. This faith that the king would ultimately 
intervene to protect the Jewish community served to fortify and console a community in exile. 
Even as this model allows for a greater appreciation of Jewish political thought and 
agency in the pre-modern period, it also presents a rather static picture of pre-modern Jewish 
politics across both time and space. Jews might constantly renegotiate their relationship with the 
monarch, but these negotiations played little if any role in the internal organization of the 
community itself. For Yerushalmi, contemporaneous historical events did not fundamentally 
alter the political actions of or ideologies expressed by Jewish communal leaders. It is important 
                                                          
13 This model reached its apotheosis in the mid-20th century in the works of Yitzhak Baer. See Baer, Galut (Berlin, 
1936), and “The Origins of Jewish Communal Organization in the Middle Ages” (Hebrew) Zion 15 (1950), 1-41. 
14 Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature: Vol. 1 (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1931), 2. 
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to note that Yerushalmi and Baron developed this concept of the royal alliance with regard only 
to Christian Europe and not the Islamic world.   
Nevertheless, historians of Jewish communities in the Islamic world during the twentieth 
century assumed that these paradigms applied equally to Jewish political organization under 
Islam. Even S.D. Goitein, whose Mediterranean Society revolutionized our understanding of the 
social boundaries between Jews and Muslims echoed this; he called the Jewish community of the 
medieval Islamic Mediterranean “a state within the state and beyond the state.”15 By this he 
meant that the Jews of the Islamic world constituted an autonomous corporate body within their 
own state and relied on the caliph for protection, but they owed loyalty to Jewish religious 
authorities in foreign, sometimes even hostile territories. In this regard, Jewish political 
organization in the medieval Islamic world operated mostly in isolation from Islamic political 
life. 
Menahem Ben Sasson integrated the study of geonic history with Goitein’s insights about 
Mediterranean history. He brought attention to the role long-distance Jewish merchants played 
fostering relations between the geonic centers and local communities by transporting letters, 
responsa, and donations on their behalf. In this model, the relations between the geonic yeshivot 
and local communities were affected, not only by internal Jewish developments, but by larger 
geo-political developments that altered trading patterns and transportation networks. Still, this 
“Mediterranean” model understands the Jewish community as autonomous, and it does not 
consider how relations between rabbinic leaders and state power may have impacted the exercise 
of geonic authority within these networks.  
                                                          
15 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society Vol. II, 403. 
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In contrast to more traditional understandings of geonic authority, which asserted that the 
geonim ruled over Jewish communities in the Islamicate world with an iron fist, Ben Sasson 
found that local communities in the Mediterranean functioned largely independently from the 
yeshivot from the ninth century onwards. This allowed him to ask the question, then, of why 
local communities chose to rhetorically position themselves as subordinate to the Babylonian 
yeshivot. Ben Sasson argues that the Babylonian yeshivot were most significant for the symbolic 
authority which they could confer on local leaders. This ascribes a distinctly political 
significance to the geonim, one which Ben Sasson compared to the role of Muslim caliphs in 
their relations with regional Muslim leaders.16  
More recently, Arnold Franklin’s study of the importance of Davidic lineage in the 
Islamic East brings attention to the influence of Islamic concepts of authority and legitimation on 
Jews. But it does not take into account the actual ties between Jewish leaders and Islamic 
political power.  
 Moshe Gil recognized the importance of Islamic sources for reconstructing Babylonian 
Jewish history, and he identified many Jewish and Islamic sources relating to this era which had 
not been available to previous scholars. His work provides the foundation for future scholars to 
more thoroughly investigate this history.17  
More recent work has upended our understanding of the political boundaries between 
Jews and Muslims. Analyses of documents from Fatimid Egypt, medieval Iberia, and the 
Ottoman Empire have demonstrated that Jews, rather than zealously guarding their communal 
autonomy, often appealed to gentile political and legal authorities. Uriel Simonsohn has recently 
                                                          
16 Menahem Ben Sasson, The Emergence of the Local Jewish Community in the Muslim World: Qayrawan, 800-1057 
(in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), 401-425. 
17 Moshe Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael (Hebrew, 4 vols.) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv UP, 1997. 
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described the medieval Islamic world as characterized by “legal pluralism”; Jews and Christians 
were not confined to the legal institutions of their respective religious communities but often 
made use of Islamic legal venues. A scholarly consensus has emerged that it is inaccurate to 
characterize the Jewish community of the pre-modern Islamic world as fully autonomous.18 
If the Jewish community was not, in fact, politically autonomous in the way that scholars 
have assumed, then changes in Islamic political life would also have an impact on the internal 
life of the Jewish community. As this dissertation contends, we cannot fully comprehend 
medieval rabbinic authority without understanding the rabbis’ many ties to Islamic state power. 
 
Jewish Government Officials in the Medieval Islamic World 
In both Christian Europe and the Islamic world, Jews held a distinct, subordinate status. 
Yet despite their subjugation, Jews were employed by Christian and Muslim governments; often, 
they rose to positions of great power. Non-Muslims (dhimmīs) served in Islamic administrations 
from the first Islamic conquests and continued to hold administrative positions throughout the 
middle ages and into the Ottoman period.  
The first scholar to investigate the phenomenon of the “court Jew” in the Islamic world 
was Walter Fischel in 1937. The sources that Fischel identified discussing court Jews are 
indispensable, and he was one of the few scholars to integrate the study of Arabic chronicle 
sources and documentary evidence from the Geniza.19 Yet even as he incorporated geniza 
sources into his analysis, Fischel still assumed a model of Jewish communal autonomy whereby 
these individuals played a relatively negligible role in Jewish communal life relative to more 
traditional rabbinic leaders. He did not consider how these officials’ relations with the Abbasid 
                                                          
18 Rustow, “The Genizah and Jewish Communal History,” 312-314. 
19 Walter Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam (New York: Ktav, 1937; 1969). 
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state might have impacted Baghdad’s Jewish communal leadership or exercise of rabbinic 
authority among Jews. 
There have been no subsequent systematic studies of Jewish government officials in 
Abbasid Iraq, and scholars have largely left Fischel’s analysis of the significance of Jews in 
Abbasid financial administration unchallenged. Nevertheless, throughout his work, Fischel 
assumed that Jews played a central role in the economic life of the medieval Islamic world, even 
though the sources that he presents merely indicate that, in addition to a much larger and more 
significant population of Muslims and Christian government officials, a relatively small number 
of individual Jews acted as financial administrators in medieval Islamic states. Moreover, he 
elides important distinctions between the relative significance and function of individual Jewish 
officials in different regions. As a result, he conflates the high status of the Jew Ya ̔aqūb b. Killis 
(d. 991), who served as vizier to the Fatimid caliph with the lower-prestige Jewish financial 
administrators of Abbasid Iraq. 
Indeed, most evidence indicates that Jews were fairly marginal figures in Abbasid 
governance, especially when compared to their Christian counterparts. Many Nestorian 
Christians served as court secretaries (kuttāb) and played a central role in the transmission of 
classical Greek philosophy into the Islamic world and the development of Abbasid courtly 
culture.20 By contrast, Jews seem to have played a minimal role in these transformative 
movements.21  
                                                          
20 For studies of Nestorian Christian secretaries in Abbasid Baghdad, see Jean-Maurice Fiey, Chrétiens Syriaques 
sous les Abbassides surtout à Bagdad, 749–1258 (Louvain: Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, 1980) and Cécile Cabrol, 
Les Secrétaires Nestoriens à Bagdad, 762–1258 AD (Beyrouth: Université Saint-Joseph, 2012). On their role in the 
Greco-Arabic translation movement, see Dmitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic 
Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early Abbasid Society (New York: Routeledge, 1998). On their prominence 
in intellectual life in Baghdad during the Buyid period, see Joel Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: 
The Cultural Revival During the Buyid Age (Leiden: Brill, 1986). 
21 Mohammad Hannan Hassan, “Where were the Jews in the development of sciences in medieval Islam? A 
quantitative analysis of two medieval Muslim biographical notices,” Hebrew Union College Annual 81 (2010), 105-
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Furthermore, unlike in Fatimid Egypt or Umayyad Spain, Jews in Iraq never rose to 
positions of great prominence at the Abbasid court. There was no Jewish vizier in Iraq along the 
model of Ya ʿaqūb b. Killis and Abu Sa ‘ad al-Tustarī in Fatimid Egypt or Hạsday b. Shaprut ̣ and 
Shemuʾel Ha-Nagid in Spain. Unlike in Ayyubid Egypt, where Maimonides served as the 
physician to sultan Salah ̣al-Din, no Jews served as court physicians to the Abbasid caliph. 
Instead, in Abbasid Baghdad, Jews served mainly as lower-level financial administrators, and 
Arabic chroniclers did not discuss them in great detail. They instead referred to Jews, mostly in 
passing, as bankers (jahbadhs), responsible for collecting and exchanging money and also 
advancing loans to the state and safeguarding the assets of various Muslim officials; as tax 
collectors; and as mint officials. Although the most prominent Jews in Abbasid governance 
appear to have been financial administrators, Muslims and Christians also served in these roles; 
it is unclear if a majority of these officials were, in fact, Jewish. 
Most studies of the Abbasid bureaucracy devote little attention to these figures. Yet 
although they may have been somewhat marginal in the social life of the Abbasid court, they 
played a crucial role in Abbasid governance, connecting the state to long-distance mercantile 
networks thus ensuring that it had access to the credit necessary to pay all of its expenses and 
that its monetary system continued to function. By following a group of jahbadhs through four 
distinct political regimes in Baghdad, this dissertation will also give insight into continuities and 
changes in Abbasid financial administration over 350 years. 
Although they may not have been as highly-ranked as Jewish officials in other parts of 
the Islamic world, Jewish jahbadhs in Abbasid Iraq also served as mediators between Jews and 
the state. During most of this period, Geonic sources characterized Jewish jahbadhs as 
                                                          
126. The question of why Christians were more prominent in Abbasid administration than Jews is outside of the 
scope of this dissertation, though it likely has to do with a continuation of patterns from Sassanian administration. 
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prestigious high-level government officials who enjoyed the respect of their Muslim 
contemporaries. This dissertation will shed light on the various roles that Jewish jahbadhs played 
in advancing and challenging the authority of various Jewish leaders, both within Baghdad and 
across the Mediterranean. 
 
Institutions in the Medieval Near East 
 By tracing the history of Jewish institutions in the medieval Islamic world, this 
dissertation contributes to a long-standing discussion about the stability of institutions in the late 
antique and medieval Near East. 22  
 In the first half of the twentieth century, scholars of the medieval Near East sought to find 
parallels to the allegedly “stable” institutions of the medieval Latin West, such as guilds. In 
failing to find such evidence, these scholars concluded that the Islamic world lacked “stable” 
institutions, especially after the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate in the mid-tenth century. 
Jewish historians also identified the major “institutions” of the Jewish communities in the Near 
East such as the geonic yeshivot, but tended to assume that these institutions were in a state of 
“decline” by the tenth century.23  
The next generation of social historians of the medieval Near East argued that institutions 
were not a useful category for understanding the societies they studied. Following Clifford 
Geertz24, they shifted their attention from “institutions” to “individuals.” Abraham Udovitch, for 
                                                          
22 This section largely summarizes an argument about institutions in the Near East which has already been made by 
Marina Rustow and Eve Krakowski in their upcoming article in Jewish Social Studies. I am summarizing the 
scholarship here because it demonstrates the reasons why this dissertation proposes an institutional history and the 
ways in which an institutional history can contribute to a broader discussion about social structure in the medieval 
Near East. 
23 Louis Ginzburg, Geonica (New York: JTS, 1909). 
24 For more on Geertz’s influence on the field of Islamic social history and the problem of institutions in the 
medieval Near East more generally, see the upcoming article in Jewish Social Studies: Marina Rustow, Eve 
Krakowski, “Formula as Content: Medieval Jewish Institutions, the Cairo Geniza and the New Diplomatics.”  
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example, argued that trade in the Islamicate world was characterized by informal relationships 
between individuals, rather than legal or institutional mechanisms.25 Goitein even devoted an 
entire volume of A Mediterranean Society to “The Individual.” Most influentially for Islamic 
studies, Roy Mottahadeh argued that Buyid Iraq was characterized by informal institutions but 
formalized ties. This theory helped him to explain the resilience of society amidst so-called 
“institutional decline” after the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate. Many subsequent scholars 
have found Mottahadeh’s insights about Buyid Iraq useful for analyzing medieval Islamicate 
social structure.26 
A new generation of historians has challenged the individual-centered model and has 
found evidence for robust institutions in the medieval Near East. In contrast to Udovitch, Jessica 
Goldberg argued that medieval Islamicate trade was based on a great deal more than informal, 
face-to-face agreements between individuals. Rather, eleventh century merchants shared “a well-
developed, broadly shared and known set of standard contracts across the Islamic world which 
allowed individuals to put their goods in the hands of others and rely on the strong property 
protections of markets and courts.”27 Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman found that Jewish merchants 
made formal partnership agreements in Jewish courts according to Jewish law.28 This suggests 
                                                          
25 Avraham Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970). 
26 Eg, Michael Chamberlain’s discussion of elite households in Damascus, Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social 
Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190-1350 (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jonathan Berkey’s analysis of 
education in Ayyubid Cairo, Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of 
Islamic Education (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005);  Daphna Ephrat’s work on madrasas in Seljuq Baghdad, Ephrat, 
A learned Society in a Period of Transition: the Sunni "Ulama" of Eleventh Century Baghdad (Albany: SUNY UP, 
2000). Also, for Arabic-speaking Jews’ use of institutions of patronage, see Marina Rustow, “Formal and Informal 
Patronage Among Jews in the Islamic East: Evidence from the Cairo Geniza,” Al Qantara XXIX (2008). 
27 Jessica Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: the Geniza Merchants and their 
Business World (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 354. 
28 Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman, The Business of Identity: Jews, Muslims, and Economic Life in Medieval Egypt 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014). 
  
16 
that institutions played a greater role in organizing life in the medieval Islamicate world than was 
previously assumed.  
Recently, Nathan Hofer has encouraged historians of the medieval Near East to define 
institutions according to their sociological definition: “an established custom or practice” that 
“provides stability and meaning to human behavior.”29 This model allowed him to analyze Sufi 
orders in Ayyubid and Mamluk Egypt with attention to continuities in social practices and 
understanding, rather than brick-and-mortar structures.  
Hofer’s definition of institutions is particularly useful for this dissertation, which follows 
three different, though overlapping, Jewish “institutions” over a period of 350 years. It allows us 
to avoid halakhically-informed teleological discussions of “institutional decline.” Instead, this 
dissertation investigates how the remarkably long-lasting institutions of the yeshiva, the 
exilarchate, and the jahbadh continually adapted and refashioned their relations with the state 
and with each other to shape and give meaning to medieval Jewish life.  
 
Sources and Methodological Approaches 
 This dissertation draws on Arabic historical chronicles, letters and letter collections 
written by Jewish communal elites, and Jewish historical chronicles and other literary works. In 
what follows, I give an overview of my sources and how I analyze them.  
 
Arabic Historical Chronicles 
In this dissertation, I use Arabic historical chronicles to describe the political climate of 
medieval Baghdad and its implications for Jews. I will rely on Arabic historical chronicles dating 
                                                          
29 Nathan Hofer, “Sufism, State, and Society in Ayyubid and Early Mamluk Egypt, 1173-1309” (PhD diss., Emory 
University, 2011), 21–40. 
  
17 
to the so-called “middle period” of Islamic historiography (mid-10th-15th centuries), which 
represented a new historical consciousness in medieval Islam. Previous historians had used their 
works to legitimate Abbasid rule. Yet after the fall of the Abbasids in the mid-tenth century, this 
narrative ceased to be compelling. The next generations of historians (mid-10th-15th centuries) 
instead tried to understand “what had gone wrong.” Rather than using history to legitimate 
Abbasid rule, they looked to the recent past “as a source of political prudence and moral 
admonition,” crafting their narratives from accounts that would support their underlying 
philosophy of history and governance.30 Even as they looked to the past as a source of moral 
instruction, the majority of the historians of the middle period were, themselves, affiliated with 
various forms of political power; the majority of the historians we know about worked as court 
secretaries. As these authors wrote about the past, they commented on and were embedded in 
contemporaneous events. They used their narratives to comment covertly (and sometimes, 
overtly) on the political affairs of their own society.  
 This dissertation analyzes the discussions of events relating to Jews (and, to a lesser 
extent, other dhimmī populations) in these chronicles. This approach is somewhat problematic, as 
most Muslim chroniclers were not particularly interested in the internal affairs of non-Muslims, 
and they did not necessarily know much about these populations. But as Gabrielle Spiegel 
argues, “Texts both mirror and generate social realities.” The ideology that shaped the structure 
of medieval historiographical texts also informed the historical events themselves.31  
Indeed, the Muslim chroniclers chose to include events relating to Jews (and other 
dhimmī populations) because of the relevance of these events (or the interpretation of these 
                                                          
30 Humphries, Islamic History, 130. 




events) for the greater point that they were making about good governance. That is precisely 
what makes these chronicles so useful for my dissertation. By identifying the significance of 
these accounts for the internal logic of the texts and the political claims of the authors, I will be 
able to see how actions relating to dhimmīs and Jewish government officials in particular were 
informed by and informed questions of Islamic political authority and power.  
 
Jewish Letters, Letter Collections, and Responsa from the Cairo Geniza 
This dissertation primarily analyzes letters composed by Jews affiliated with the 
Babylonian yeshivot. Some of these letters dealt with the transportation of funds or responsa to 
or from the yeshivot, or various conflicts among the leaders of the yeshivot. Others impart 
religious teachings and were intended to be read aloud at synagogues in Iraq, Egypt and 
throughout the Mediterranean.  
This corpus represents only a small percentage of the writings of the Jewish community 
of medieval Baghdad as a whole: those materials which passed through Cairo and were deposited 
in the Cairo Geniza.32 As a result, there are significant chronological and geographical gaps in 
our source base. For example, we have almost no documentation from the Seljuq Era in Baghdad 
(mid-11th through mid-12th century) even though other literary and documentary evidence 
indicates that the yeshivot continued to operate during this time.33 Even during the well-
                                                          
32 On the “life-cycle” of medieval Arabic documents, see Tamer El-Leithy, “Living Documents, Dying Archives: 
Towards a Historical Anthropology of Medieval Arabic Archives” al-Qantạra 32 (2011): 389-434.  
33 For the Seljuq era in Baghdad (1055-1157), there are no extant original letters, although 8 original letters that 
attest to the continued existence of the yeshivot, or otherwise discuss affairs in Baghdad during this time. The 
Jewish authorities in Baghdad continued to wield influence outside of the city proper. For example, the Nagid of 
Aden Madṃūn b. Hạsan-Japheth (c. 1140) received a title from the Babylonian exilarch in Baghdad, and he sent 
gifts to the yeshivot in both Baghdad and Palestine. See Mordechai Friedman, S.D. Goitein, India Traders of the 
Middle Ages: Documents from the Cairo Geniza (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 37ff. and idem, India Book Vol. 2: Madṃūn 
Nagid Eres ̣Teman ve-Sahạr-Hodu  [Heb.] (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2010). For an overview of the other 
relevant literary and documentary sources for the Babylonian Gaonate and Exilarchate after the death of Hạyya 
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documented early 11th century, we still know very little about the writings that might have been 
generated, used, and disposed of in Baghdad or in other parts of Iraq and Persia.  
Furthermore, we possess only a small number of “original letters.”34 The vast majority of 
the letters that we do possess are copies. Many of these were probably part of larger collections 
of letters that were collected for either literary or didactic purposes.35 We do not know which 
considerations shaped the formation of these collections, nor do we understand how 
representative they are of the total written output of the yeshivot. In some cases, the letters 
contained within these collections may never have even been sent in the first place; they may 
have been composed specifically for inclusion in the collection of letters as an example of a 
particularly “eloquent” letter. In other cases, a particular letter may have been copied because it 
had political significance in a different context. 36  
                                                          
Gaon, see Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature (New York: Ktav, 1972), 202-248 and 
Moshe Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael [Hebrew or English], Secs. 261-268. 
34So far, I have not located any original letters from Baghdad dating to before the Buyid era. 37 “original” letters 
written by or to Babylonian geonim or exilarchs in the Buyid period have been identified in the Cairo Geniza: the 
earliest, Mosseri VIII 479, a letter of Nehẹmiah Gaon, dates to 960; the latest, Mosseri I a 5 (L2), a letter of Hạyya 
Gaon dates to 1037. Seven additional original letters dating to this time which discuss the transfer of donations to 
the yeshivot or notable figures in Baghdad. For the later Abbasid Caliphate (1157-1258), I have identified 9 original 
letters of Samuel b. ͑Alī Gaon (c. 1160-1190), many of which are fragmentary; one letter written by Samuel’s 
contemporary who describes a visit to his majlis (T-S 8J21.22); one original letter of Zekhariya b. Berakhel Gaon 
dating to 1191; one letter of Elazar b. Hillel b. Fahd Gaon (MS Adler 4011.1-2) dating to after 1194; and two letters 
by Jalāl al-Dawla in Fustat that discuss events in Baghdad, dating to 1237 and 1240, respectively (T-S 20.128 & T-S 
16.36). 
35 It would appear that the largest letter collection in my corpus, the collection of the letters of Shemuʾel b. ͑Alī and 
his contemporaries (MSS Firkovitch 72 and 105, published by Simhạ Assaf) served a literary/didactic function. The 
letters are not organized chronologically or by author, and the copyist neglected to copy the parts of letters that were 
written in Persian, implying that, for the copyist, the information contained in these letters was secondary to their 
linguistic and literary merits (in Hebrew and Arabic, only). Regarding Buyid letters, Hachmeier posits, “The 
frequent appearance of the letters in other sources like anthologies and the pre-eminence of the risāla as the vehicle 
par excellence of Arabic artistic prose should be reason enough to argue that the letters were read and studied 
primarily for their literary merit.” Klaus Hachmeier discusses the application of these concepts to understanding 
Buyid letter collections: Hachmeier, “Private Letters, Official Correspondence,” 137. 
36 For an evaluation of the genre of “letter collections” in the medieval Latin West, see Giles Constable, Letters and 
Letter Collections (Louvain: Brepols, 1976), 56ff. Klaus Hachmeier, idem discusses the application of these 
concepts to understanding Buyid letter collections.  
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The issue is compounded when analyzing Babylonian rabbinic responsa, answers to 
halakhic questions posed by Jewish communities outside of Baghdad. Although some geonic 
responsa were preserved in the Cairo Geniza, many were copied numerous times and ultimately 
preserved in books printed in Europe centuries later. 37  
Geonic letters and responsa seldom explicitly refer to specific Muslim rulers or political 
events. Still, they do give insight into the administration of the yeshivot and their relations with 
Jews outside of Baghdad. Moreover, medieval letters were not mere repositories of information 
and historical data. Rather, these letters had ceremonial, diplomatic, and literary value in their 
social and political context.38 By analyzing these letters with attention to this context, this 
dissertation will reveal how the claims to spiritual authority that Jewish leaders made were 
intimately related to the Abbasid political milieu in which they were asserted. 
 
Jewish Historical/Halakhic Narratives 
This dissertation also makes use of medieval Jewish historical, halakhic, and travel 
narratives. Medieval Islamicate societies, like those of medieval Christendom, were traditional 
societies that depended on the past for legitimation.39 Although Islamicate Jews did not develop 
a robust historiographical tradition, their institutions derived authority through historical claims. 
                                                          
37 For an overview of 19th and 20th century historiography on the geonic period, see Gerson D. Cohen, “The 
Reconstruction of Gaonic History,” in Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature (Jerusalem: 
Ktav, 1972), xiii-xcix. As Cohen argues, although many of the sources relating to the Babylonian geonim have been 
published and given “cursory” analysis, they have not yet been properly historicized: “there is a mine of material, 
Jewish as well as Muslim, waiting for the historian to elucidate the activities of the geonim in the context of the 
society of their day” (lxxii).  
38See Klaus Hachmeier, “Private Letters, Official Correspondence: Buyid Inshā ͗ as a Historical Source,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies 13:2 (2002), 125-154. On geniza letters as substitute for the physical presence of their authors, and 
the practice of reading letters aloud, see Arnold Franklin, “More than words on a Page: Letters as Substitutes for an 
Absent Writer,” in Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Medieval and Early Modern Times (Boston: Brill, 2014), 287-
305.  
39 On this phenomenon in Latin Europe, see Gabrielle Spiegel, “Political Utility in Medieval Historiography: A 
Sketch,” History and Theory 14 (1975), 314-325. 
  
21 
Close-readings of medieval Jewish historical/halakhic narratives with attention to the political 
context in which they were composed give further insight into the claims to authority advanced 
by Jewish leaders in Baghdad and throughout the Mediterranean at different times and in 
different political contexts. 
Texts composed by Jews affiliated with the yeshivot in Baghdad, such as Nathan Ha-
Bavli’s Judeo-Arabic Akhbār Baghdad40 (c. 956) and the Aramaic Circular Letter of Sherira 
Gaon (a responsum written in response to a query by Nissim b. Yaacov of Qayrawan) both 
provide invaluable information on Jewish communal authorities in Baghdad in the late 9th and 
10th centuries and how they characterized their relationship with the Abbasid state.  
I also draw on medieval Jewish travel literature. Ovadaya the Proselyte,41 Petahỵa of 
Regensburg42, and Benjamin of Tudela43 all visited Baghdad in the twelfth century. They 
described their experiences in the city and recorded stories that they heard about notable episodes 
in the history of the Baghdad Jewish community. Although these texts contain fictional elements 
and were intended for a Jewish readership in Europe, they provide insight into the kinds of 
narratives that Baghdad’s elite Jews expressed about themselves to foreign visitors.44 
Finally, this dissertation examines historic/halakhic narratives composed by rabbinic 
elites outside of Baghdad, such as Abraham ibn Dawud’s Book of Tradition and Maimonides’ 
Introduction to the Mishneh Torah. Analyzing these sources in dialogue with contemporaneous 
                                                          
40 Menahẹm Ben Sasson, “The Structure, Goals, and Content of the Story of Nathan ha-Babli,” in Culture and 
Society in Medieval Jewry: Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, ed. M. Ben-Sasson, R. 
Bonfil, and J. Hacker (Jerusalem: Merkaz Shazar, 1989), pp. 137–196 [Hebrew]. 
41 Norman Golb, “The Autograph Memoirs of Obadiah the Proselyte,” in Studies in Geniza and Sepharadi Heritage 
Presented to Shelomo Dov Goitein, ed. Sh. Morag et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981), 77–107 [Hebrew]. 
42 Abraham David, “Sibbuv Rabbi Petaḥya me-Regensburg be-Nusaḥ Ḥadash,” Qobeṣ ʿal Yad, n.s. 13 (1996): 237–
269. 
43 Michael A. Signer, M.N. Adler, The itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Travels in the Middle Ages (Malibu: J. 
Simon, 1983). 
44 Martin Jacobs, Reorienting the East: Jewish Travelers to the Medieval Muslim World (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
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Jewish travel narratives and geniza material further demonstrates how rabbinic claims to 
halakhic and spiritual authority differed depending on the political circumstances in which they 
were composed. 
 
Outline of Chapters  
The dissertation is structured chronologically, beginning in 908 with the first references 
to high-level Jewish court bankers in Arabic sources and ending right before the Mongol 
conquest of Baghdad in 1258. Each chapter examines developments in Jewish communal and 
political life under each successive Islamic regime in Baghdad. 
Chapter 1, “‘Every Desire that you have from the Kingdom’: Jewish Politics in the Late 
Abbasid Caliphate, 908-942,” examines Jewish political culture in the first half of the tenth 
century, during the apotheosis of the Abbasid Caliphate. It begins with an explanation of the 
Abbasid political developments that fostered the rise of a new group of Jewish financial 
administrators within the Abbasid governing bureaucracy. Next, it considers how these Jewish 
government officials made alliances with Jewish communal officials, raising their prestige within 
the Jewish community while, at the same time, challenging the traditional structure of Jewish 
communal authority. Then, it examines the ways in which Jewish leaders in the early tenth 
century used their close relations with the Abbasid state to project their own authority.  
Chapter 2, “‘We must go out to them ourselves’: The Babylonian Yeshivot and the Buyid 
State, 933-1028,” seeks to understand how the yeshivot continued to survive—and thrive—
without access to the same forms of political power that they had enjoyed in the past. It begins 
by examining how the breakdown of the centralized Abbasid administration and the rise of the 
Buyids impacted the status of Jewish court bankers in Buyid territory. Then, it considers how 
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this environment affected the operations of the yeshivot and their ability to use their connection 
to centralized political power to perform favors for their followers. The final section explores 
how these changes in political organization forced Jewish leaders to re-conceptualize their own 
relationship to the state and project their authority in a new way. 
Chapter 3, “‘Suppose the Jew is dead’: Jews and the “Sunni Revival” in Seljuq Baghdad, 
1037-1146,” examines the effect of Seljuq rule and a new Sunni ascendancy on the Jews of Iraq. 
Part I explores the social and political dynamics of Baghdad during this period, examining the 
debates and contradictions surrounding the place of non-Muslims in a majority-Sunni society and 
government. Part II explores how Jewish communal leaders in Baghdad tried to navigate this 
new political context and advance their own interests and those of their co-religionists before the 
state. Part III uses the fragmentary surviving Jewish sources to suggest how these changes 
created a crisis of ideals in the Jewish community, forcing them to reevaluate their own 
relationship with the state once more. 
Chapter 4, ‘“None of the concerns that require a king?’ Jewish Political Realignment in 
the Independent Caliphate, 1161-1258,” considers the impact of efforts toward administrative 
centralization on Jews during the final years of the Abbasid Caliphate. I argue that these 
developments might have led to the granting of investiture to the geonim, and increased 
temporarily the status and prestige of the various Jewish officials at the Abbasid court. Next, I 
explore the impact of these political and administrative changes on the operations of the Jewish 
community, itself. I also consider the implications of this new arrangement on the way in which 
the geonim and the exilarch in Baghdad promoted their authority in relation to each other. The 
chapter concludes by considering how the geonim and their allies, now officially part of Abbasid 
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administration, characterized their relationship to the Abbasid state during the final years of the 
caliphate. 
Chapter 5, “‘No Need of Babylonia’? The Construction of Rabbinic Authority in the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Century Mediterranean,” investigates how Jewish communities in the 
Mediterranean and in Europe related to and characterized the Babylonian yeshivot during the late 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, after the “classical geonic era.” Part I argues that economic and 
geopolitical developments in the middle of the eleventh century diminished long-distance 
connections between Egyptian and Babylonian Jews, thereby leading some Mediterranean 
Jewish leaders to claim halakhic authority without receiving titles from the Babylonian yeshivot, 
even as the Babylonian yeshivot continued to command the loyalties of some Jews. Part II 
contends that the renewal of trans-Mediterranean connections with Iraq in the middle of the 
twelfth century catalyzed a halakhic and historiographic tradition that either explained the 
transfer of rabbinic authority to the west or denied the authority of Babylonia altogether. Part III 
argues that these challenges led rabbinic leaders in Babylonia to emphasize the halakhic 
significance of their location in Babylonia itself, and that many Jews worldwide continued to 
accept and promote these claims to Babylonian halakhic supremacy.  
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Chapter 1: “Every Desire that you have from the Kingdom”: Jewish Politics in the Late Abbasid 
Caliphate, 908-942 
 
In 928, Sa ʿadya b. Yosef al-Fayyūmi ascended to the gaonate of the Yeshiva of Sura 
(Mata Mahṣīya) in Baghdad. As one of his first acts in office, he composed a missive to Jewish 
communities residing abroad in Fustat, Egypt on behalf of the yeshiva. In the letter, he 
emphasized the yeshiva’s religious authority and its responsibility to promulgate Jewish law by 
declaring, “We are commanded to write to you letters of warnings and admonishments to arouse 
your hearts and to awaken your passing thoughts to the commandments of the Lord our God.” 1 
In this way, Sa ʿadya followed in the tradition of previous geonim who tried to promote proper 
observance of Jewish law through the dissemination of halakhic writings among their followers. 
But he also differed from his predecessors in his understanding of the function of the yeshiva. 
For Saʿadya, the yeshiva was not only a center of religious authority, but also a conduit to 
political power with direct links to state officials, a position that he made explicit at the end of 
his letter: 
And every desire and request that you have from the kingdom inform us for then 
we will direct [them] to the masters of the important houses that are in Baghdad, 
that we sit between them, the sons of Mar Netịra and the sons of Mar Aharon … 
and thus they will sit for you in front of the king (caliph).2 
 
In this regard, Saʿadya was not unique; nearly every gaon or exilarch in the early tenth century 
eagerly cultivated relationships with the Abbasid state. 
On the one hand, these close ties between Jewish communal leaders and state officials are 
indicative of Jewish integration into mainstream Abbasid political culture, a situation reflected in 
                                                          
1 Bodl. MS Heb.c.13.22. Moshe Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael [Hebrew], 4 vols. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 
the Ministry of Defense, and the Bialik Institute, 1997), doc. 8.  
2 Ibid.  
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contemporaneous Jewish and Muslim sources. Changes in Abbasid political life in the early tenth 
century gave Jews more access to state power than ever before. In particular, wealthy Jewish 
merchants came to play prominent roles in the financial administration of the caliphate.3 Urban 
Jews began to communicate overwhelmingly in Arabic, the language of the Islamic government, 
rather than their ancestral Aramaic.4 Jewish communal officials relied on their ties to the 
government to enforce their rulings.  
On the other hand, the ease with which Saʿadya and his contemporaries invoked their 
relations with the state is surprising. The geonim inherited a rabbinic legal tradition that, at best, 
was skeptical of relations with non-Jewish authorities. In Late Antiquity, the rabbis of the 
Talmud criticized the exilarch for his involvement in politics. Indeed, they derived their own 
authority from their separation from such Jewish figures more associated with state power as the 
exilarch.5 Earlier geonim, living a century before Sa ʿadya, included clauses in their responsa 
asking that God protect their followers from “evil rule,” indicating a rather pessimistic view of 
gentile authorities.6 Such later Jewish sources as Sherira Gaon’s letter (late-tenth century) also 
advanced this topos by arguing that the exilarchs were corrupted through their connection to 
secular power.  
Why then were Jewish communal leaders in the early tenth-century more open to 
involvement with the state than their forebears and their successors, and what practical 
implications did this have for Jewish political life? This chapter examines Jewish political 
culture in the first half of the tenth century, during the apotheosis of the Abbasid caliphate. It 
                                                          
3 Walter Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam (New York: Ktav, 1969), 1-44. 
4 On the transition from Aramaic to Arabic and Hebrew among tenth-century Jews, see Rina Drory, Models and 
Contacts: Arabic Literature and Its Impact on Medieval Jewish Culture (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 
5 See Geoffrey Herman, A Prince Without a Kingdom: The Exilarch in the Sasanian Era (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2012), esp. 181-190 and 217-238. 
6 See, e.g., Seder Rav ʿAmram Gaon (Jerusalem: 1912), 1.  
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begins with an explanation of the political developments that fostered the rise of a new group of 
Jewish financial administrators within the Abbasid governing bureaucracy. Next, it considers 
how these Jewish government officials made alliances with Jewish communal officials, raising 
their prestige within the Jewish community while, at the same time, challenging the traditional 
structure of Jewish communal authority. Then, it examines the ways in which Jewish leaders in 
the early tenth century used their close relations with the Abbasid state to project their own 
authority.  
 
Part I: Tenth Century Political Developments and the Rise of the Jahbadhs 
At the beginning of the tenth century, the Abbasid Caliphate experienced a temporary 
revival. The caliph, who had been exiled to Samarra and effectively stripped of his power by the 
army, returned to Baghdad in 892 and built a new, lavish palace complex. Now in command of 
the army, he squelched a revolt in southern Iraq and successfully repelled Bedouin invaders. He 
also restored direct authority in Egypt and Syria and tribute relations with proxy dynasties in 
Persia.7 The caliph al-Muqtadir (r. 908-932) greatly expanded and centralized the Abbasid 
bureaucracy. Whereas under the early Abbasids, the caliph took an active role in governing, 
personally receiving petitions from his subjects and meeting with high-ranking officials, by the 
tenth century, the caliph had retreated into the palace and stopped meeting with the heads of 
various departments himself. Viziers managed his administration. As Maaike van Berkel 
explains, the vizier acted as a “Janus figure”: he functioned as both a personal servant to the 
caliph and as a political leader.8 Court chroniclers described the position of vizier as precarious. 
                                                          
7 Maaike van Berkel, Nadia Maria El Ceikh, Hugh Kennedy, and Letizia Osti, Crisis and Continuity in the Abbasid 
Court: Formal and Informal Politics in the Caliphate of Al-Muqtadir (295-320/908-32) (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 13-48. 
8 Ibid., 66. 
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The vizier needed to do everything in his power to maintain the favor of the caliph since the 
caliph could dismiss him and confiscate all of his property at any time for any reason. The 
moment that a vizier rose to great power, his political rivals conspired against him to discredit 
him in the eyes of the caliph; often, a once-powerful vizier found himself destitute.  
High-level officials thus needed places to safeguard and conceal their own assets, many 
of which were probably obtained through less-than-legal means—a sort of insurance policy—in 
case they lost favor with the caliph and he seized their property.9 At the same time, the expansion 
of the empire and the bureaucracy required a more sophisticated system of currency regulation, 
money transport, and credit.10 Many different coins of many different values circulated 
throughout the empire, and the state needed to convert them to the same currency when they 
were deposited in centralized treasuries. Moreover, the caliph’s treasury was seldom sufficient to 
cover all of the expenses of governing the empire, so viziers often needed to procure large sums 
of money in order to pay provincial administrators and launch military campaigns.  
These needs led to the development of a new position in the Abbasid bureaucracy: the 
jahbadh (collector or court banker). Jahbadhs presided over large networks of traders and 
bankers throughout the empire, and, within these networks, they used letters of credit to facilitate 
the transport of large amounts of capital. They granted loans to state officials: when the state 
needed an advance on money, a vizier would go to a jahbadh and demand that he loan him the 
                                                          
9 According to Arabic chroniclers, embezzlement of state funds was a widespread practice among Abbasid officials, 
and they assumed that most officials possessed illegal monies. The sources praised those viziers who pursued 
corrupt officials. An individual found guilty of embezzlement was stripped of his position, imprisoned, and forced to 
surrender his assets. Still, the act of embezzlement did not preclude him from holding a high-level position at court 
in the future, and many of the embezzlement trials were probably politically motivated. See Maaike Van Berkel, 
“Embezzlement and Reimbursement: Disciplining Officials in Abbāsid Baghdad (8th-10th centuries A.D.),” 
International Journal of Public Administration 34, no. 11 (2011): 712-719. 
10 Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 4. 
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money. 11 Viziers also deposited some of their assets with jahbadhs, and they relied on the 
jahbadhs to conceal these funds from the state to the extent of their ability. In 918, the budget of 
the caliphate included a māl al-jahābadha, a fee paid to the jahbadhs in exchange for their 
services. Contemporaneous sources attest to a dīwān al-jahābadha, or office of the jahbadhs, 
from 928 onwards.12  
The position of jahbadh was not restricted by religion, and, according to Arabic 
chroniclers, Muslims, Christians, and Jews all served as jahbadhs. Although Christians and 
Muslims had long played prominent roles in the Abbasid bureaucracy, the participation of Jews 
in this manner was unprecedented.13 Yet by the early tenth century, some Jews presided over 
powerful long-distance trade networks with access to large amounts of capital, positioning 
themselves to serve as jahbadhs. The officials Sa ʿadya mentioned in his letter— “the sons of 
Mar Netịra and the sons of Mar Aharon”—were members of two prominent Jewish jahbadh 
families explicitly referred to in Arabic sources.14 According to the Book of Viziers, a list of 
forms of address for the officials of Al-Muqtadir’s court, their fathers, Yūsuf b. Fīnhạ̄s and 
Aharon b. ʿAmrām, received the honorary title Jahābadha al-Ḥadṛa, “the jahbadhs of the 
caliph.” Only one other jahbadh, a Christian, received this title.15 
Jahbadhs occupied a unique space within the Abbasid bureaucracy. They did not serve as 
members of the caliph’s household, and I am not aware of a single account of a meeting between 
                                                          
11 Contemporaneous Arabic chroniclers described the loan agreements in rather one-sided terms. A vizier typically 
ordered, rather than requested, a jahbadh to issue him a loan. Sometimes the jahbadh refused, but most often he 
eventually agreed to the terms imposed on him. For examples of loan agreements between Jewish jahbadhs and 
Muslim viziers, see the sources cited by Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 21-25. 
12 Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 4-5. 
13 For an overview of Christians employed in the Abbasid bureaucracy, see Van Berkel et al., Crisis and Continuity 
in the Abbasid Court, 87-110. 
14 Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 34-44. 
15 Ibid., 9. 
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a jahbadh and the caliph al-Muqtadir himself.16 Most likely, jahbadhs were not ranked high 
enough to be granted an audience with the caliph in his inner chamber.17 Instead, they were most 
closely bound to viziers through ties of reciprocity: jahbadhs depended on the viziers to deposit 
money with them and to pay back loans with interest, while viziers depended on jahbadhs to 
both shield their personal assets from the state and grant them substantial loans whenever the 
state required.18  
Most of our information on Jewish jahbadhs comes from the works of al-Tanūkhī (c. 
971), a judge in Baghdad who recorded a large collection of stories about courtly life that he 
claimed to have heard directly from “learned, literary, and otherwise excellent sheikhs.”19 He 
intended the work to serve as a veiled critique of the corruption of the society in which he lived, 
and he used narratives about court bureaucrats from a few decades earlier to impart moral 
lessons to his readers. 
According to al-Tanūkhī, the position of jahbadh at court was not tied to the fate of 
individual viziers. The caliph al-Muqtadir went through fifteen viziers throughout his twenty-five 
year reign, but his two Jewish jahbadhs, Yūsuf b. Fīnhạ̄s and Hārūn20 b. ʿAmrām, “were never 
dismissed until their death.” According al-Tanūkhī, this was because their dismissal could result 
in the collapse of the caliphate’s financial system: 
The Caliph [al-Muqtadir] did not want to dismiss them in order to uphold the 
dignity of the office of the jahbadh in the eyes of the merchants so that the 
merchants might be ready to lend their money through the jahbadh in necessary. 
Were a jahbadh to be dismissed and another appointed in his place with whom the 
                                                          
16 A Judeo-Arabic history of the Netịra family refers to a meeting between Netịra and the caliph, but this account is 
almost certainly legendary. See Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 11. 
17 On the link between the physical shape of the Abbasid palace and access to the caliph, see Lestizia Osti, “Abbasid 
Intrigues: Competing for Influence at the Caliph’s Court,” Al-Masaq 20, no.1 (2008): 5-15.  
18 Most viziers had their own personal money managers, and they tried to shield their assets by not recording them in 
books. Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 15. 
19 Tanūkhī, I, 1. 
20 Arabic equivalent of the Hebrew Aharon. 
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merchants had not yet had any dealings the business of the caliph would come to a 
standstill.21 
 
Thus, it was the jahbadhs’ bonds of trust and loyalty with many different merchants throughout 
(and possibly even outside of) the caliphate that made them so valuable to the Abbasid 
administration. These professional networks lasted across generations. Saʿadya’s letter indicates 
that the sons and grandsons of these two officials (the sons of Netịra and the sons of Aharon b. 
ʿAmram) presided over the same mercantile networks after their fathers’ deaths and maintained 
their privileged positions in Abbasid administration. Although al-Tanūkhī explicitly identified 
the jahbadhs’ religious status, he did not consider this religious identification particularly 
relevant to their actions. Instead, he characterized the Jewish jahbadhs as savvy, prudent officials 
who successfully maintained alliances with rival officials. One of the figures that he discussed 
was none other than the Jahbadh Sahl b. Nazị̄r, known in Jewish sources as Sahl b. Netịra, and 
one of the sons of Netịra mentioned in Sa ʿadya’s letter. 
According to al-Tanūkhī, after the vizier ʿUbayd-allāh b. Sulayman was deposed by the 
caliph and imprisoned, the Jewish Jahbadh Sahḷ b. Nazị̄r had an inkling that the vizier would be 
promoted again. He sent a hundred dinars to the family of the disgraced vizier every month while 
he was in prison. Sahḷ’s prediction came true: Ubayd-allāh was released from prison and 
elevated to the vizierate once more. Ubayd-allāh arrested the kātib Jarādah and seized his money 
(possibly in retaliation for Jarādah’s role in his previous misfortunes). Jarādah, however, had 
done Sahl “many a kindness” in the past, so he again sent one hundred dinars to the discredited 
vizier’s family every month while he was in prison. When the vizier found out that Sahl was 
                                                          
21 Al-Tanūkhī, Nishwār al-Muhạ̄dara Vol. II, ed. D.S. Margoliouth (Damascus: 1930), 85. The translation is found 
in Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 28. 
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sending money to Jarādah’s family, he was incensed. In response, Sahl gingerly reminded the 
vizier of his service to him when he was in the same position: 
O Vizier, I have not been doing this, neither would I venture on such a proceeding. 
The man who has been doing this is a man who transmitted a hundred dinars 
monthly to [your family] in recognition of the benefits which [you] had conferred 
upon him; and in recognition of benefits conferred on him by Jarādah has been 
transmitting to Jarādah’s family the same amounts as he formerly sent to [your 
family].22 
 
The vizier then “blushed, hung his head, and kept silence for a time; presently his face began to 
stream with perspiration.” Sahl, at first, regretted having spoken and thought that he would 
surely be arrested. Instead, the vizier “raised his head, and said, ‘You have done well Sahl.’”23 In 
relating this anecdote, Al-Tanūkhī praises Sahl’s actions. Sahl was not duplicitous; rather, he was 
a savvy, prudent, and generous official, a valuable ally who performed favors for those who 
performed favors for him. His ability to remain “above the fray” while maintaining multiple, 
overlapping alliances marked a successful jahbadh.  
Jewish texts characterized jahbadhs in much the same way. A Judeo-Arabic text in honor 
of the Netịra family from the middle of the tenth century, preserved in the Cairo Geniza, 
celebrated Sahl’s “skill in Arabic script and excellence at the art of letter writing (tarsīl),” talents 
that would have been essential for navigating Abbasid political life. The documents went on to 
extoll Sahl as a social networker who cultivated relationships with many rival officials at court: 
Every day [Sahl] rides to the caliph’s palace. He does not take an income from the 
caliph, but rather he pays him 500 mithqāl each year, and he distributes this amount 
to the viziers of the sultan. He did not confiscate a single [mithqāl] from this sum 
[for himself]. … He also performs acts of kindness for the gentiles, through charity 
[sạdāqa] and gifts. He buys around 500 garments, more or less, and disperses them 
among the gentiles, and he also sends money to Kufa, distributing it to the ʿAlids 
and the Hashemites. In doing this, he followed after the model of his father.24 
                                                          
22 Translated by D. S. Margoliouth, The Table-Talk of a Mesopotamian Judge (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 
1922). 
23 Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 14. 




Accepting income from the state would have put Sahl at risk of depending upon a single political 
figure at court whom, should the caliph become angry with him, would have meant his ruin. At 
the same time, an official might at some point accuse him of taking more money than he was 
entitled to, leading to his downfall. Giving money to the caliph and all of his viziers would 
ensure that no one conspired against him. By donating to the ʿAlids and the Hashemites, many of 
whom served as intercessors between the government and local officials, Sahl ingratiated himself 
with local elites throughout Abbasid territory. Most Abbasid viziers also made sure to give 
money to the ʿAlids.25 In this way, Sahl curried favor with diverse forms of political power 
throughout the region and positioned himself as a successful jahbadh. 
 
The Jahbadhs as Dhimmīs 
Although the position of jahbadh was not restricted to any single religious group, the 
majority of known jahbadhs from the first half of the tenth century appear to have been non-
Muslim (dhimmīs).26 Indeed, wealthy dhimmīs were well-situated to become successful 
jahbadhs, and structural features of dhimmī communities likely helped to facilitate their rise. 
Because jahbadhs rose to prominence in the Abbasid bureaucracy by safeguarding the assets of 
viziers and concealing them from other state officials, it was in a vizier’s interest to entrust his 
assets to someone who was part of a different community with fewer ties to his own. As a result, 
                                                          
25 M. A. Pomerantz, “Licit Magic and Divine Grace: The Life and Letters of al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995),” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago: 2010), 126. 
26 Of the ten jahbadhs active in the first half of the tenth century that Fischel identified, four have discernably Jewish 
names: Hārun b. ʿImrān, Yusuf b. Fīnhạ̄s, Sahl b. Nazị̄r,and Isrāʾīl b. Sạlih.̣ Three have explicitly Christian names: 
Ibrāhīm b. Yūhạnnā, Zakariyyā b. Yūhạnnā, Nikolas b. Andūna, and Merkūr b. Shanūda, and another, Ibrahīm b. 
Ayyūb, the head of the dīwān al-jahbadha is explicitly identified as a Christian. It is unclear whether Jahbadh 
Ibrāhīm b. Ahṃad b. Idrīs was Muslim. Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 5. 
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fewer individuals affiliated with a vizier’s Muslim enemies would have been able to inform on 
him to the state or testify about his assets.  
But what if a dhimmī jahbadh violated his agreement with a vizier whose money he was 
safeguarding? Because the viziers needed to hide their assets from the state, they could not 
appeal to Muslim courts to rectify the situation. Instead, as this section will demonstrate, Muslim 
viziers appealed to dhimmī communal officials, compelling them to excommunicate (or threaten 
to excommunicate) the jahbadh in question unless he abided by the agreement.27  
According to Jewish sources, Muslim officials often pressured dhimmi ̄ communal 
officials to excommunicate their coreligionists. The geonim referred to this possibility in 
multiple legal rulings (responsa) and reluctantly ruled that it was impossible to refuse to issue a 
ban of excommunication in response to a demand from a non-Jewish official: 
[Regarding] a king or authority or head of customs who orders a community (qahal) 
to issue a ban of excommunication for his needs and belongings, and desires to 
punish or take money from a Jew, and it is impossible not to issue the ban of 
excommunication because of force. This ban that is issued is not total, and there is 
no meaning to it.28 
 
The responsum tried to create a loophole to avoid imposing an actual ban by having Jewish 
leaders refrain from pronouncing the exact rabbinic legal formula of excommunication. Still, this 
responsum and others like it indicate that this practice was far from uncommon. 
                                                          
27 In this way, Jewish communal institutions may have functioned as enforcement mechanisms within an 
underground economy for Muslim officials. There is a large literature on alternative forms of governance for 
individuals without access to effective government institutions, including organized crime and prison gangs. See, 
e.g., David Skarbek, “Prison Gangs, Norms, and Organizations,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
82, no.1 (2012): 702-716 and the sources cited therein.   
28 Most responsa from before the eleventh century were transmitted anonymously, and thus it is difficult to date 
them with any certainty. Still, I suggest that, even if these responsa were written before the tenth century, the 
individuals that this chapter is dealing with understood these responsa as part of their inherited tradition. All of the 
responsa cited in this dissertation were accessed through the Bar Ilan Responsa Project Online. שערי  -תשובות הגאונים 
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Al-Tanūkhī described the act of excommunicating (or threatening to excommunicate) 
dhimmī officials as a clever, effective method of governing. He illustrated its power through an 
anecdote in his Nishwār al-Muhādhara attributed to the qādị̄, Abū Bakr Muhammad b. ʿAbd-
allāh. According to Abū Bakr, during the vizierate of ʿAlī b. ʾIsā, two new Byzantine emperors 
ascended to the throne and began to oppress Muslim prisoners of war and force them to convert 
to Christianity. This “deeply distressed” the vizier, and he was at a loss for what to do: “This is 
not a matter with which I can deal, for it is not within the competence of our sultan nor of the 
caliph, neither would they obey me. Otherwise I should have laid out money in equipping a force 
with all earnest for the invasion of Constantinople!” he exclaimed to the qādi ̄.29 The qādi ̄, 
however, had an ingenious plan. He advised the vizier:  
The Christians have a potentate in Antioch who is called Patriarch and another in 
Jerusalem called Catholicos. The authority of these two extends over the whole 
Byzantine Empire, so that at times they have excommunicated the Emperor himself 
or released him from excommunication, and these sentences have been recognized. 
The Byzantines hold that disobedience to these two potentates is heresy and that no 
Emperor can be properly installed in the Byzantine capital without their approval, 
without his paying homage to them and being promoted by them. Now the two 
cities are within our empire and these persons are under our protection. The viziers 
should write to the governors of the cities to summon them and inform them of the 
treatment accorded to the captives, which is contrary to their doctrines, and that if 
a stop be not put to it they (the Patriarch and the Catholicos) will be held responsible. 
Let him then see what answer he will receive. 
 
The vizier did this, and the Patriarch and the Catholicos wrote a letter to the emperors 
threatening to excommunicate them unless they improved the prisoners’ treatment: 
By your treatment of the captives you have violated the Christian religion. You 
have no right to treat them thus, seeing that such conduct is contrary to the precepts 
of Christ. … Either you shall put a stop to this treatment and instead treat them with 
kindness and cease demanding that they should become Christian, or we from our 
two thrones shall curse and excommunicate you. 
 
                                                          
29 The translator suggested that this was a manuscript error, since these events took place before there was a separate 
sultan and caliph in Baghdad. 
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The threat had the desired effect. A messenger reported that the Byzantines had stopped 
oppressing the Muslim prisoners. When the prisoners heard that the vizier was responsible for 
alleviating their plight, “they proceeded to lavish blessings” on him.30  
The anecdote is almost certainly fictional. There is no additional record of this event, and 
the story raises questions. Why did the vizier assume that the caliph would not be capable of or 
interested in assisting the prisoners? After all, as commander of the faithful, the caliph would 
have had a religious obligation to protect his fellow Muslims from harm at the hands of a foreign 
power. Indeed, at the end of the story, the qādị̄ praised the vizier for his assistance, telling him 
that, because of his good deed in helping the prisoners, he “will secure [God’s] reward in the 
future life.” Why would the caliph not have wanted to advance his own virtue in relation to his 
subjects by improving their conditions in captivity?  
The vizier’s inability or refusal to involve the caliph suggests that the vizier was trying to 
keep a secret from him—and that the story was never actually about Muslim prisoners of war. 
Throughout his writings, al-Tanūkhī used anecdotes from the past in order to teach his 
contemporaries how to be successful and prudent politicians. This particular story illustrated the 
effectiveness of appealing to dhimmī legal authorities when one needed to conceal one’s 
activities or financial holdings. In this narrative, however, a Muslim vizier’s appeal to a dhimmī 
official was not a duplicitous scheme for concealing his activities from the state. It was a way for 
him to fulfill his religious obligations.   
 
The Jahbadhs as Jews31 
                                                          
30 Table-Talk I, 32-34. (30-33). 
31 This section focuses specifically on Jewish legal texts, and it extrapolates about the writing system of Jews based 




As members of a dhimmī community with its own language and legal system, Jews were 
uniquely well-positioned to assist viziers in concealing assets from the authorities. For one thing, 
Jewish merchants almost certainly kept records of their transactions in Hebrew letters.32 When a 
vizier was dismissed from service, the state confiscated all of his documents in order to locate 
and seize all his assets.33 A Muslim official would not have been able to read records of assets 
kept by Jews. He would have had to call on a Jew to interpret the documents and testify 
regarding the amount of money specified in them. 
Jewish law, however, strongly prohibited informing on one’s fellow Jew for the benefit 
of a non-Jew. According to the Talmud, an informer (moser) should be put to death, and he will 
suffer for his crime for eternity. This principle applied, even when the individual in question had 
informed on a Jewish “robber” who was, in fact, guilty. Although the geonim did not officially 
advocate the death penalty for informers (under Abbasid rule dhimmīs did not have the power to 
carry out capital punishment), they strongly condemned the act and openly discouraged it.  
One responsum tried to discourage the act of informing by warning that someone who 
informs on his fellow Jew to the authorities with the result of excommunication of the 
individualshould not expect favors from the community in the future. It cautions that “there is no 
mercy for one who expels and bans and requests from us to secure for him an act of kindness and 
to bless him. He stands in his faith and mercy on his heirs, and no man will write about him 
among the faithful of the land.”34 Other responsa encourage an informer’s blood relatives to kill 
                                                          
32 Fischel thought that this was a possibility, but it seems particularly likely since so many of these Jews were in the 
process of concealing Muslim assets and most viziers did not keep written records of their financial holdings. 
Moreover, Geniza evidence indicates that Jewish merchants wrote primarily in Judeo-Arabic, and it is likely that 
many would not have been able to write in Arabic letters. 
33 See Van Berkel, “Embezzlement and Reimbursement;” Idem., “The Vizier and the Harem Stewardess: Mediation 
in a Discharge Case at the court of Al-Muqtadir,” Abbasid Studies II, ed. John Nawas (Leuven: Orientalia 
Lovaniensia Analekta, 2010), 303-318. 
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him. 35 The geonim also provided a recourse for an individual who had been reported to the 
authorities: he was entitled to compensation for the property damage that he suffered, and he 
could obtain a letter from the Jewish court to present to the Islamic court in case the matter arose 
again.36  
Many geonic responsa address scenarios in which governmental authorities compelled a 
Jew to testify under oath regarding “stolen” money that had been deposited with a Jew, very 
likely in the context of disciplinary procedures against Abbasid viziers. For example, one 
community asked,  
An oath that a king or authority or customs official requires is forbidden for a Jew 
to swear, but [what about the case of] a king who demands money from a Jew that 
had been stolen, and wants to know where this individual or his money is, where it 
was deposited, or who deposited it with him? 
 
The question itself attests to Jews sometimes holding possession of money that was considered 
“stolen” and officials trying to track down this money in order to confiscate it. The gaon 
responded forcefully, declaring both that the act of testifying was in violation of Jewish law and 
that one who testified should be excommunicated: 
Do not say to the king, “[The money] is this amount.” [The one who testifies] will 
be excommunicated to the king, and the community will answer amen. 37 And do 
not deliver a Jew or his money that came from a robber or a thief. And also R. 
Nahṣhon says, ‘It is forbidden for a community to receive charity (sẹdaqa) from a 
non-Jew, and one who receives money from him is not considered to be marked for 
eternal blessing.’38  
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36 Teshuvot Hageonim, Koronel #333 
 The editor interpreted melekh (king) here as referring to the head of the yeshiva, and thus the sentence would .למלך 37
read “he will be excommunicated by the head of the yeshiva.” Yet in the same sentence, the term melekh is used 
only to refer to a gentile king. I suggest, rather, that the term should be translated as “to the king,” meaning that the 
informer will be excommunicated from the Jewish community and would have to depend on the protection of the 
gentile authorities. Cf. the Chronicle of Natan ha-Bavli, in which the exilarch Uqba is banned from Baghdad, and 
warned that if he returned, “Islam would be incumbent upon him.”  
38 Teshuvot Hageonim, Koronel, #26 
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Additionally, according to this gaon, any Jew who received money from a non-Jew, probably in 
this case referring to bribe money, would suffer divine punishment.  
The extent to which Jews actually obeyed geonic rulings is unclear. Undoubtedly, many 
openly flouted geonic rulings and informed on Jews to the government. Indeed, it is unlikely that 
the geonim would have issued so many rulings against the practice of informing if the issue 
never came up. Still, the responsa indicate that this principle, rooted in the Talmud, were central 
to Jewish law as medieval Jews would have understood it. A general reluctance to inform on 
fellow Jews, coupled with communal sanctions against informers, likely helped jahbadhs in their 
roles safeguarding the assets of Muslim viziers.  
The jahbadhs thus had a vested interest in cultivating relations with the Babylonian 
geonim in order to ensure that the geonim would protect their interests by imposing sanctions on 
Jews who informed on them. Muslim viziers would then have been obligated to perform favors 
for the Jewish jahbadhs who protected their property. As the next section argues, the power and 
prestige of Jewish jahbadhs within the Abbasid court buttressed their power and prestige within 
the Jewish community. Throughout the tenth century, Jewish jahbadhs played central roles in 
Jewish communal politics, functioning as intermediaries between Jewish communal leadership 
and the Abbasid state.  
 
Part II: Jewish Jahbadhs as Intercessors between Jews and the State 
Sa ʿadya’s letter suggests another function for the court bankers: as presenters of petitions 
from Jews before the government. The caliph al-Muqtadir actively encouraged the submission of 
petitions in special Mazạ̄lim courts presided over by viziers. By addressing his subjects’ 
grievances, the caliph promoted his own goodness in relation to corrupt officials. In bringing 
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petitions before the caliph, Jews demonstrated their loyalty to the caliph in exactly the same way 
as his other subjects, and the caliph used Jews to exercise his power in much the same way that 
he used his Muslim subjects. Most Jews in Baghdad, whose families had communicated 
overwhelmingly in Aramaic only a few generations before, probably did not possess the requisite 
Arabic cultural and linguistic knowledge to navigate the world of the Abbasid court on their 
own. They almost certainly relied on the small numbers of Jewish jahbadhs who did possess 
specialized knowledge of Arabic and courtly protocol to intercede on their behalf before the 
government. 
The jahbadhs and Jewish communal officials in Baghdad eagerly cultivated mutually-
beneficial relations with each other during the early tenth century. By allying themselves with 
rabbinic leadership, the jahbadhs ensured that Jewish communal leaders would protect their 
financial interests and impose sanctions on Jews who did not pay back loans or informed on 
them. At the same time, by allying themselves with the jahbadhs, Jewish communal leaders 
ensured that the state would honor the rulings that they issued and back them up with force, if 
necessary. Jewish communal leaders also hoped to use their alliances with jahbadhs to limit 
unregulated contact between the Jews under their jurisdiction and the state. 39 By encouraging 
Jews to submit petitions only through jahbadhs affiliated with the Yeshiva of Sura, Sa‘adya tried 
to ensure that only petitions favorable to his own faction would be conveyed to the government.  
Yet Saʿadya was by no means the only Jewish communal leader who tried to monopolize 
the loyalty of Baghdad’s Jews. During al-Muqtadir’s rule, rival geonim and exilarchs from all 
over Abbasid territory wrested control over the caliphate’s Jews, and all of them used their 
                                                          
39 Ellis Rivkin identifies the tenth century as a turning point in the structure of Jewish communal relations, but he 
does not consider the role of the state in framing these relations. Ellis Rivkin, “The Saadia-David ben Zakkay 
Controversy: A Structural Analysis,” in Studies and Essays in Honor of Abraham A. Neuman, ed. Meir Ben-Horin, 
Bernard D. Weinryb, Solomon Zeitlin. (Leiden: Brill, 1962): 388-423. 
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alliances with Jewish government officials to petition against their rivals. This section will 
analyze the involvement of the Abbasid state in three major Jewish intra-communal conflicts that 
took place during the first half of the tenth century, two of which were also alluded to in non-
Jewish sources. All involved Jewish jahbadhs and were fought in the shadow of the Abbasid 
palace.   
 
 
Kohen Sẹdeq vs. Mevasher ha-Kohen, 917-922 
In 917, there was a disagreement over who should be appointed as the next Gaon of 
Pumbedita. The Babylonian Exilarch, David b. Zakkay, wanted Kohen Sẹdeq. He enlisted the 
support of Saʿadya b. Yosef al-Fayyumi, who was then affiliated with the yeshiva of Palestine. 
Aharon b. ʿAmram, the Jewish jahbadh discussed in Arabic court chronicles, however, wanted to 
appoint Mevasher ha-Kohen b. Qimoy. Mevasher’s faction enlisted the help of Aharon b. Meʾir, 
the gaon of Palestine. The yeshiva was divided between followers of Kohen Sẹdeq and followers 
of Mevasher for the next five years (until August of 922), when an agreement was reached that 
allowed both men to jointly hold the position. They abided by this agreement until Mevasher’s 
death in December of the same year. Kohen Sẹdeq continued as the sole Gaon of Pumbedita until 
his death in 935.  
Sherira Gaon briefly described this conflict in his Circular Letter (c. 986), the most 
complete contemporaneous institutional history of the yeshivot. He did not specify the reasons 
why the various officials preferred different candidates. It appears, however, that Aharon b. 
ʿAmram, a newly powerful court banker, hoped to augment his own influence in Jewish 
communal affairs by opposing the exilarch, who had previously acted as the main intercessor 
between the community and the government. During that time, Mevasher appointed Aharon b. 
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Yosef, also known as Sarjado (son-in-law of Aharon b. ʿAmram’s son) to the First Row of the 
Academy of Pumbedita, probably to thank Aharon for his political support. 40 Year later, Aharon 
b. Yosef became gaon of Pumbedita even though, according to Sherira, “he was not from a 
rabbinic family but from among the merchants.”41 
This was not the first time that there was a controversy over the selection of a gaon, nor 
was it the first time that two individuals within the yeshivot held the same position while 
refusing to accept each other’s authority. Yet this conflict was different. Most notably, the 
involvement of a Jewish jahbadh in yeshiva politics was unprecedented, and Mevasher’s 
appointment of Aharon b. Yosef even more so. It marked the first time that an individual without 
former ties to the yeshivot officially joined the yeshiva hierarchy. Yet from then on, most 
sources indicate that Jewish court bankers played central roles in yeshiva politics, including 
taking part in deliberations over religious practice.  
  
The Calendar Controversy—921-923  
Between 921 and 923, the Jewish community of the Islamic world was divided over the 
issue of calculating the calendar. The Palestinians, led by the Palestinian Gaon Aharon b. Meʾir, 
calculated that Passover would begin on a Sunday in 921, while the Babylonians calculated that 
it would begin on a Tuesday.42 At its core, however, it was a struggle over authority between 
                                                          
40 B.M. Lewin, ed., Sefer Iggeret Rav Sherira Gaon (Haifa, 1921), 40.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Both the Palestinians and the Babylonians used the past to legitimate their respective authorities to calculate the 
calendar. The Palestinians claimed that, since ancient times, they had the right to calculate the calendar. They 
substantiated this assertion by citing a Talmudic ban against intercalating outside of the land of Israel, and they 
insisted that since antiquity, the Babylonians had followed Palestinian calendrical decisions that were announced on 
the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. The Babylonians disagreed, declaring that while they had followed in this practice 
in earlier generations, at one point one of their sages had gone to Palestine and learned the proper method of 
intercalation and that, from then on, Babylonia had calculated the calendar independently. For further explanation of 
the technical halakhic issues involved in intercalation, see Sacha Stern, Calendar and Community: A History of the 
Jewish Calendar, Second Century BCE-Tenth Century CE (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 265ff. 
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Jewish leaders in Babylonia and those in Palestine, a controversy that had existed in some form 
since the Abbasid Caliphate united the two territories in 750.  
The fight united previous rivals. Mevasher Gaon and the jahbadh Aharon b. ̔Amrām 
abandoned their former-ally and the gaon of Palestine, Aharon b. Meʾir, and joined together with 
David ben Zakkay and Kohen Sẹdeq to support the Babylonian position.43 Sa ̔adya, although 
ostensibly affiliated with the Yeshiva of Palestine, also supported the Babylonian faction. During 
the next two years, the Babylonians and Palestinians exchanged increasingly vitriolic letters 
advancing their own claims to authority in the matter of intercalation and attacking those of their 
rivals.44 Both parties considered correct calculation of the calendar to be a central religious 
obligation, and they worried about the consequences of each other’s error. When Sa ̒adya wrote 
to three of his students in Egypt regarding the matter, he emphasized that he wanted to prevent “a 
man of the people from erring by desecrating the festivals of God, by eating leavened bread on 
Passover, and by eating, drinking, and doing work on Yom Kippur.”45 Throughout their letters, 
the supporters of the Palestinian position blamed Sa ʿadya for inciting the conflict and leading 
the Babylonians astray.  
Even though the calculation of the calendar was ostensibly a “religious” matter, the 
letters all make reference to the involvement of the Jewish court banker, Aharon b. ̔Amram, in 
supporting the Babylonian position. Ben Meʾir, who had assumed that his former-ally, Aharon 
b. ̔Amram, would support him, wrote of his horror when he received letters from Aharon b. 
ʿAmram in favor of Babylonia: 
                                                          
43 Rivkin, “Saadia-David Ben Zakkai,” 399.  
44 Eleventh -entury copies of these letters were preserved in the Cairo Geniza. They were published by Bornstein in 
18xx, who did not identify the manuscripts that he used. Sacha Stern and Marina Rustow identified the surviving 
manuscripts and are now in the process of preparing a new critical edition of all of the geniza related to the calendar 
controversy. They have kindly given me access to their research notes, which I consulted in writing this section. 
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45 Bornstein, “Mahḷoqet,” 83.  
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We thought that you were standing by the truth until the last letters arrived, those 
that were sent to us by... Aharon ben ̔Amram…And in these (letters) are engraved 
words that cancel out all that was engraved in the first ones…We were hoping that 
good would come from you but evil came instead, and what we feared came upon 
us. You waged battle with us and laid in wait for us so as to shoot us in hiding and 
in the open.46 
 
This clearly demonstrates the involvement of Jewish government officials in internal-Jewish 
debates over religious practice. Was Aharon’s involvement indicative merely of the integration 
of Jewish government officials in rabbinic institutions? Or did Aharon actually use his 
connections to Abbasid political power to appeal to the state on behalf of the Babylonian 
position?  
One might assume that the question of whether Passover should begin on a Sunday or a 
Tuesday would be of little interest to the Abbasid state. Yet new manuscript evidence suggests 
that the ruling authorities did intervene in the conflict. The geniza preserved a significant portion 
of a “Book of the Calendar” written in the high court of the exilarch David ben Zakkay in the 
year 921 (1233 SE).47 The book’s purpose was to ensure that future generations would 
understand the correct method of calculation and would not be led astray by any of Ben Meʾir’s 
writings. The text reveals that, on multiple occasions, the Babylonians considered appealing to 
the state. 
At first, the Babylonians explained that they did not “resolve to get letters from the king 
to remove [Ben Meʾir]” because “[w]e will not be able to destroy all of his writings,” and they 
decided to “leave him alone for the day of vengeance and anger that awaits every inciter.” The 
text thus suggests that this decision not to invoke the power of the state against Ben Meʾir at this 
time had more to do with the futility of using state power to suppress heretical practices than a 
                                                          
46 A. Guillaume, “Further Documents on the Ben Meir Controversy,” Jewish Quarterly Review 5, no. 4 (1915): 543–
557. Stern, Rustow, trans. Manuscript B. 
47 Stern, Rustow, trans. Manuscript G.   
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principled opposition to involving gentile authorities in intra-communal disputes. If anything, the 
assertion that they did not get letters to do away with Ben Meʾir suggests that the writer assumed 
that his readers would wonder why the state had not been invoked. Instead, the Babylonians 
wrote the “Book of the Calendar” to warn the rest of the people against Ben Meʾir’s “wanton and 
devious” actions.  
But after the book was written, according to the Babylonians, “hatred of [Ben Meʾir] 
went into the hearts of all the wise.” Then, according to the text, the government became 
involved and Ben Meʾir no longer commanded any authority over the community: 
The authorities became involved in the case [of Ben Meʾir]. They spoke to the Amīr 
(commander): ‘The land has been delivered into the hands of a fool, woe unto its 
inhabitants! He is giving them water to drink from cisterns, he is tending their flock 
between thorns and nettles, he is making them rest in the heat, in the shadow of a 
cloud, and to an arid place he is leading(?) them, and also setting himself in a way 
that is not good.’48  
 
Who, exactly, was the amīr to whom the people appealed, and which individuals appealed to 
him?  The text does not provide any identifying information. In order to exercise his prerogatives 
as Gaon of Palestine, however, Ben Meʾir would have needed the support of the Abbasid state 
(that had regained control of Palestine and Egypt in 905). Thus, the amīr with the authority to 
remove him would have been a high-level Abbasid official. He might even have been the caliph 
(amīr al-mu ʾminin, or commander of the faithful), himself. As for the question of who, exactly, 
mounted the appeal, it must have been someone with a connection to the highest echelons of the 
Abbasid government: the jahbadh Aharon b. ʿAmrām, himself.  
Indeed, while Ben Meʾir’s letter is full of bitter insults against Sa ʿadya and the other 
Babylonian rabbinic leaders, he described Aharon b. ʿ ʿAmrām in laudatory terms: 
The crown of Israel, our precious and pleasant jewel, his honor, greatness, and holiness, 
Aharon ben ̔Amram (may he rest in Eden) savior of the generation, who has not inclined 
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his ear to turn away from the Lord’s precepts. May the Lord therefore guard him and 
sustain him with happiness in the land and increase for him glory over glory and splendor 
over splendor and sustain for him two dear sons, glorious descendants, virtuous 
grandchildren beloved and pleasant.49 
 
Considering that Aharon b. ̔Amram had just written a letter opposing Ben Meʾir’s stance on the 
calendar, it seems curious that he would bother applying all of these honorifics and blessings to 
his opponent. This can be explained, however, by understanding the significance of Aharon 
b. ̔Amram’s position as a jahbadh. Ben Meʾir would have needed his continued support before 
the state in order to remain Gaon of Palestine. Although Ben Meʾir was not willing to concede to 
the Babylonian position on the calendar, he needed to preserve his relationship with Aharon 
b. ̔ ̔Amram by any means necessary. By asserting that the entire controversy was a result of 
Sa ̔adya and David ben Zakkay (Aharon’s former rivals), while bestowing blessings on Aharon, 
he hoped to salvage their relationship. In this, he was somewhat successful: Ben Meʾir remained 
gaon of Palestine until 926, three years after the calendar controversy concluded. 
Further evidence for the involvement of non-Jewish authorities in the matter comes from 
the Nestorian Christian archbishop and theologian Elias of Nisibis (c. 1019), who referenced the 
controversy in the Syriac section of his bilingual Syriac-Arabic historical chronicle Kitāb al-
Azmina, declaring, “In [the year 921 CE] there befell a division/disagreement between the Jews 
of the West and the Jews of the East concerning the calculation of their festivals.”50 Although 
Elias did not say anything else about the resolution of the conflict or the involvement of the 
authorities in it, Elias’ awareness of the disagreement indicates that this seemingly-internal 
Jewish theological conflict came to the attention of people far outside of the Jewish community.  
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 Overall, the sources indicate that Jews involved the gentile authorities in intra-communal 
disputes, including those which dealt with matters of actual religious practice.51 Moreover, 
Jewish communal officials needed the support of Jewish jahbadhs in order to issue binding legal 
rulings, even on matters related to Jewish ritual practice.  
 
Sa ʿadya-David Ben Zakkay: 930-932/938 
According to multiple Jewish and non-Jewish sources, a dispute broke out between Sa 
ʿadya, Gaon of Sura, and the Exilarch David b. Zakkay in 932. Eventually, this dispute divided 
all of the Jews of Baghdad and was only resolved through the intervention of Jewish jahbadhs 
and the Abbasid authorities. According to the chronicler Natan ha-Bavli (c. 950s), the conflict 
began when two men under the exilarch’s jurisdiction were engaged in a legal dispute with each 
other over their inheritance. They came to an agreement to divide the money and donate a 
portion of it to the exilarch. The exilarch wanted the geonim to sign off on the agreement. 
Saʿadya, however, refused to do so because “he saw in [the documents] things that were not 
correct in his eyes.” Saʿadya tried to avoid disclosing his objection to the document, but 
ultimately, the exilarch’s men forced him to explain. The exilarch was incensed at Saʿadya’s 
refusal to sign, and he sent his son to Saʿadya to try to force him to acquiesce. When the 
exilarch’s son could not contain his frustration, the conflict escalated. Incensed at the disrespect 
shown to his son, the exilarch excommunicated Saʿadya and appointed Yosef b. Yaʿaqov as the 
Gaon of Sura. Saʿadya appointed the exilarch’s brother Hạsan as a counter-exilarch. The conflict 
                                                          
51 That being said, while Babylonian supporters might have succeeded in stripping Ben Meir of his title as Gaon, 
new evidence indicates that the matter of the calendar was far from resolved. There is evidence for alternative 
calculations of the calendar as late as 1094. See Marina Rustow & Sacha Stern, “The Jewish Calendar Controversy 
of 921-922: Reconstructing the Manuscripts and the Transmission History, in Time, Astronomy, and Calendars in 
the Jewish Tradition, ed. Sacha Stern and Charles Burnett (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 81-82. 
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divided the entire Jewish community of Baghdad; it was ultimately resolved through the 
involvement of Abbasid authorities.  
Natan Ha-Bavli was explicit about the role played by court bankers, particularly a certain 
Ibn Sarjādo, in advocating on behalf of both factions before the state: 
All of the rich men of Baghdad (a reference to the court bankers) and the students 
of the yeshiva and the courtiers supported Rav Saʿadya with bribes and by 
advocating his cause in front of the king and his ministers and his advisors. And in 
Baghdad there was one important man and his name was Kelev52 b. Sargado who 
helped the exilarch; he was a rich man, and he gave 60 silver coins from his own 
money to remove Rav Saʿadya from his place. But he could not do this since 
because Saʿadya had the support of the sons of Netịra and all of the rich men of 
Baghdad.53  
 
In this way, Jewish court bankers impacted internal Jewish communal politics. Saʿadya was able 
to remain in his position because he commanded the loyalties of the majority of Jewish courtiers, 
but he could not entirely do away with David ben Zakkay because of Aharon b. Sargado’s 
counter-appeals to the state. 
Portions of Ibn Sargado’s polemic against Saʿadya and David ben Zakkay’s letter 
excommunicating him were preserved in a Karaite manuscript found in the Firkovitch collection 
in St. Petersburg and published by A. Harkavy.54 The information in Ibn Sarjādo’s polemic is 
consistent with much of Natan’s account, particularly regarding the alliance between Ben 
Sargado and the exilarch and both parties’ recourse to state power. In the document, Ben 
Sargado accuses Saʿadya of desecrating the Sabbath in order to bribe a government official 
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53 Neubauer, MJC II, 80 
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named Mubarak to install Hạsan, the exilarch’s brother, as exilarch (The Arabic text is in bold, 
the Hebrew in regular font): 
One day [Sa ‘adya] went out with Hạsan the brother of the exilarch to the 
house of Mūbarak (presumably, a government official) and this was witnessed 
by most of the Jews of Baghdad. And this, he said, this matter resulted in many 
beatings to Israel from the faction of the governors for weeks and months. And he 
desecrated the name [of God] and also the Sabbaths by bringing gifts at the least to 
the deputies on [that] day.55  
 
Sa ʿadya’s petitioning of the government, the exilarch declared in his letter of excommunication, 
had created all sorts of problems for the Jewish community. He described Sa ‘adya as: 
One who desecrates the name of heaven with publicity and makes and incites a 
great controversy in Israel. He sent quarrels between us and Hạsan [my] brother 
and played me such that he caused a controversy in Israel that resulted in a 
cancellation of law and distortions of law, and hatred and jealously between brother 
and brother, and man and his neighbor, by castrating them at the hand of the rulers 
and by imprisoning them in jail.56  
 
The exilarch then attacked Saʿadya’s lineage. He claimed that Saʿadya had been lying about his 
ancestry. He was not, as he claimed, a descendent of the tribe of the biblical patriarch Judah, but 
rather “a son of resident aliens and his fathers were circumcised and immersed” (meaning that 
his ancestors were converts). The exilarch continued, describing Saʿadya as “a vile person 
without a name and his fathers are comparable to sheepdogs.” 57 All of these accusations—
desecrating the Sabbath, appealing to the government to advance his own position, and being 
from a non-noble lineage —were intended to undermine Saʿadya’s legitimacy as gaon and 
Hạsan’s legitimacy as exilarch.58 Saʿadya’s supporters employed similar insults against the 
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exilarch’s faction.59 Yet, even as they condemned Saʿadya for inciting beatings and arrests 
through his appeals to the government, in the same document, Sa ʿadya’s opponents admit that 
they carried out beatings themselves. Ben Sarjado, himself a court banker, testified that people 
from the exilarch’s faction “struck” Saʿadya on “the back of [his] neck” and on his “forehead” as 
they excommunicated him, telling him, “you will not be resurrected for all eternity.”60  
The conflict even caught the attention of contemporaneous Muslim chroniclers. In a 
section of his book about Jewish scholars and sects, the geographer Al-Mas ̔ūdī (d. 956) recalled 
meeting Sa ʿadya, and he presented a brief account of his conflict with the exilarch: 
And among [the Jews] was S ʿayīd b. Yaʿaqūb61 al-Fayyūmi who was Rabbanite in 
madhab also and he studied under Abī Kathīr, and his translation was preferred by 
most of them. And there were stories about him in Iraq with the exilarch Dawud b. 
Zakkay of the seed of David who raised an objection against him. And this was 
during the caliphate of al-Muqtadir. And [the conflict] formed factions among the 
Jews on their (Saʿadya and David b. Zakkay) account. The vizier ʿAlī b. Isā 62 and 
others among the viziers and the qādịs and the men of learning appeared in a majlis 
in order to decide between them. And al-Fayyūmi was appointed head over most of 
them and they submitted to him.63 
 
Al-Mas ̔ūdī’s account both differs from and complements Natan’s version of the story. Al-
Mas ̔ūdī set the conflict squarely during the caliphate of al-Muqtadir (d. 932), while Natan 
implied that it was only resolved years later. Nevertheless, the fact that three different texts, 
written by both Jews and Muslims, all record the involvement of the Abbasid state in this 
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conflict is clear evidence for the role of the state in a seemingly internal Jewish dispute and the 
involvement of Jewish courtiers in shaping the terms of the conflict.  
Ben Sargado’s polemical text does not say anything about what happened after Saʿadya 
was excommunicated. Al-Masʿūdī suggests that the conflict between Saʿadya and the exilarch 
was resolved through mediation in the court of one of al-Muqtadir’s viziers, presumably before 
his death in 932. Yet in Natan Ha-Bavli’s narrative, the conflict persisted for another six years. It 
appears that as part of the “separation” agreement between the two parties the jurisdictions of the 
gaon and the exilarch were entirely detached. Whereas previously the exilarch needed the 
geonim to endorse his ruling, in this state of affairs, they were not to interact with each other at 
all and administered their own affairs independently. This was a problem, however, when an 
individual loyal to the exilarch had a legal case involving an individual under Saʿadya’s 
jurisdiction. According to Natan, this situation quickly became violent, and it convinced the 
people that they needed to find someone to mediate between the gaon and the exilarch once and 
for all. 64 They turned to the court banker, Bishr b. Aharon, who was Ben Sargado’s father-in-
law: 
And they [the community members] all gathered around Bishr b. Aharon who was 
the father-in-law of Khalaf b. Sargado65 who was a great man in Baghdad and was 
one of the important men of the place (courtiers), and they explained to him how 
they arrived at the division of Israel and how difficult their situation is. They said 
to him: rise, for the word is yours, and we are your people and maybe we will be 
able to do away with the controversy which is solely dependent on your son-in-law 
Khalaf b. Sargado.  
 
It seems that the people chose Bishr because of the prestige of his position as an Abbasid 
courtier, his relative neutrality in the conflict, and his ability to influence his powerful son-in-
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law. He acted as a mediator, entreating both individuals to make peace with each other. First, he 
said to the exilarch:  
What have you done, and until when will you exacerbate the controversy and not 
guard yourself from punishment? Fear your lord, and remove yourself from the 
controversy for you know how strong it is. And now see if you can repair your ways 
with Rav Saʿadya and make peace with him and rest what is in your heart against 
him. 
 
Bishr similarly implored Saʿadya to make peace. Both men “heeded his words.”  
On the Fast of Esther, Bishr gathered both factions on two separate lots of his property. 
Natan describes the scene as rich in tension and drama. Each man’s supporters lined up facing 
each other. Bishr acted as messenger between the two rival factions, and he “went between them 
with words of peace.” Eventually, Bishr’s efforts were successful. Sa ʿadya and David b. Zakkay 
“entreated each other and kissed each other and embraced each other.” 
 In holding the negotiations in this manner, Bishr imitated Abbasid courtly practices of 
mediation. Usually, when Abbasid courtiers negotiated, the two rival parties were held in 
separate sections of the palace, and a mediator went between them. Sometimes, the mediator 
relayed each side’s messages faithfully, while at other times, the mediator took a more active 
role in trying to shape the negotiations, modifying one or both parties’ words in order to 
encourage a deal.66 It appears that Bishr’s mediation strategy inclined toward the latter. Even 
after they embraced, Sa ʿadya and the exilarch were still skeptical of each other’s intentions. To 
seal the deal, Bishr insisted that Saadya and the exilarch eat the festive Purim meal at his house 
that evening. After two days of feasting, wine had washed away the bitterness between the two 
men. Their reconciliation was complete. Saʿadya was restored to his position as Gaon, although 
Yosef b. Ya ʿaqov, his replacement, continued to hold his title and earn income from the yeshiva.  
                                                          




Bishr was able to negotiate between the two individuals as a result of the status that his 
relationship with the state conferred. By the end of this period, the Jewish court bankers had 
emerged as a formidable group that played an integral role in internal Jewish communal 
leadership. They became tied to the yeshivot through marriage and obtained positions within the 
yeshiva hierarchy themselves. The banker Aharon b. Yosef b. Sargado, Saʿadya’s rival, became 
gaon of Pumbedita in 942. A Judeo-Arabic text described Sahl b. Netira, the son of Netira and 
the daughter of the gaon Kohen Sedeq, not only as a sophisticated Abbasid courtier, but as a 
learned rabbinic scholar:   
[Sahl] is strong at the recitation of the Miqra (Torah), Mishnah, and Talmud. He 
has mastery of and is familiar with everything in the study of religion (dīn) and 
jurisprudence (fiqh)̣, and he is a student of Rav Saʿadya. And he has issued various 
legal decisions.67  
 
In administering the yeshivot, the court bankers made use of Abbasid courtly protocol, a 
phenomenon that would intensify throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries. 
Notably, Jewish communal leaders did not perceive a tension between traditional Jewish 
values which abhorred gentile politics and their own ties to the Abbasid state as mediated by the 
jahbadhs. As the next section will argue, in the first half of the tenth century, Jewish leaders 
described even an ideal Jewish polity in the diaspora as one in which Jewish leaders had close 
relations with gentile kings. 
 
Part III: “The Caliph grants his desires”: Jewish Political Legitimation in the early tenth 
century  
                                                          
67 Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 11. 
  
54 
Jewish leaders not only depended on state power to provide the force necessary to back 
up their rulings, but also used their proximity to the state to assert their authority on a rhetorical 
level. Although they had inherited a tradition that was skeptical, at best, of relations with gentile 
governments, Jewish leaders in the early tenth century took great pride in the status that their 
relations with the government afforded them, and they were eager to invoke their close 
relationship with the state to lend legitimacy to their rule.  
This ideology is most evident in the chronicle of Natan Ha-Bavli (c. 950s).68 The first 
half of the text, discussed above, described a series of conflicts between rival geonim and 
exilarchs in Baghdad during the first half of the tenth century. It concludes with the narrative of 
dramatic reconciliation between Sa ʿadya Gaon and his former-enemy, the exilarch David b. 
Zakkay. The second half of the text is a synchronic account of the idealized operations of the 
main Jewish political institutions of Abbasid Baghdad (namely, the yeshivot and the exilarchate) 
and the relations between them. In particular, Natan describes the exilarch as conducting himself 
in the same manner as a gentile king.  
Menahẹm Ben Sasson argues that the account of Natan Ha-Bavli was written in the 
middle of the tenth century to reassure the Jews of Qayrawan that the yeshivot still commanded 
their authority even after the instability that arose from the many intra-communal conflicts 
discussed in the text. Although the text was not entirely factually accurate—it contains some 
supernatural elements, and its account of the expulsion of the exilarch Uqba misidentifies many 
                                                          
68 Judeo-Arabic sections of Natan Ha-Bavli’s text were preserved in Geniza manuscripts. The first section was 
published and translated by Israel Friedlander, “The Arabic Original of the Report of R. Natan Hababli,” Jewish 
Quarterly Review 17, no. 4 (1905), 747–761, and subsequent Judeo-Arabic manuscripts were found and published 
by Menahẹm Ben-Sasson, “The Structure, Goals, and Content of the Story of Natan Ha-Babli [Heb.],” in Culture 
and Society in Medieval Jewry, eds. M. Ben-Sasson, R. Bonfil and J.R. Hacker (Jerusalem, 1989). Natan’s entire 
account was later translated into Hebrew, and Neubauer published it at the end of “Seder ʿOlam Zuta” in Medieval 
Jewish Chronicles I (Oxford, 1895), 77-88. Menahem Ben Sasson has argued that the Hebrew version is largely 
complete, and it represents a mostly accurate version of the older Judeo-Arabic text.  
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of the main actors—it was an authentic mid-tenth century text, and Natan likely did have some 
first-hand experience in Baghdad. Moreover, as Ben Sasson explains, the author exhibited a great 
deal of familiarity with Abbasid political culture as described in contemporaneous Arabic texts.  
As Chapter 2 will argue, many of the political relations described in Natan’s text had 
ceased to exist after the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate in the middle of the tenth century. 
Thus, the text was written not only to assure Jews abroad that the situation in Baghdad had 
returned to normal after the infighting within the yeshivot, but also to convince them that the 
decline of Abbasid fortunes in the mid-tenth century did not signal the decline of the yeshivot. In 
this sense, as Albert Baumgarten and Marina Rustow argue, Natan’s account should be 
interpreted as a text that was “recorded for the consumption of outsiders with embellishments 
just at the moment when both the customs that it claimed to describe and the political power on 
which they rested were in steep decline.”69 Indeed, Natan’s chronicle demonstrates that Jews 
held the Abbasid court in esteem, so much so that even writing at a time when the government 
had collapsed, they believed that the best way to advance their own authority within the Jewish 
community was to continue to present themselves as Arabic courtiers with close relations to the 
government.    
The first half of the chronicle dealt with conflict within the Jewish community, and it was 
explicit about the role played by appeals to the non-Jewish government in waging these conflicts. 
Notably, Natan Ha-Bavli never condemned these appeals to non-Jewish authorities; in his 
narrative, every single Jewish communal official appealed to the state through the intercession of 
Jewish courtiers. The issues inherent in appealing to the state—the lack of permanence of the 
                                                          
69 Albert I. Baumgarten and Marina Rustow, “Judaism and Tradition: Continuity, Change, and Innovation,” in 
Jewish Studies at the Crossroads of Anthropology and History: Authority, Diaspora, Tradtion, ed. Ra ʿanan S. 
Boustan, Oren Kosansky, and Marina Rustow (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 227-228. 
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rulings, the frequent reversals of fate—were the same as those manifest in contemporaneous 
Islamic chronicles that glorified the state.  
The second half of Natan’s narrative provides a synchronic depiction of an idealized 
Jewish communal leadership structure. Even in this idealized image, the state continued to play a 
central role in legitimating Jewish communal leadership. His account begins with a description 
of the process by which a new exilarch was chosen. He explains that “the two heads of the 
yeshivot gathered together with all of the heads of the community and the elders in the house of a 
great man in Baghdad, one of the great ones of the generation, such as Netịra” to select him.70 
This would indicate that even in a time of “peace” Jewish government officials were expected to 
play a central role in the selection of Jewish communal leaders.  
After his coronation, according to Natan, the exilarch almost never left his house. This 
echoes the behavior of the Abbasid caliph who remained sequestered in his palace. The only time 
he does so is to meet with the caliph. According to Natan, the exilarch could meet with the caliph 
whenever he wanted: 
When [the exilarch] wants to have a reception with the king to request something 
from him or to greet him, he asks the ministers of the king and his slaves. They 
always allow him to enter to speak to the king, who gives him permission to enter 
his presence, and he gives him permission and commands the guards to let him 
enter.71  
 
By the tenth century, the Abbasid caliph remained mostly secluded, and there is no evidence that 
al-Muqtadir ever met face-to-face with a Jewish exilarch. By presenting such meetings as regular 
occurrences, Natan emphasized the proximity of the exilarch to the center of Abbasid power. 
Moreover, according to Natan, the caliph’s slaves and officials all received the exilarch with 
great excitement: 
                                                          
70 MJC II, 83. 
71 MJC II, 85. 
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And when he enters all of the slaves of the king run before him, and he already 
prepared in his bosom gold coins to give to the slaves running before him, such that 
they prevent him from entering [by mobbing him]…they honor him and grab his 
hand until he goes and stands before the king and bows before him.72 
 
Similarly, the caliph also treated the exilarch with respect and granted all of his wishes: 
And the king asks him about his well-being and about his affairs and about what 
brought him in. [The exilarch] requests permission from [the king], to speak to his 
face, and he grants it to him. He begins with praises and blessings that were 
prepared for him previously. Then, he recounts for (the king) the customs of his 
fathers and the fathers of his fathers regarding [the exilarchs], and he placates him 
with words in Arabic until he grants his request and gives him what he asked for. 
And (the king) writes for him all of the [decrees] that he requested from him, and 
(the exilarch) leaves there and departs from him in a state of happiness and peace.73 
 
The exilarch is honored by all of the caliph’s retinues, conducts himself like a high-level official, 
and the caliph himself grants all of the exilarch’s desires.  
Of course, Natan had never witnessed an audience between the caliph and the exilarch, 
and it is impossible to say whether the account bears any relation to the actual reality of such 
meetings or even if such meetings ever occurred at all.74 Nevertheless, the narrative served to 
glorify the exilarch’s rule by projecting his proximity to the center of Abbasid power.  
Furthermore, Natan explains how the exilarch used his relationship with the caliph to 
suppress insubordination: 
And R. Natan said this: that he saw that the son of David b. Zakkay went out to 
Fars, which was in the jurisdiction (reshut) of his father. They did not give him 
honor, nor did they greet him, so he sent word to his father. His father sent writs of 
excommunication (petihọt) and bans (hẹremot). He told the deputy, and the deputy 
told the king of Baghdad, and the king of Baghdad wrote to the king of Fars, 
instructing him to support [David Ben Zakkay] and help them. When the king of 
Fars heard that the letter from the king of Baghdad arrived, he supported [David 
                                                          
72 MJC II, 85. 
73 MJC, 85.  
74 The Jewish exilarch, or raʾis al-jālūt, is discussed in multiple contemporaneous Muslim sources. Overall, 
Muslims held the exilarch’s ancestry in great esteem, and most of them believed that the exilarch commanded the 
authority of all Jews. The exilarch also took part in religious disputations in Muslim courts. Still, there is no 
reference in Arabic sources to a meeting between the exilarch and the caliph like the one that Natan describes. See 
Gil, “The Exilarchate,” in The Jews of Medieval Islam: Community, Society, Identity, ed. Daniel Frank (Leiden: 
Brill, 1995), 33-67. 
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Ben Zakkay], and he [the son of the exilarch] took a lot of money from them, from 
Fars, which was in the reshut of his father, and from all of its territories. When he 
arrived and returned to Baghdad, none of the heads of the yeshivot objected to him 
in this matter.75 
 
In this anecdote, the exilarch appealed to the caliph and was able to use the force of the state to 
enforce his own rights to the income from Fars. The other Jewish communal leaders raise no 
objection. The infighting from the previous decades was over. The heads of the yeshivot and the 
exilarchs had settled on mutually-agreeable borders, and, most significantly, Muslim rulers 
supported this agreement.76   
This is not to say that relations with the government, alone, could legitimate a leader 
within the Jewish community. Throughout this period, many texts censured Jewish leaders for 
“buying their position from the state” rather than deriving their authority from Jewish tradition. 
For example, during the calendar controversy, the Babylonians accused Ben Meʾir of having 
been elevated by the gentiles. Similarly, the Karaite scribe who copied the polemic against 
Saʿadya Gaon emphasized the “taboo against anyone who appeals for help from the Muslims for 
them to elevate him to the headship,” asserting that the text proved that Saʿadya was one of those 
false leaders who derived his authority from the state.77 All of these accusations, however, were 
accompanied by accusations that a given official also did not possess the requisite credentials to 
hold the position: Saʿadya, for example, was accused of fabricating his ancestry and violating 
Jewish law by desecrating the Sabbath.  
                                                          
75 MJC, 86. 
76 This story subtly suggests that the political scene had shifted. In Natan’s previous accounts, rival Jewish leaders 
had appealed, through court bankers, to the caliph himself or the king of Baghdad regarding their rights to the 
income from provinces far outside of Baghdad. In this case, the king of Baghdad is different from the king of Fars, 
and the king of Baghdad needed to write a letter to the king of Fars asking him to support the son of David Ben 
Zakkai. This might be a subtle reference to the Buyid confederation, in which separate kings ruled over Baghdad, 
Isfahan, and Rayy. The moral of the story was that, even though the caliphate had fragmented, the Jews were still 
able to rely on a somewhat united polity to enforce their rights and authority. 
77 Harkavy, Zikhron, 225. 
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Overall, during the first half of the tenth century, Jewish leaders were eager to invoke the 
state whenever it could help them. And their relations with the state, in tandem with such 
traditional Jewish modes of legitimation as nobility of ancestry, communal consensus, and 
erudition all worked to augment their authority among Jews throughout the Mediterranean. 
Although the state by itself could not legitimate a Jewish leader, it was an essential aspect of that 
leader’s claims to authority and the ways in which he and his followers projected his power. 
 
Conclusions 
 The relatively strong Abbasid state under al-Muqtadir facilitated the rise of a new class of 
Jewish courtiers. The Jewishness of these courtiers was rather tangential to their function in the 
Abbasid bureaucracy. Still, certain aspects of Jewish communal organization could make Jews 
particularly useful in these positions. First, Jewish mercantile networks had developed methods 
of transporting money across great distances through the use of letters of credit. Second, the 
ability to compel a Jewish communal leader to excommunicate someone provided an 
enforcement mechanism outside of official state channels for viziers depositing their private 
funds with Jewish jahbadhs. Third, traditional legal prohibitions against informing on fellow 
Jews meant that a vizier could be more confident that his money would be concealed and that a 
banker’s compatriots would not inform on him to the authorities. All of these factors contributed 
to the rise of Jewish elites at court. 
With their newfound access to power, Jewish courtiers came to accept petitions on behalf 
of Jews and present them before the caliph. The state was relatively powerful until the mid-930s, 
and Jewish leaders established alliances with Jewish court bankers. This new political situation 
changed the shape of the Jewish community. It challenged the traditional role of the exilarch as 
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the main intermediary with the state and destabilized what may once have been commonly 
accepted boundaries between the various Jewish communal institutions, both within Baghdad 
and throughout the caliphate. This complicated the division of power and authority that had 
previously existed among Jewish communal leaders, leading to the various intra-communal 
disputes discussed in this chapter.  
 Rather than viewing the involvement of the gentile government as a problem, the rabbis 
very much took pride in their close relations with the state, and they used their proximity to state 
power to advance their authority and prestige among Jews outside of Baghdad. Saʿadya’s letter, 
Natan Ha-Bavli’s text, and even the Book of the Calendar all invoke relations with gentile 
authorities to project the power of Babylonia. Although a relationship with state power alone was 
not a sufficient claim to authority, it was an important aspect of Jewish political claims 
throughout this period.  
Yet all of the events discussed in this chapter took place during a time of relative 
stability. The economic foundations of the caliphate and of the Jewish community were fairly 
secure during the reign of Al-Muqtadir. Throughout the early tenth century, the yeshivot and the 
exilarchs continued to earn income on their landholdings, even as they squabbled over the exact 
distribution of this income. Jewish leaders could rely on a relatively powerful state apparatus to 
enforce their rulings and support the agreements that they made with each other. 
But only a few years later, in 946, the caliphate officially collapsed when the Abbasid 
caliph al-Muktafī was forced to submit to the rule of the Daylamite Buyid Amīr Mu ʿizz al-
Dawla. How would this situation impact the Jewish community? What would happen when the 
foundations of the court bankers’ power—the Abbasid state—had fallen apart? When the 
traditional Jewish institutions of Baghdad lost their income? When economic and political 
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turmoil destabilized the existing political order? The next chapter will examine the changes in 




Chapter 2: “We must go out to them ourselves”: The Babylonian Yeshivot and the Buyid State, 
933-1028 
 
In 953, just eight years after the Buyids has wrested control of Baghdad, an anonymous 
Yeshiva official wrote to a Jewish notable in al-Andalus describing the dire predicament that the 
yeshivot were facing: 
We no longer have any reshuyot from which to obtain our daily bread for they have 
been destroyed. And from those that do remain we must go out to them ourselves, 
because those in power in the yeshiva, the judges, enter our reshuyot. In addition, 
the lands which we owned have been destroyed and were lost during the bad years 
which have passed over us. We have lost our money and our land.1 
 
Although the writer did not specify what, exactly, took place during “the bad years,” his reader 
probably needed no explanation. The entire Arabic-speaking world knew that the previous 
twenty years of political upheaval and economic decline had devastated the region of Iraq with 
disastrous consequences for all of its inhabitants, Jews and non-Jews alike.  
After the caliph al-Muqtadir’s death in 932, the Abbasid caliphs were greatly weakened. 
By 936, the caliph had effectively lost all control over the army, and throughout the 930s and the 
940s, rival military leaders grappled for control over Baghdad. It was a time of violence, 
economic decay, and political fragmentation. The caliph had been rendered powerless, reduced 
to a mere figurehead, a situation that would persist for the next hundred years, when Iraq was 
ruled by the Buyid confederation. 
How did this impact the Jewish community of Baghdad, whose institutions had been 
inextricably bound up with the institutions of the Abbasid Caliphate itself? What would the 
                                                          
1 Bodl. MS Heb f 34, fs. 39-44r. Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 13.  
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consequences of political fragmentation be for a community that had derived its own power and 
authority through its relationship with a centralized state?  
On the one hand, this was a time of hardship, both for Babylonian Jewry as a whole and 
for the yeshivot. As the letter indicates, the yeshivot lost access to the sources of income on 
which they had relied on the past. The Yeshiva of Sura closed from 945 until around 987, and 
Pumbedita was marred by internal conflict and poverty. A relatively large number of letters have 
survived from the middle of the tenth century, and nearly all of them include plaintive pleas for 
financial support, suggesting that the yeshivot could not rely on income from Iraq in the same 
way as they had in the past. On the other hand, as Goitein recognized, there is more evidence of 
donations and texts sent between the yeshivot and their followers during the late tenth and early 
eleventh centuries than from any other period.2  
This chapter seeks to understand this phenomenon. How did the yeshivot continue to 
survive—and thrive—without access to the same forms of political power that they had enjoyed 
in the past? Part I will examine how the breakdown of the centralized Abbasid administration 
and the rise of the Buyids impacted the status of Jewish court bankers in Buyid territory. Part II 
considers how this environment affected the operations of the yeshivot and their ability to use 
their connection to centralized political power to perform favors for their followers. Part III 
explores how these changes in political organization forced Jewish leaders to re-conceptualize 
their own relationship to the state and project their authority in a new way. 
  
                                                          
2 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the 
Documents of the Cairo Geniza, Vol II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 204. 
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Part I: The Fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate and its Effect on Jewish Jahbadhs 
As Chapter 1 argued, in the first half of the tenth century, Jewish court bankers had risen 
to power in the centralized office of the caliph al-Muqtadir. The court bankers were able to 
provide loans to the caliph’s viziers whenever needed, and they safeguarded the money owned 
by rival viziers. Although the caliph’s viziers rose and fell, the court bankers remained in their 
positions throughout the entirety of al-Muqtadir’s reign, managing the financial system of the 
entire caliphate.  
After al-Muqtadir’s death, however, this delicately-balanced system collapsed. Former 
viziers and courtiers engaged in outright rebellion against the new caliph, who lost control over a 
great deal of the army. According to the Muslim historian Ibn Miskawayh (late-10th c.), in 936, 
the caliph ceded control of the army to his vizier Ibn Rā ʾiq, and he granted him the title of amīr-
al-umarāʾ. This effectively transferred all administrative power to the amirs, a situation which 
Ibn Miskawayh said persisted until his own day:  
From this time [936] the power of the viziers ceased. The vizier no longer had 
control of the provinces, the bureaus, or the departments. … Ibn Rāʾiq and his 
secretary had control of the whole business of state, and the same has been the case 
with all who have held the Princeship from the time of Ibn Rāʾiq to this date. The 
revenue from the provinces is transmitted to the treasury of the amirs, they order 
and prohibit with regard to it, and expend it as they please, while remitting what 
they choose to the Sultan for his expenses. The treasuries (biyūt al-amwāl) became 
obsolete.”3 
 
This meant that the centralized treasuries in which Jewish court bankers had risen to 
power, including the office of the jahbadhs, the dīwān al-jahābadha, had also become obsolete. 
Financial administration was decentralized. By 946, the caliph, confined to his palace, was 
forced to cede all of his power to the Buyids, a Persian and Shiite dynasty. 
                                                          
3 Miskawayh, Tajārub al-Umam, Vol. I, 352; trans, Vol. IV, 396.  
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The Buyids divided up their territory among various military commanders, giving them complete 
control over the revenues of a given territory. The development of this new system of land 
grants, called the iqtạ̄ʿ system, effectively eliminated the centralized financial offices of the 
caliphate in which the Jewish court bankers had risen to power.4 Instead, various officials took 
control of the administration of increasingly-smaller territories.  
During the Buyid era personal relationships pervaded political culture. “Small-scale” 
associations, often hierarchical patron-client relationships, formed between individuals in the 
void left by the collapse of the Caliphate. As Roy Mottahadeh argues, society came to be 
characterized by networks of personal dependency, not by any sort of wider group coherence or 
shared ideals.5 
For Muslims, the Buyid period represented something of a crisis of political ideals. The 
sense of Islamic solidarity—a people (umma) united under a rightly guided caliph—on which the 
Abbasids had swept to power had ceased to be. The caliph, the representative of the Prophet 
Muhammad on Earth and the rightful leader of Sunni Muslims, had been rendered powerless, 
reduced to a mere figurehead. Nevertheless, as Mottahadeh argues, reciprocal relations combined 
to create a resilient social order that prioritized individual achievement over ethnic or religious 
group identity. Marina Rustow suggests that the breakdown in Islamic notions of solidarity 
during this period yielded benefits for Jews, allowing them to take part in courtly life to a greater 
extent than before.6 The depictions of Jewish officials in Buyid-era chronicles composed by 
Muslim elites corroborates this. 
                                                          
4 On the development of the iqtạ̄ʿ system in Buyid Iraq, see Sato Tsugitaka, State and Rural Society in Medieval 
Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 18-41. On the impact of the iqtạ̄ʿ system on Buyid governance and institutions, see John 
Donahue, The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq: Shaping Institutions for the Future (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 229-262. 
5 Roy Mottahadeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (London: I.B. Taurus, 2001). 
6 Marina Rustow, “Patronage in the Context of Solidarity and Reciprocity: Two Paradigms of Social Cohesion in the 
Premodern Mediterranean,” in Patronage, Production and Transmission: Books in Medieval and Early Modern 




Jewish Officials in Buyid Courts 
During the Buyid period, there was a proliferation of competing provincial courts 
throughout the eastern Islamic world. These courts modeled themselves on the former Abbasid 
court in Baghdad and employed a relatively large number of Jewish and Christian officials. 
Buyid rulers never attempted to enforce dhimmī laws, and they seldom questioned the right of 
Jews to serve in Islamic governments or to hold positions of authority over Muslims.7  
In fact, more Jews held positions in Muslim courts than ever before. Buyid officials 
employed Jewish officials as financial administrators, and they relied on them to manage their 
personal funds, provide administrative expertise, and advance loans whenever necessary. 
Chroniclers still referred to these individuals as jahbadhs, but the position did not have the same 
relationship to the centralized financial administration of the caliphate as it once had. Instead, the 
jahbadhs of the Buyid period served primarily as private money collectors for individual Buyid 
officials. For example, the kātib Ibn Shīrzād had a Jewish jahbadh, ʿAlī b. Hārūn. Similarly, at 
least three Jewish bankers allied themselves with Abu ʿAbd-allāh al-Barīdī, including Sahl b. 
Nazị̄r, a certain Ya ʿaqub, and Isrā ʾil b. Sālih.̣ Isrāʾil b. Sālih ̣was close enough to al-Barīdī that 
he narrated an account of events in al-Barīdī’s life to contemporaneous historians.8   
Although the Buyids had come to power through force, they tried to legitimate their rule 
through “the reflected glory of culture.”9 Political fragmentation also contributed to the 
                                                          
Patronage among Jews in the Islamic East: Evidence from the Cairo Geniza,” Al-Qantạra: Revista de Estudios 
Árabes 29 (2008): 81–122. 
7 This was very much debated and condemned among Muslim jurists. As Luke Yarbrough has argued, theʿulamāʾ 
themselves wanted access to power, so they condemned vigorously the employment of dhimmīs within the 
government. See L. Yarbrough, “Upholding God’s Rule: Early Muslim Juristic Opposition to the State Employment 
of non-Muslims,” Islamic Law and Society 19, no. 1 (2012): 11-85. 
8 Isrāʾil the jahbadh: Miskawayh, Vol. II, 52-53. 




flourishing of intellectual life, as rival emirs and viziers in the many provincial courts competed 
for prestige by trying to attract the most renowned scholars to their court. By the mid-tenth 
century, participation in Arabophone intellectual life provided a great deal of social and political 
currency, and it was beneficial for rulers and scholars alike. A ruler used majlis to engender a 
sense of consensus and community among elite members of the different, often competing 
political, religious, and ethnic factions under their control and to compel these individuals to be 
obligated to thank him for his beneficence (shukr ala ni ʿama).10 Scholars, in turn, formed bonds 
with individuals from other segments of society, and they were able to leverage these networks 
to connect to powerful individuals who could perform favors for them in the future.  
In this way, Buyid political culture invited Jews (and non-Muslims in general) to 
participate in courtly life, possibly to a greater extent than they had previously. By entering into 
communication with scholars and debating Muslims and Christians in front of a Buyid prince, a 
Jew could gain at least some access to local political power. He might be able to obtain favors 
from a Buyid amīr or vizier who was impressed with his level of erudition or rhetorical skill. 
Muslim and Christian intellectuals both described corresponding with Jews, and when they had 
questions about Jewish belief or practice, they did not hesitate to call on Jews.11 Many Jews 
corresponded with intellectuals present in courtly circles, even if they themselves did not reside 
at court.12 
                                                          
10 Pomerantz, “Licit Magic,” 197. 
11 Camilla Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible from Ibn Rabban to Ibn Hazm (Leiden: Brill, 
1996). Adang argues that Muslim writers in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries had Jewish informants and 
accurately described different sects within Judaism and their versions of the Torah.  
12 In particular, AbūʿAlīʿĪsā b. Zurʿa, a Jacobite Christian and one of the main translators of the Aristotelian corpus 
and one of the most prominent Christian philosophers in the circle of the vizier Ibn Saʿdān, corresponded with both 
Bishr b. Finhạ̄s b. Shuʿayf al-Hạ̄sib and Dawūd b. Mūsaj. See David Sklare, Shemuʾel  ben Hofni Gaon and his 
Cultural World: Texts and Studies (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 114, and below. 
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For example, at the end of the tenth century, the Jewish accountant (al-Ḥāsib) Bishr b. 
Finhạs b. Shu ʿayb wrote Ibn Zurʿa, the Jacobite Christian companion of the vizier Ibn Sa ʿdān to 
ask about the differences between Judaism and Christianity.13 Ibn Zurʿa was impressed with 
Bishr’s questions, and responded to them in 997. In the text, he made reference to another Jewish 
scholar, Dawūd b. Mūsaj, an affiliate of al-Sijistanī. He described him as “my friend” (sạdīq) and 
as “one of the foremost thinkers among the Jews.”14 In this way, philosophic inter-religious 
correspondence created bonds between individuals who otherwise would never have come into 
contact with each other.  
The descendants of al-Muqtadir’s court bankers, the Banū ʾImrām, patronized a group of 
Jews studying Greek philosophy (falsafa) in Mosụl. The group met in the synagogue on 
Sabbaths and holidays.15 In 952, two individuals from this group, Bishr b. Samʿān b. ʿIrs b. 
ʿUthmān and Ibn Abī Saʿīd b. ʿUthmān, composed a letter to the Christian Yahỵā b. ʿAdī, asking 
him about various topics related to Aristotelian thought and its reception in Late Antiquity, 
indicating a deep knowledge of philosophy. In his response, Yahỵā praised the Jewish letter-
writer, “complimenting him on the high rank he has attained in these studies.”16 In 983, a Jewish 
wool-merchant, Ibn Salhụ̄n, wrote an account of his participation in this study group, entitled 
Kitāb al-Manazịr. At least two of the men with whom he studied held titles from the yeshivot: 
Sahl b. Ishạ̄q was Alluf of the Yeshiva of Sura and Efrayim b. Satỵa was the Resh Kallah of the 
yeshiva who was appointed judge of Mos ̣ụl by Aaron b. Sarjādo.17 He described Efrayim as “the 
                                                          
13 Sbath, Vingt Traites, 19-52. Discussed in Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 114. 
14 Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 114., 45n. Sbath, Vingt Traites, 47. 
15 Pines, “A Tenth Century Philosophical Correspondence,” PAAJR, 24 (1955), 103f, especially 104, n.6. 
16 Pines, “Philosophical Correspondence,” 104. 
17 Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni, 119-120 
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best of the people of our time in the religious sciences and fascinated by other sciences as 
well.”18  
Some geonim and exilarchs took part in disputations at Buyid courts (majālis) as well. 
Two Judeo-Arabic manuscripts of theological works by the Buyid vizier Ibn ʿAbbad have been 
found in the Cairo Geniza.19 According to al-Tawhịdī, the Jewish Exilarch debated the vizier Ibn 
ʿAbbād in Rayy on the “inimitability of the Koran.” Later, the vizier said that he was happy that 
he beat him since the Jews have a reputation for being good at debate.20 In a polemic against 
Shemuʾel b. Họfni, the Karaite Yūsuf al-Basị̄r reports that Shemuʾel b. Họfni took part in the 
majlis of a vizier.21 Regardless of the extent of their participation in physical majlis, the later 
geonim engaged with Islamic scholastic theology (more specifically, Mu ʿtazili thought) in 
nearly all of the texts that they composed in Judeo-Arabic. Many of them responded directly to 
the arguments of Muslim theologians (mutakalimūn). Shemuʾel b. Họfni’s ‘Treatise on the 
Abrogation of the Law” addressed the mutakalimūn Ibn Khallād and Abu ʿAbdallāh al-Basṛī by 
name.22  
As demonstrated by the previous examples—in which a wool-merchant, an accountant, 
and a Talmudic scholar engaged in intellectual exchange with Muslim viziers and the 
philosophers they patronized—the relative intellectual openness of Buyid political culture 
allowed for a greater degree of social mobility than under the united Abbasid caliphate. This is 
also evident in the actual positions that Jews held in Buyid courts. For example, when Bajkam 
                                                          
18 Sklare, Shemuʾel b. Hofni, 121. 
19 Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidke, Al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād Promoter of Rational Theology: Two Muʿtazilī 
Kalām texts from the Cairo Geniza (Leiden: Brill, 2016). Likely, as more of the Arabic and Judeo-Arabic literary 
manuscripts from the Firkovitch collection are analyzed and published, more evidence for Jewish correspondence 
with Muslim and Christian theologians and philosophers will be uncovered. 
20 al-Tawhị̄dī, Akhlāq al-Wazīrayn, 299-301.  
21According to Sklare, Shemuʾel  b. Hofni, 110n.31. 
22 Sklare, Shemuʾel b. Hofni, 110. 
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conquered Baghdad and expelled many of the caliph al-Rādị̄’s men in 938, he retained the 
Jewish jahbadh ʿAlī b. Khalāf, and he even appointed him as kātib in 938 and clothed him in a 
robe of honor.23  In this role, ʿAlī b. Khalāf safeguarded Bajkam’s money, worked as his chief 
administrator, and paid fines on his behalf.24 Others rose to even higher positions: a Jew named 
Ruzbah served as governor of Sīrāf, a Persian city under Buyid control.25  
Some Muslims were uncomfortable with the high status of certain Jewish officials and 
the intermingling between Jews and Muslims. For example, according to al-Sụ̄lī, Ibn Khalāf’s 
slave was found with a Muslim woman in 937: 
A Jew was found with a Muslim woman. This Jew was a slave (ghulām) to the 
Jewish jahbadh Ibn Khalāf. The chief of police flogged him in the presence of the 
Jew one Friday. The city was scandalized/captivated by this, as the affair was 
repugnant [qabīh]̣.26  
 
Yet notably, while this incident “scandalized” the city, it did not negatively alter the position of 
Ibn Khalāf, who Bajkam appointed as his secretary one year later.  
Instead, to the extent that there was a category that defined most Jewish officials during 
this period, it was not their religion, but their profession as tujjār (great merchants). As 
Mottahadeh explains, the tujjār were a relatively small, identifiable group of individuals within a 
given city who held (or were assumed to hold) significant financial resources. The position 
brought with it prestige. The “leading merchants” (wujūh al-tujjār) were considered one of the 
most important social groups within a given city. After all, they functioned as something of a 
                                                          
23 al-Sūlī, Akhbār al-Rādị̄ bi’allāh wa’l-Mutaqqī bi’allāh, ed. J. Heyworth Dunne (London, 1935), 103. Miskawayh, 
Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, Vol. I, 384. Translation: Vol. IV, 433-34.  
24 al-Sụ̄lī, Akhbār, 128-129. 
25 al-Rudhawarī, Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, Vol. III., 149-150; Translation: Vol. VI, 155-156.  
26 Al-Sụ̄lī, Akhbār, 108. Trans. Canard, I, 176. About 150 years later, the Sunni jurist Ibn al-Jawzī reported that the 
Jewish banker then did not rest until he had the chief of police flogged in front of the Jews in retaliation. Unlike al-
Sụ̄lī, however, Ibn al-Jawzī was not a contemporary of Ibn Khalāf. Moreover, Ibn al-Jawzī wrote during a time 
when jurists were increasingly questioning the role of dhimmīs in Muslim administrations, so his version of the story 
may also have served as a polemic against the tyranny of dhimmī officials. See Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạ̄m, VI, 293. 
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long-distance credit network, whose access to capital was necessary to pay the army and other 
expenses. As a result, a leader required their loyalty in order to govern effectively. In fact, 
Bajkam had even consulted the leading merchants about whom to appoint as caliph to ensure that 
his choice would be accepted unanimously by the population, thus solidifying his rule.27 It is 
unclear if non-Muslims would have been consulted in this capacity, but the anecdote certainly 
speaks to the high status of the tujjār during this period. At the same time, conquerors who 
needed to pay the army quickly, or leaders who were unable to pay back their debts, did not 




In contrast to Al-Muqtadir’s Jewish court bankers who occupied a liminal status vis à vis 
the world of the Abbasid court, subsequent generations of Jewish courtiers did not necessarily 
hold their positions for life. Instead, their fates were bound up with the fates of the political 
officials with whom they allied themselves. Throughout the Buyid era, strongmen rose and fell, 
and those loyal to them, including individual Jews, rose and fell alongside them.  
Rival officials under each military commander jockeyed for power, conspiring against 
each other and orchestrating each other’s downfalls. For example, in 938, Bajkam’s vizier, 
Hạsan b. ʿAbd-allah, convinced Bajkam that his Jewish secretary, ʿAlī b. Khalāf b. Tayāb, had 
stolen 100,000 dinars from him in Mosul. Bajkam arrested ʿAlī b. Khalāf and his brother, and he 
appointed the Muslim Ibn Shīrzād in his place.28 Yet there was nothing distinctly anti-Jewish 
                                                          





about this action, necessarily. The effect of the downfall of ʿAlī b. Khalāf was an elevation in the 
status of Ibn Shirzād’s personal jahbadh, the JewʿAlī b. Hārūn.  
Nevertheless, during difficult times, Buyid rulers often seized the assets of their own 
officials and the individuals loyal to them, torturing and imprisoning them in order to make up 
their debts. According to al-Sụ̄lī, just a few years after he had appointed Ibn Shīrzād as his 
secretary,  
Bajkam convened the secretaries to make them establish the budget of income in 
the different provinces. But it was a trick, because when they joined together he 
arrested Ibn Shirzād and his family … as well as the Jewish banker ʿAlī b. Hārūn.29  
 
Bajkam then seized the property of all of the secretaries that he had just arrested. According to 
al-Sụ̄lī, “[h]e took from the Jew ʿAlī b. Hārūn, after having subjected him to terrible torture, 
110,000 dinars; Then, Bajkam killed him after that.”30  
Officials often raided wealthy traders to pay back their loans; many of these traders were 
Jews. For example, according to Abu Shujā ʾ, the Buyid ruler Baha al-Dawla found himself 
impoverished in 996. He wrote to three of his courtiers “requesting them to furnish him with 
clothing and other things.” Only one of the three followers, AbuʿAlī b. Ismaʾil, “obtained what 
was requested after demanding from a Jew, Abu ʿAlī b. Fadḷān,31 a loan for which compensation 
was provided, but he [AbuʿAlī b. Ismaʾil] did not comply with his [Ibn Fadḷān’s] wishes,” by 
granting Ibn Fadḷān the promised compensation. The courtier then went to Baha al-Dawla with 
                                                          
29al-Sụ̄lī, Akhbār, 147, lines 8-12;  Translation: Canard, I, 229. 
30 al-Sụ̄lī, Akhbār, 148. Translation: Canard, I, 231. 
31 Ibn Fadḷān was probably a descendant of Bishr b. Aharon, a Jewish court banker who served al-Muqtadir and one 
of the “sons of Aaron” referred to by Sa’adya. A geniza letter written by Hạyya Gaon asks Elhạnan b. Shemarya in 
Fustat to assist a certain Abu al-Fad̩l Yosef b. Bishr in claiming his property in Fustat. Hạyya explains that Abu al-
Fadḷ “comes from prestige in Baghdad, of nobility among its elders,” and he wrote the name Fadḷ in Arabic 
characters, suggesting that he was from a family of court bankers. Because of the custom of naming first-born sons 
after their paternal grandfathers, Abu al-Fadḷ and Ibn Fadḷān are very likely the same person. See T-S 10 J 27.10, 
Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, Doc. 39. The Jewish Ibn Fadḷān family is referenced in Arabic chronicles 
throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 
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the goods that he had requested, and Baha al-Dawla was impressed. Then, probably to avoid 
needing to pay compensation to Ibn Fadḷān, “[t]he two agreed to assail the Jews and exact a fine 
from them. … AbuʿAlī b. Ismaʾil went back to Baghdad with these instructions; when he got 
there he arrested a number of Jews and treated them unjustly, with punishment and torture.”32 
Although Ibn Fadḷān had provided a loan as promised, this did little to secure his own position or 
that of his co-religionists.  
In all of these cases, however, Jewish courtiers were not singled out as Jews. In 
describing his downfall at the hands of his rival, Ibn al-Miskawayh did not even mention ʿAlī b. 
Khalāf’s Jewish identity, and ʿAlī b. Khalāf’s downfall had led to the (albeit temporary) 
elevation of Ibn Shīrzād’s Jewish jahbadh ʿAlī b. Harūn. When Bajkam needed funds to pay his 
debts, however, he did not hesitate to arrest the wealthy men under him, regardless of their 
religion. Jews suffered because they were bound up in a social order in which power was 
ephemeral.   
 
Characterization of Jewish Officials in Buyid-Era Historiography 
In fact, contemporaneous Muslim chroniclers characterized Jewish officials in positive 
terms and condemned the raiding of wealthy men, regardless of religion. In order to understand 
this, it is necessary to understand who, precisely, the chroniclers of this period were. Most served 
as secretaries to viziers at Buyid courts; as a result, they viewed the process of governing 
firsthand. As Joel Kraemer has argued, historians of the Buyid period emphasized their 
professional affiliation as secretaries, clerks, and philosophers over their religious identity, and 
their historical writings are “tonally and thematically secular.” They characterized history writing 
                                                          
32 al-Rudhrawarī, Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, Vol. III, 282; Translation, Vol. VI, 300-301.   
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as “philosophy teaching by example,” and their narratives served to “record the experiences of 
nations so that men (mainly rulers and government officials) might derive lessons from the 
examples that recur in history. 33 In their narratives, the practice of raiding wealthy men, 
particularly dhimmīs, was antithetical to good governance.  
For example, according to the chronicler al-Sụlī, in 933, al-Barīdī needed to raise a large 
one hundred thousand dinars to pay his army in order to capture Baghdad. In order to do this, al-
Sụ̄lī explained, al-Barīdī “assailed the Jews, who were the bulk of the traders; by outdoing every 
known form of outrage he made up the hundred thousand dinars.”34 Eight years later, al-Sụlī 
reports that al-Barīdī entered Baghdad, and “[g]reat oppression and strong beatings befell the 
traders in Baghdad, and the people fled. A group of wealthy Jews and Zoroastrians left Baghdad, 
for al-Shām.”35 Similarly, the chronicler Ibn al-Miskawayh also condemned al-Baridī’s actions 
as inherently oppressive: 
Prices rose high in Baghdad, and al-Barīdī oppressed the people in the way that he 
and his family was known for. He captured the kharāj in March. He thus ruined the 
farmers who fled; and he started collecting the poll tax, trampling on the ʾahl al-
dhimma. He set the weak against the strong.36 
In these narratives, the incessant raids constitute the antithesis of good governance. For Ibn al-
Miskaywayh, a ruler could only be successful if he avoided such unseemly behavior. Thus, 
according to al-Miskawayh, when Abu Zakariyya Yahỵā b. Sā ‘id realized that Bajkam wanted 
to conquer Baghdad in 937, he wrote him a letter to warn that his rule would never be considered 
legitimate unless he ceased his incessant raids: 
Prince, you are a candidate for sovereignty and aspire to the service of the Caliphate. 
Do you imprison ruined men who have been despoiled of their fortunes and demand 
money of them in a strange town, ordering them to be tortured? Only yesterday a 
                                                          
33 Kraemer, Humanism, 210, 228. 
34 Al-Sụ̄lī, Akhbār, 251, lines 12-13. 
35 Al-Sụ̄lī, Akhbār, 279. 
36 Ibn Miskawayh, Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, Vol. II, 25; Trans. Vol. V, 27. 
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plate containing hot coals was placed on the stomach of Sahl b. Naz ̣ị̄r the collector. 
Do not you know that when people hear of this, they will be set against you and it 
will provoke the animosity and the active hostility of those who do not as yet know 
your name, not to mention those who have realized this conduct of yours?... 
Remember that this is Baghdad, the seat of the Caliphate, not Rayy or Isfahan, and 
it will not put up with such behavior.37 
 
The unfortunate Sahl b. Nazị̄r, who had hot coals placed on his stomach, was Jewish. Yet the 
letter writer did not consider Sahl’s Jewish identity or even his affiliation with Bajkam’s enemy, 
Al-Baridī, relevant to his argument. He condemned Bajkam’s raids and torture of rich men to 
extract funds (regardless of their religious identity), and he argued that the population would not 
respect someone who engaged in such unseemly practices. According to Ibn Miskawayh, 
Bajkam heeded Abu Zakariyya’s advice. He released the people that he had imprisoned, and he 
appointed Abu Zakariyya Yahỵā b. Sā ‘id as his advisor. The caliph later appointed Bajkam as 
amīr al-umarāʾ in Baghdad, a position he held until his death. 
By contrast, according to Ibn Miskawayh, the Buyid amīr ʿIzz al-Dawla known as 
Bakhtiyār (r. 967-978), was notorious for his oppressive raids on Muslims and dhimmīs alike. 
When he found himself impoverished,  
Bakhtiyār turned in quest of money to reprehensible sources, which it would be 
unseemly to describe, and which are illicit according to all religions. The story that 
the caliph had been fined spread in Baghdad among high and low. … The vizier … 
depended for the sums which he required for the pay of the troops and the 
maintenance of the retinue and dependents of the courts, which he had to find, upon 
fines which he inflicted on the subjects and the traders, and extortion by chicanery. 
He began with the ahl al-dhimma, then proceeded to adherents of the faith and 
appropriated the goods of the professional witnesses (shahūd) and leading citizens, 
of the respectable sort; he also employed a gang of informers and accusers whom 
he styled Agents and whom he paid regular stipends. Prayers were offered against 
him in the Public Mosques, churches and synagogues, meeting places and assembly 
rooms.38 
 
                                                          
37 Miskawayh, Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, Vol. I, 379; Trans., Vol. IV, 427. 
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Similarly, in this account, Bakhtiyār’s raids may have begun with the singling out of dhimmīs, 
but ultimately targeted all segments of the population. Eventually, Bakhtiyār was overthrown by 
his cousin,ʿAdūd al-Dawla. This narrative was intended to contrast the unjust nature of 
Bakhtiyār’s rule with the moral reign of his successor.  
Overall, during the Buyid period Muslim chroniclers condemned the oppression of 
dhimmī officials as antithetical to good governance. In their narratives, they used accusations of 
oppressive tax farming and raids to discredit the legitimacy of a given ruler. Moreover, they 
worried that a ruler who arbitrarily raided dhimmī officials would go on to oppress the 
community of Muslim believers. Regardless of the veracity of many of these accounts, they 
demonstrate both the instability of the social, legal, and political order during the Buyid period 
and the relative integration of Jewish officials in elite Buyid courtly circles.  
 
 
Part II: The Trans-Mediterranean Yeshiva in the Absence of Empire 
During the period of united Abbasid rule, the Babylonian yeshivot rose to prominence 
due to their relations with a strong centralized state as mediated through Jewish jahbadhs. By the 
middle of the tenth century, however, the political apparatus of the Abbasid Empire on which the 
court bankers and the yeshivot had risen to power ceased to exist. On the other hand, as the 
previous section demonstrated, there was a greater degree of social mobility during this period of 
political fragmentation than under the united caliphate. Many Jewish officials held relatively 
high-level positions in provincial Buyid courts and engaged in correspondence with prominent 
Muslim and Christian political officials. Although these positions did not bring with them the 
same security as those of Al-Muqtadir’s court bankers—jahbadhs and traders were often subject 
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to raids during the Buyid period when there was shortfall in a given province’s budget—such 
raids were universally condemned by Muslim elites.  
It is difficult to say much about the operations of the yeshivot within Baghdad or Iraq 
during this period due to the lack of surviving source material. Nevertheless, the Cairo Geniza 
preserved a great deal of correspondence between the Babylonian yeshivot of Baghdad and 
Jewish communities and individuals in Fatimid Egypt and North Africa from the Buyid era. 
These letters offer insight into the ways in which the yeshivot related to their followers outside of 
Iraq during this period of political fragmentation and economic uncertainty. They demonstrate 
that, in the absence of a centralized state, the yeshivot continued to rely on networks of long-
distance merchants to transport letters, documents, donations, and other writings from Baghdad 
to and Egypt, and even as far west as Qayrawan and al-Andalus. As the exchange of letters 
across long distances became more central to the rule and operations of the Babylonian yeshivot, 
both the physical form and linguistic rhetoric of their letters became more elaborate and 
standardized. Through the composition of letters, the geonim, like contemporaneous Buyid 
elites, fostered a wide-ranging network of relationships with individuals across the region, both 
those who accepted their claims to halakhic authority and those who did not, such as Karaite 
Jews. They performed favors for each other, and in this way, even in the absence of a centralized 
state, affiliation with the Babylonian yeshivot still yielded concrete benefits for individuals who 
traveled between these regions.  
 
 
Yeshiva Network between East and West 
How did the Babylonian yeshivot maintain and even strengthen their relations with 
communities in North Africa during the Buyid period, when they were no longer united in the 
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same political realm? It turns out that political “borders” during this period were rather fluid. 
Neither the Fatimids nor the Buyids accepted each other’s claims to authority, and they 
employed spies and missionized in each other’s territories.39 As Jessica Goldberg’s analysis of 
the geography of Geniza merchants demonstrates, mercantile routes and networks in the 
Islamicate world were not circumscribed by political borders during this period.40 Itinerant 
merchants had always played a role in ancient Near Eastern communication networks and, in the 
absence of an imperial barīd, or postal system traversing Persia, Iraq, and North Africa, political 
and religious elites harnessed the power of commercial mercantile networks to communicate 
across long distances.41  
The yeshivot cultivated close relations with the many individuals across the 
Mediterranean who oversaw these long-distance mercantile networks. Although the yeshivot 
may not have been able to rely on income from their landholdings or from court bankers in 
Baghdad in the same way as they had in the past, these mercantile networks ensured that the 
geonim could continue to appeal to their followers abroad for monetary support. Individuals and 
communities far from Baghdad were able to transmit donations to the yeshivot through long-
distance mercantile networks using letters of credit (suftaja). By maintaining and strengthening 
relations with many different individuals and communities across the Mediterranean, the 
yeshivot could ensure that the arbitrary raid of a single wealthy patron would not have 
devastating effects on the yeshivot as a whole.  
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ed. Marianne Barrucand, (Paris: Presses de l'Universite de Paris-Sorbonne), 29-43. 
40 Jessica Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Geniza Merchants and their 
Business World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 304.  




How, exactly, did the yeshivot make use of these networks? Although we do not have 
evidence for how they communicated with their followers within Iraq, Persia, and the Levant, the 
Geniza documents offer a window into the relations between the yeshivot in Baghdad and their 
followers in Egypt and other parts of North Africa. The Geniza preserved seven original letters, 
complete with postal instructions on the verso, sent from the Babylonian yeshivot to Fustat, 
Egypt between 972 and 1040.42 All but one of the letters include postal instructions written in 
Arabic script, listing the name of the recipient, blessings on him, and his place of residence 
(Fustat or Egypt).43 The use of Arabic script suggests that non-Jewish couriers often transported 
these letters.44  
The Geniza evidence also suggests that the Babylonian geonim were unable to transmit 
letters directly from Baghdad to points west of Fustat.45 Instead, they relied on their compatriots 
within Fustat to transmit the letter to its intended recipient. Thus, if the gaon needed to contact 
one of his affiliates west of Egypt, he needed to transmit a letter through an associate in Egypt to 
the community or individual in question. For example, when a rather large sum of donations 
went missing en route from Qayrawan to Baghdad, Hayya wrote to his compatriots, Avraham 
and Tanhum, sons of Ya ʿaqov of Fez, to ask for their help in tracking down the monies. But in 
order to do so, he needed to first send the letter to a compatriot in Fustat. He informed the 
brothers that he had sent the letter at the hand of a certain Abu al-Tayyib Mar Rav ʿAmran Ha-
Levi, along with the answers to three she ʾelot that had been sent with the brothers’ previous 
                                                          
42 Sherira Gaon: T-S AS 148.49; T-S AS 146.279; Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, docs. 21, 26; Hayya Gaon: T-S 
10J27.10; Mosseri VII 157 (L 225); Mosseri I a 5 (L2); Mosseri III 206 (L 279); Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, 
docs. 39, 40, 41, 45; Shemuʾel b. Hofni: T-S Loan 169; Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 56.  
43 Mosseri VII 157 (L 225); Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 40. 
44 Goitein, Mediterranean Society Vol. I, 284. 
45 Cf., Goldberg, Trade and Institutions,” 309-310. 
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letter. The Arabic postal marks on the letter indicate that it was sent from Fustat to the two 
brothers, not from Baghdad directly.46 
In the late-tenth and first half of the eleventh century, two wealthy families of Iraqi 
origin, the Tustarīs and the Ibn ʿAwkals, operated long-distance trading networks stretching from 
Persia westward to al-Andalus.47 The Babylonian yeshivot cultivated close relations with 
members of both of these networks, although it was the Ibn ʿAwqal family of Rabbanites who 
took the lead in facilitating the transportation of letters, responsa, texts, and donations between 
the yeshivot and their followers across the Mediterranean. Ya ʿqaov b. ʿAwqal had studied at the 
Yeshiva of Pumbedita in Baghdad and was granted the title of Resh Kallah. The beginnings of 
two letters of Sherira Gaon and Hayya b. Sherira (when he was Av Beit Din) addressed to 
Yaʿaqov ibn ʿAwkal have been preserved in the Cairo Geniza.48 In one letter, Ibn ʿAwkal is 
referred to in Hebrew as the “treasurer (gizbar) of the holy yeshiva,” likely due to his role in 
overseeing, transmitting, and regulating the donations sent to the various members of the 
yeshivot.49  
 Geniza evidence indicates that Ibn ʿAwkal’s network supervised the transmission of 
sheʾelot and donations sent from major cities in North Africa to Baghdad. For example, around 
the year 1000, Ya ʿaqov b. Nissim of Qayrawan wrote to the men of Qābes, North Africa, 
regarding the transmission of their halakhic queries intended for the yeshivot in Baghdad. The 
men of Qabes had apparently sent their sheʾelot to Qayrawan with a group of messengers who 
traveled regularly between the two cities, as the sheʾelot arrived on Erev Shabbat at sunset. Ya 
ʿaqov b. Nissim wrote that he sent back to Qabes some 800 collections of letters with the same 
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47 Goldberg, Trade and Institutions, 309-310. 
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group of messengers, and, not too soon after that, transmitted another letter to Qabes with a 
certain Menahẹm, an affiliate of the yeshiva from the Land of Israel.50 
Yet these messengers did not travel beyond Qayrawan. Instead, Yaʿaqov b. Nissim, based 
in Qayrawan, needed to send the she ʾilot from Qabes to IbnʿAwkal in order for them to be sent 
to the yeshiva in Baghdad: 
I transmitted a letter to our beloved (ahuv) Abū Bishr [Ya ʿaqov b. Yosef ibn 
ʿAwkal] Treasurer of the Holy Yeshiva, and I told him…about everything, and I 
attached your questions to the letters…He assured me that they would arrive in 
peace, and their answers will come soon from now.51 
 
Despite the over four thousand kilometers separating Qayrawan and Baghdad, Ibn ʿAwkal 
assured Yaʿaqov b. Nissim that the she ʾilot would arrive in Baghdad safely and that their 
answers would arrive soon. Although Baghdad, Egypt, and North Africa had ceased to be 
connected in the same political realm, yeshiva affiliates were still able to rely on wealthy 
merchants and mercantile networks to transport texts and donations safely and efficiently across 
long distances.  
Ya ʿaqov b. ʿAwkal’s son, Yosef, resided in Cairo and, based on his surviving letters 
found in the Cairo Geniza, oriented the bulk of the family’s trade westward towards Ifrīqiyya.52 
In doing so, he became extremely wealthy, one of the wealthiest merchants represented in the 
Cairo Geniza corpus. Yusuf nevertheless also maintained his family’s affiliation with the 
Babylonian yeshivot, and he was styled with the title of Alluf of the Yeshiva. Through their 
continued affiliation with Yosef b. ʿAwkal, the yeshivot in Baghdad were able to maintain and 
strengthen their connections with communities in North Africa even after the death of his father. 
Yosef b. ʿAwkal wrote regularly to the yeshivot in Baghdad, informing them of letters, 
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donations, and sheʾelot that they should expect to receive. As a result of this information, the 
geonim were able to write to their affiliates abroad and compel them to track down donations and 
texts that had apparently gone missing. For example, in a letter from 1007, Hayya Gaon wrote to 
his compatriots, the brothers Avraham and Tanhụm b. Yaʿaqov of Fez: 
A few days ago a letter appeared before us from the darling of our eye, Abu al-Faraj 
[Yosef b. Ya ʿqov b. ʿAwqal] Alluf, may god make permanent his strength, and he 
told us that he had sent a she ʾila and was requesting its answer, but it never arrived 
to us…He told me about 70 dinars that Rabbi Khaluf b. R. Yosef z”l sent from 
Ajmāt, but we have not heard any news about them… By God, our friends, do the 
best that you can in seeing to this [matter] day and night; and do not neglect it… 
This matter is the most important of your deeds on the path to divine reward 
(thuwāb)…I am begging you to let me know who to trust in Qayrawan.53 
 
Hayya wrote this letter soon after the deaths of both his own father, Sherira, the former 
Gaon, and the yeshiva’s main contact in Qayrawan, Ya ʿaqov b. Nissim. The letter suggests that 
the breakdown in communications might have been due to the instability caused by the deaths of 
these prominent men, a situation that Hayya characterized as “the greatest of tragedies.” Still, the 
letter speaks to the strength of the trans-Mediterranean network of individuals loyal to the 
yeshiva that Hayya and Sherira had cultivated. Even after the death of the yeshiva’s main 
contacts in Qayrawan, Hayya was still able to call on others loyal to the institution to track down 
the missing monies and letters. In doing so, he characterized this service to the yeshiva as a 
divine obligation.  
Ibn ʿAwkal was not always a reliable messenger, however. In the early eleventh century, 
when Yūsuf b. ʿAwkal either neglected or was unable to deliver correspondence from the 
yeshiva, the geonim also sent letters and responsa to their followers using the long-distance 
mercantile networks operated by the Tustarīs. This is attested to in a letter from two brothers in 
Qayrawan (the sons of Berekhya) to Yūsuf b. ʿAwkal around 1007. In a previous letter, Ibn 
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ʿAwkal had written to his representative in Qayrawan, Abū ʿImrān al-Majjānī, to inform him that 
he had sent Sherira and Hayya’s letters to Qayrawan with someone he trusted, but according to 
the brothers, the letters never arrived. Their connections with the Babylonian yeshivot would 
likely have been severed “were it not for the fact that God … granted that a letter should arrive 
from my lord Hayya … via the Tustarīs.” In his letter, Hayya informed the brothers that he had 
not heard from them for five years, thus suggesting that Ibn ʿAwkal had not been transporting 
their communication as promised. 54 Regardless of why Ibn ʿAwkal might have neglected his 
duties to the yeshivot, Sherira and Hayya Gaon’s cultivated relations with other different long-
distance mercantile networks ensured that they were able to maintain contact with their followers 
far from Baghdad.  
Despite the political instability of the Buyid period and the frequency of raids against 
Jewish officials, the geonim and their followers retained a degree of trust in the integrity and 
security of this transportation system. On the one hand, they took precautions to ensure that they 
did not have to rely on a single individual or network to transport letters, texts, and donations on 
their behalf. On the other hand, in the event that correspondence to or from the yeshiva did not 
arrive as promised, the geonim and their followers almost always blamed the messenger and 
assumed that foul play was involved—often, on the part of the gaon’s rivals within the yeshiva 
itself. This is because, throughout the second half of the tenth century, yeshiva officials in 
Baghdad continued to fight each other over the distribution of income. Instead of waging intra-
yeshiva battles through the channels of the Abbasid court as they once had, they now waged 
these battles through fierce letter-writing campaigns to yeshiva affiliates abroad. They 
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complained that others within the yeshivot had stolen funds intended for them, and they tried to 
command a monopoly of the incoming donations for a given faction.  
When Nehẹmiah became Gaon of Pumbedita in 960, the previous Gaon, Aharon b. 
Sarjādo, and his followers, including a certain Nahṣhon and Sherira b. Hạnina, refused to 
recognize his authority. Sherira even maintained his own counter-yeshiva. Without access to 
centralized state power, Nehẹmya, Ibn Sarjādo, and Sherira instead appealed to Jews living 
abroad for support for their specific factions. In 960, Nehẹmya wrote to communities of Jews 
outside of Baghdad to warn them against supporting Ibn Sargado. In his letters to Fustat, he 
characterized Ibn Sarjādo as an evil man who transgressed Jewish law in the worst ways 
possible: 
How can you forget us and abandon us and crush our hearts, for this Khalāf b. 
Sarjādo, the evil one whose evils are notorious, and whose lies and falsehoods and 
deceptions have been exposed to all! It is not just that he stole for himself the 
donations that came to the scholars, but even more than that, he consumes what is 
designated for orphans and the poor, and he [informs] on us to the authorities!55 
 
In subsequent letters, Nehẹmya continued to exhort his followers to avoid assisting Ibn Sarjādo 
in any way by even opening his letters. In 963, he admonished the Babylonian community of 
Fustat:  
Do not be led astray by the stupidness … of ‘Kakhshon’ and ‘Shevira’ [puns on the 
names of Nakhshon and Sherira, from the roots meaning “to deceive” and “to 
break”], and do not help any man open their letters or reply to their letters, and do 
not read them for us. And any man that has a question or a desire, he should send 
with you [so that it will] come before us.56   
 
Sherira officially became gaon after Nehẹmya’s death in 968, but the members of 
Nehẹmya’s faction refused to accept his authority. Shemu ʾel b. Họfnī, Nehẹmya’s nephew, 
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presided over his own “school.”57 In a letter from 977, he complained that donations and sheʾelot 
intended for his faction by Shemarya b. Elhạnan were instead sent “in the name of the other 
person” (meaning Sherira), “and we [Shemuʾel’s faction] were not remembered, nor did we 
receive a portion … of the righteous man’s donations.”58 Instead, Shmu ʾel bemoaned, the 
messenger “assigned them to one of the scholars who has assumed authority.”59 None of these 
letters make any reference to the possibility of appealing to government officials, either within 
Baghdad or abroad. Instead, they ask their followers to earmark she ʾelot and donations and to 
make sure that they were transported by and delivered to affiliates of the correct faction of the 
yeshiva. 
In the 980s, the yeshiva of Sura re-opened under Sẹmah ̣Sẹdeq, and Shemuʾel b. Họfni 
assumed the title of Gaon of Sura in 999. The fighting over donations continued until the two 
yeshivot reached an agreement with one another regarding the distribution of donations that 
came to Baghdad: they would ask communities to earmark donations for a specific yeshiva; any 
money that was not specifically earmarked was divided equally between the two yeshivot. To 
symbolize the new peace between the warring families, Hayya, then Av Beit Din, married 
Shemuʾel b. Họfni’s daughter. Shemuʾel described this agreement in Hebrew in a letter from 
1008 to Qayrawan: 
Complete peace was made between us and our Lord and Master Sherira Gaon…and 
with the Gaon his son [Hayya], for his son married our daughter and a contract was 
composed between us, stating that all the donations arriving in the name of each of 
us would be for himself, none other participating; and if non-earmarked donations 
arrived, or if they were without specification or were in the name of scholars of the 
yeshiva, they would be divided, half for us and half for our son-in-law.60 
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In another letter, Shmu ʿel explained that this agreement symbolically joined the two yeshivot as 
one: 
The elders of our yeshiva assembled together with the elders from his place and 
made peace between them and us, and also with the Gaon, his son and our son-in-
law; our shield was consolidated; the three of us were as one.61  
 
Under united Abbasid rule, the government enforced the boundaries between rival Jewish 
officials. In Shmu ʿel’s letter, however, the state itself was irrelevant. The agreement involved 
connecting Sherira’s family and Shemu ʾel’s family through marriage to ensure that the bond 
between the two families would last beyond a single generation.62  
Still, this agreement between officials within Baghdad did not guarantee that letters and 
donations sent between Baghdad and the Mediterranean would be sent to their intended 
recipients. This breakdown in communications, however, was cause for alarm. When the 
individual responsible was discovered, he was subject to heavy sanctions to deter others. For 
example, the Babylonian community of Fustat reported that, for three years, they did not send 
donations to the yeshiva because they needed the money to rebuild the synagogue in Fustat, 
likely after its destruction at the hands of the Fatimid caliph al-Hạ̄kim. The situation had been so 
desperate that they even used some funds set aside for the ransoming of captives in order to 
rebuild. Even during this period, they continued to write letters to the yeshiva in Baghdad and 
await the gaon’s reply. As they explained in a letter from 1025, the yeshiva’s reply never arrived: 
We sent this letter to the presence of the Gaon, may he live forever, at the hand of 
MarʿAtạ̄f Ha-Levy b. Tov (May he rest in Eden), We apologized for the lateness of 
the renewing of the al-Akhmās (the fifths, the donations) in entirety. We built the 
synagogue, may Allah protect it, and in doing so took from the ransomed prisoners 
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a large sum. Nevertheless, we told you of our longing and waiting for arrivals of 
the letters of His Presence (Hayya Gaon), may God exalt him.63  
 
Three years later, the community figured out why they had never received the gaon’s response. 
The gaon’s letter had been delivered first to a certain Rav Avraham Bahịr ha-Yeshiva, but when 
he sent the letter on to the community in Fustat with another messenger, it never arrived.64 
Having identified the messenger who failed to deliver the letters as promised, the Babylonians in 
Fustat sought to avoid the problem again. They suggested that the yeshiva in Baghdad flog the 
official in the presence of the entire yeshiva to dissuade others from negligence: 
Today is three years but we were told that here is the one who took the letters that 
we received. So we ask our Gaon to brand him in the presence of the yeshiva, 
vigorously with clubs, the one who does this and plotted this. Write to us when you 
do this so that we will also do it, since this will be a great benefit.65 
 
Thus, even in the absence of a single polity connecting Iraq, Egypt, and other parts of North 
Africa, the yeshivot were able to harness the power and integrity of long-distance mercantile 
networks to communicate with and solicit donations from individuals and communities far from 
Baghdad. Most significantly, the network of yeshiva-affiliated individuals and communities 
assumed that their correspondence would be delivered to the intended recipient. If not, they 
almost always assumed foul play. They called on other individuals in their network to 
investigate, and, when they determined the guilty party responsible for the missing letters, they 
imposed a heavy punishment.   
 
Epistolary Practices 
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During the Buyid era, in the absence of concrete confessional and political borders, the 
exchange of letters took on an increased significance. Maurice Pomerantz argues that, for 
Arabic-speaking Muslim elites, letters aspired to re-constitute an idealized past, a world order 
governed according to Islamic principles and just authority.66 The rules governing the 
composition of epistolary prose also served as a way to inscribe and preserve the boundaries 
between different strata of society. The composition and transmission of letters came to serve a 
similar function for the yeshivot, which were in a similar period of transition.  
Throughout this period, the geonim emphasized the importance of scribes in the yeshiva 
hierarchy. In the second half of the tenth century, geonim began extending greetings on behalf of 
the sofer, or scribe of the yeshiva, a Hebrew equivalent of the Arabic kātib, or secretary. The 
sofer was responsible for the composition and copying of letters. He ensured that their contents 
were eloquent, understandable, and in keeping with legal principles. In the new yeshiva 
hierarchy developing at the end of the tenth century, the sofer was a privileged position held by 
the son of the current Gaon. In fact, both Hayya b. Sherira Gaon and Yisraʾel b. Shmuʾel b. 
Họfni Gaon served as scribes for their respective fathers, and they identified themselves as such 
in the letters that they drafted.  
The yeshiva scribes increasingly modeled the physical form of their documents on 
contemporaneous Abbasid and Buyid chancery practices. For example, just as a new form of 
cursive Arabic script had developed in the tenth century, so too did yeshiva-affiliated scribes in 
the chancery of Nehẹmya Gaon in the 960s develop a distinct calligraphic cursive documentary 
Hebrew script. This script was used by most subsequent geonim.67 Additionally, yeshiva scribes 
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wrote the name of the Gaon sending the letter on a single line, echoing the use of tarjamas, or 
headings, in Abbasid (and later Fatimid) petitions, in which the name of the sender was also 
written as a header, separate from the body of the text.68 The vast majority of original geonic 
letters contain large spaces between lines and a large margin on the left, echoing the style of 
extant Fatimid documents. The yeshiva scribes made sure to leave the verso mostly blank, so that 
a letter could be folded up in such a way that the writing of the letter was concealed on the 
inside. Thus, even in letters complaining of their abject poverty, the geonim distinguished their 
letters from mundane mercantile correspondence through their wanton use of paper. Their use of 
royal diplomatics emphasized the continued prestige of their institutions even in the absence of a 
formal relationship with a centralized state. 
Yeshiva scribes also came to apply such elements of Arabic epistolary prose as puns and 
rhyming couplets to the Hebrew prose of the yeshiva’s correspondence.69 In so doing, they 
developed a uniquely Jewish “Rabbanite” register of epistolary, replete with quotations from the 
Hebrew Bible, Mishnah, and Talmud that emphasized the eloquence of Hebrew above the literal 
meaning of the text.70 The influence of Buyid epistolary prose is particularly apparent in the 
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flowery, literary, Hebrew introductions that preceded nearly every letter exchanged between 
yeshiva affiliates. The geonim and their followers made sure to preface nearly all of their letters 
with a Hebrew introduction, including those whose body was in Judeo-Arabic. For example, the 
Babylonian community of Fustat addressed Hayya Gaon with the following rhyming couplets in 
Hebrew in the introduction to a Judeo-Arabic letter: 
Li-Kavod Yaqar Haderet/ Fiʾar Sạfiret/Gadulet Segulet/ Dagelet Qadeshet 
/Yashishet Qashishet Marenu V’Rabeinu Hayya Gaon Kol Yisraʾel71  
To the honored, dear presence of the glory of the great treasured siren, the holy, ancient, 
venerable banner of our master and Rabbi Hayya, Gaon of all of Israel 
 
In one letter to Hạyya Gaon that did not contain this Hebrew introduction, the writer, al-
Baradānī, the Hạzzan of the synagogue of Baghdad, made a special point to apologize for 
composing his letter in Arabic, rather than Hebrew: 
I apologize for writing this letter in Arabic, but I was away, and when I 
returned…my heart was occupied by letters that arrived from my sons that said in 
them that one of my sisters, the son of another sister, and the son of [my] daughter 
had died…My lord Gaon, I have not found a single person to go on the 
Pilgrimage.72 And I do not have a letter formulary [rasūm kitāb73], so I wrote this 
letter quickly, relying on your favor, that you will excuse me.74 
 
Similarly, the geonim referred to their affiliates using such idioms as the Hebrew ahovenu (our 
love) and yedidenu (our beloved). All of these terms hearkened back to biblical ideas of 
covenantal love and emphasized the close relations between the yeshivot and their followers. By 
composing the majority of their letters in literary Hebrew rather than the everyday spoken 
language of Arabic and employing Hebrew idioms alluding to biblical notions of covenantal 
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loyalty when addressing their followers, individuals affiliated with the Babylonian yeshivot 
elevated and distinguished their correspondence from more mundane mercantile and political 
communication.  
 In fact, when men submitted she ʾelot to the yeshiva in Baghdad, they typically sent them 
to other yeshiva affiliates well in advance of when they would be sent to Baghdad. That way, 
other yeshiva affiliates with higher ranks in the hierarchy could look them over and make any 
necessary revisions to ensure that the she ʾelot were as eloquent and halakhically sound as 
possible. When the men of Qabes submitted she ʾelot to Yaʿaqov b. Nissim without any time to 
look them over, he admonished them: 
This matter is difficult for me. Why did you send him, in this way, since there was 
no space to read over your questions? If there was a place that needed a repair I 
would have repaired it … My brother, do not do as before. Send [letters] to me 
before the holiday.75 
 
The shared knowledge of literary, epistolary Hebrew, the language of Halakha, and the use of titles 
and idioms of affection created a fraternity of elite Rabbanite Jews across the Mediterranean who 
were loyal to each other and to the institution of the yeshiva.  
But, like their Muslim counterparts, the geonim also corresponded with and entered into 
patronage relationships with those who did not share their religious vision or recognize their 
authority, such as Karaite Jews. As discussed earlier, Hayya Gaon relied on the Karaite Tustarīs 
to transport letters on his behalf. Moreover, around 998, Shmu ʾel b. Hofnī wrote to a follower in 
Fustat, hoping to cultivate a group of the city’s “prominent men” (wujūh), possibly a reference to 
individuals with government affiliations, who could be “prodded” to benefit him in the same way 
as his patrons in Baghdad. In doing so, he asked the letter recipient to thank a Karaite named 
Abū Sulaymān David b. Bapshād “since he has evinced toward me nothing but kindness and 
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benefited me and been loyal to me … let him know of the esteem in which I hold his loyalty.”76 
The gaon characterized this relationship as a bond of loyalty between two individuals only, 
without any adherence to wider shared ideals or the institution of the yeshiva as a whole.  
 
Favors for Individuals 
 These connections with a wide variety of elites throughout the Mediterranean ensured 
that relations with the yeshivot brought concrete benefits to the yeshiva and to those with whom 
they corresponded, even without a relationship with a centralized political authority. For 
example, around 990, Elhạnan b. Shemarya, the son of the head of the community of 
Babylonians in Fustat, traveled to Mosụl with his partner. He hoped to travel on to Baghdad, but 
Sahl, the alluf of the yeshiva who was also a judge in Mosụl, wrote to Sẹmah ̣Sẹdeq, the gaon of 
Sura to tell him that Elhạnan and his partner were scared of traveling to Baghdad because they 
feared that the government would rob them. Sẹmah ̣Sẹdeq immediately did everything that he 
could to assist Elhạnan b. Shemarya and his compatriot. He wrote that, when he heard that 
Elh̩anan was in Mosul, “Our soul was revived just as if our son of blessed memory…were 
standing among us, just as ‘the spirit of Jacob revived for he (Joseph) was alive (Gen 45:27) even 
though he did not believe it at the time.’” He continued, “You are precious to us and known for 
your greatness in Torah, and for the piety and righteousness of your father, the elder in wisdom 
and love of the Lord.”77 Semah Sedeq assured Elhạnan that the Yeshiva of Sura would protect 
him: “We made an oath to [our deputy] that if you came with the help of God, you would not 
have a problem.” Although Elhạnan never made it to Baghdad, Sẹmah ̣Sẹdeq explained, “[w]e 
took it upon ourselves to provide [Elhạnan] with the shakhor ha-derekh (the road tax) that he 
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will need [to return to the land of Israel], and we paid all of his expenses … from one hundred to 
one thousand pieces of silver.” 78 By instructing his deputies to pay Elhạnan’s expenses, Sẹmah ̣
Sẹdeq helped him navigate the complicated, decentralized political apparatus of Buyid Iraq. The 
gaon was so concerned that his letter would reach Elhạnan in Fustat that he paid a Muslim 
courier ten dirhams to transport it. This postal fee (al-hạq) is recorded in Arabic script on the 
verso of the letter.79   
Similarly, in 1030 when Sahlān b. Avraham of Fustat faced a threat to his leadership, 
Hayya offered to write to Abū l-Nas̟r Fad̟l al-Tustarī, a prominent Fatimid courtier and Karaite 
Jew to “ask him…to direct his solicitude (‘ināya) towards you” and intercede on his behalf, 
likely before the Fatimid government.80 In doing so, Hayya cited Sahlān’s “covenantal loyalty 
(‘ahd) [to the yeshiva] and the firmness of my heart.”81 Here, the leader of the Babylonian-
Rabbanite yeshiva residing in Buyid Iraq asks a Karaite Jewish government official in Fatimid 
Egypt to perform a favor for another Rabbanite—to thank him for his loyalty to the yeshiva in 
Baghdad. This transaction epitomizes the overlapping forms of personal loyalty characteristic of 
Buyid-era political relations and the relative insignificance of the political borders between 
different territories. 
Another example of the benefit of such ties was the ability to conduct business more 
easily in various locations across the Mediterranean. For example, when a man from Baghdad 
needed to claim his brother’s property in Fustat, Hayya wrote to Elh̟anan b. Shemarya, his 
representative in Fustat on behalf of the two brothers: 
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I was asked to write on behalf of a man in Fustat, and he is Abu al-Fadḷ Mar Rav 
Yosef b. Bishr, may God help him, and his brother, the Sheikh Abu al-Hạsan Mar 
Rav ʿAlī b. Bishr, may god make permanent his strength, was entrusted to claim 
[Abu al-Fadḷ’s] rightful property [in Fustat], and the power of attorney [al-awrāka] 
is in my handwriting, and it is true. And this man who is entrusted, who is the lord 
Abu al-H̩asan…comes from prestige in Baghdad, of nobility among its elders. I am 
asking you, my lord, the Rosh Ha-Seder … not to bother him in summoning him 
for trial…and help him, the lord Abu al-H̩asan, in his writing to his brother 
regarding what he can do to advance his affairs and his rights.82 
 
Presumably, the brothers could have reclaimed their property using the court system in Egypt, 
provided that the legal documents that gave them the rights to the property were admissible. Yet 
by enlisting a prominent religious leader from their city of origin to vouch on behalf of their 
character, the brothers likely were able to avoid a lengthy legal battle.   
Thus, there were material benefits to affiliation with the yeshivot even in the absence of a 
direct relationship between the yeshivot and a centralized political power. The geonim and their 
followers, all of whom were embedded in political and mercantile associations throughout the 
Mediterranean, leveraged their diffuse networks on each other’s behalf. When they described 
performing these favors, however, they emphasized that the relationship between the yeshiva and 
its deputies transcended the individual patron-client relations that saturated the surrounding 
Islamicate society.  
 
 
Part III: Covenant Yeshiva, Politics of Powerlessness 
Beginning in the ninth century, the geonim bestowed on their affiliates abroad honorary 
titles that had originally been reserved for the scholars in Babylonia.83 For the title-holder, a title 
from the yeshiva gave him prestige and authority within his own community. It also meant that 
                                                          
82 T-S 10 J 27.10r, l.5-11. Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 39. 
83 Ben Sasson, “Varieties of inter-communal relations in the Geonic period,” Jews of Medieval Islam: Community, 
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he, himself, had a stake in ensuring the well-being of the yeshivot in Baghdad and spreading a 
message extolling their authority and primacy in Jewish tradition.  
But from where, exactly, did the authority of Babylonia derive? And what meaning did it 
have outside of Abbasid territory? The answers to these questions were not at all clear during the 
second half of the tenth century, when the political models that had once given power to the 
yeshivot had become obsolete. Babylonian Jews, like their Muslim counterparts, missionized 
throughout Fatimid territory, experimenting with different models explaining the relationship 
between their own religious authority and political power. They justified their own authority 
outside of the areas in which they had access to actual political power. This section will consider 
the process by which the yeshivot came to articulate an argument for their continued authority in 
Jewish tradition, ultimately deriving their authority, as rabbis, from a conscious rejection of the 
corruption of gentile politics.  
 
A Covenantal Community 
During the Buyid era, the geonim described the bond between themselves and their 
followers as a covenant (brit) which hearkened back to the original covenant that God made with 
Abraham and his descendants (Gen. 17:7).84 In the Hebrew Bible, the terms ahavah and yedidut 
describe covenantal love, the relationship between God and the Jewish people.85 Every gaon 
during the Buyid era made use of this language in addressing his followers. As Nehẹmya Gaon 
wrote to his compatriots in Fustat in 962:   
                                                          
84 In his letter from 928, Sa’adya never describes the relationship between the yeshivot and the community as being 
rooted in a covenant, nor does he make reference to ancestral ties between the two communities. The language of 
covenant, while based on traditional notions of Jewish community, became more pronounced during the Buyid era. 
85 Seth Schwartz, Were the Jews a Mediterranean Society? Reciprocity and Solidarity in Ancient Judaism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 168. 
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And (it is) out of all of our love for you [and] the closeness of the covenant which 
is between us and among you that we write to you every year and look forward and 
hope that you remember [our] love (ahava) and covenant and friendship (yedidut), 
and that you remember us and the sages of the yeshiva, and to send [the various 
types of donations] just as your ancestors—may their memory be a blessing—did 
a long time ago and also as you did in the days of the (previous gaon).86 
 
It is easy to read this as boilerplate geonic language. After all, the yeshivot had been in operation 
for hundreds of years, and they traced their genealogy back to the sages of the Talmud. 
Nevertheless, the claims to antiquity became increasingly important during the Buyid period 
when the power of the state could no longer justify the supremacy of the yeshivot. Without the 
centralized institutions of the Abbasid state to rely on, the geonim instead invoked their historic 
covenantal relationship to the communities under their jurisdiction—a relationship that pre-dated 
and would outlive the now-obsolete Abbasid State.  
 This covenant was instantiated every year when the communities and officials under the 
gaon’s authority swore an oath of loyalty to him, as attested to in a Judeo-Arabic responsum 
from the Cairo Geniza:  
The well-known usage of the people which is manifest and recognized concerning 
the renewal of the authorization of judges every year and the subordination of the 
reshuyot of the two yeshivot to their heads. 87  
 
Yet even if the community or individual did not swear an oath of loyalty to the gaon in a given 
year, the covenantal relationship remained in effect. As the gaon went on to explain:  
The authority [of the geonim] is in accordance with the traditional norms. No 
individual of the people, nor any community may change the tradition accepted by 
the forefathers for official custom is in accordance with it … all of this would be 
obligatory to these people regarding the Rosh Yeshiva who has authority over their 
district, even if they had not sworn to him in accordance with what has been 
discussed in this responsum. As for the previously mentioned oath of theirs, it has 
the status of an oath to fulfil a commandment and is obligatory to them.88 
 
                                                          
86 London. Bodleain Library, MS Heb 12.25r, l.8-10; Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael, doc. 15.  




In essence, the covenant between the geonim and those subject to their reshut was based on 
“traditional norms” and the practices of the community’s forefathers. An individual or 
community’s disloyalty did not negate the oath of loyalty to the yeshiva that their ancestors had 
made even centuries earlier. Rather, the covenant remained in effect for all eternity, even—and 
especially—during times of political upheaval. 
 
 
The Jewish Body-Politic 
During the Buyid period, letters from the yeshivot emphasized the symbiotic relationship 
between the yeshivot and their followers. The authority of the Babylonian yeshivot derived, not 
from external political power, but from their eternal position as the “heads” of the worldwide 
Jewish body-politic. If the yeshivot in Babylonia suffered, Jewish communities as far away as 
Egypt and Qayrawan would also suffer. This Jewish body-politic existed independent from 
external forms of political power. 
Rabbinic sources had emphasized the significance of the Sanhedrin, the mythical 
precursors of the yeshivot, for the wellbeing of Israel. They likened the Sanhedrin to a vineyard, 
and they compared scholars to grape clusters.89 Geonim made ample use of this Hebrew and 
Aramaic imagery in their letters. In letters from both 968 and 970, Sherira quoted the Babylonian 
Talmud: 
This people (Israel) is like a vine: its branches are the aristocracy, its clusters the 
scholars, its leaves the common people, its twigs those in Israel that are devoid of 
learning. This is what was meant…‘Let the clusters pray for the leaves, for were it 
not for the leaves the clusters could not exist’ (H̩ullin 92a).90 
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The metaphor of the grape vine emphasized the interdependence between the yeshivot and their 
followers. The yeshivot not only depended on the “leaves”, or their donors within the Jewish 
community as a whole, but also prayed on their behalf.  
Sherira also likened the Jewish people as a whole to a body; the yeshiva was the head, 
without which the rest of the body could not survive:  
How can you believe that you will remain intact and that your houses of study will 
not suffer while the yeshiva goes to pieces? We are your heads, as it is written: 
‘Your heads—your tribes’ (Deut. 29:9; i.e., there are no tribes where there are no 
heads). How can a body remain intact when the head is sick? The body goes after 
the head…‘My house lies in ruins while you busy yourselves each with his own 
house’ (Haggai 1:4).91 
 
In this way, Sherira argues, even if a community has learned scholars who patronize their own 
school of Jewish learning, this is not enough. This local school will suffer if the yeshivot suffer, 
since they are bound together and dependent on each other, regardless of the political boundaries 
between them. In essence, the worldwide Jewish body-politic transcended the fleeting nature of 
contemporaneous political events.    
 
“Seeking modestly, humility, and meekness:” The Letter of Sherira Gaon 
By the end of the tenth century, the geonim came to define themselves, as rabbis, in 
direct opposition to state power. They did not simply argue that gentile politics was irrelevant to 
the relationship between the yeshivot and the communities who wrote to them. They derived 
their authority from their unequivocal rejection of the corruption of gentile politics.  
In 987, leaders of the Jewish community of Qayrawan wrote to Sherira Gaon, at the 
Yeshiva of Pumbedita, to ask for an explanation of the chain of transmission/authority of Jewish 
tradition and the names of all of the rabbinic authorities from after the time of the completion of 
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the Talmud up to the present day. The question itself exemplifies contemporaneous theological 
issues in the Islamicate world more broadly regarding the nature of oral transmission of sacred 
texts. The yeshiva’s deputies wanted a responsum that could counter the challenges of both 
Karaite Jews and Muslims, who questioned the authenticity of the Oral Torah and the authority 
of contemporaneous rabbis (and, by extension, the rabbis of Qayrawan) to teach it.92  
Sherira’s answer took the form of a shalsheret, or chain of transmission, hearkening back 
to Mishnah Avot. Overall, the text provided a spiritual genealogy depicting an uninterrupted 
chain of transmission from Yehudah ha-Nasi all the way down to Sherira and his son Hayya that 
legitimated their own authority as the inheritors of the entirety of the Oral Torah.   
Most of this account was consistent with previous geonic sources, and it provides a 
halakhic justification for rabbinic authority. It also served to counter the arguments of the 
Karaites, who asserted that the Oral Torah was made up. Yet throughout the text, Sherira 
condemns Jewish merchants and other Jewish officials who had close relations with the state, in 
direct contrast to previous texts. For example, Sherira describes Aharon b. Yosef ha-Kohen 
Khalāf b. Sargado, the Gaon of Pumbedita from 942-960, as a merchant who was not learned and 
should never have been appointed gaon in the first place:  
Aharon b. Yosef ha-Kohen was appointed to the gaonate. He was not from the 
descendants of the rabbis. Rather he was from merchants, and Mar Rav Mevasher 
Gaon had appointed him to sit in the Great Row in the Yeshiva. And this was not 
because he was fit to succeed our father the Gaon in the geonate. Rather the post 
should have gone to Mar RʿAmram the Av, the brother of our mother.93 
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Natan ha-Bavli, by contrast, had praised Aharon’s erudition and emphasized his father-in-law’s 
role in brokering a peace agreement between David b. Zakkay and Saʿadya Gaon. The Geniza 
has preserved fragments of Aharon’s Judeo-Arabic commentary on the Pentateuch as well as 
some of his responsa. His responsa were known by and cited by later scholars, including 
Maimonides, Abraham b. Ezra, and even Sherira himself.94 So why, in his letter, did Sherira 
describe Ibn Sarjādo’s identity as a “merchant” as a disqualification from being a scholar or 
gaon?  
The political context in which Sherira lived can provide some clarification. As a 
“merchant,” Aharon was part of a class of individuals who had once provided the yeshivot with a 
conduit to political power. After the fragmentation of the caliphate, however, this position 
involved taking part in the often messy, unstable world of Buyid politics, a world of reciprocity. 
For Sherira, connection with this world was inherently corrupting, and the qualities of a 
successful merchant were antithetical to the ideal qualities of the Gaon, the halakhic arbiter of 
the entire Jewish people. Moreover, in this narrative, the noble, ancient, and interrupted ancestry 
of the rabbis is contrasted with the “merchants” who have no ancestry worth mentioning.  
Sherira, instead, emphasized that not only was he from an uninterrupted lineage of rabbis, 
but also that he and his son were of exilarchic descent. In a society that valued lineage and 
ancestry, this noble ancestry would further legitimate Sherira’s authority. At the same time, 
Sherira claimed that his exilarchic ancestors had abandoned the “evil ways” of the exilarchs: 
The exilarchs exercised heavy handed authority and wielded great power in the 
days of the Persians and in the days of the Ishmaelites. For they would buy the 
exilarchate for large sums of money, and some of them would greatly torment the 
rabbis and trouble them. Our ancestors were of exilarchic descent. However, they 
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abandoned all those evil ways of the exilarchate and joined the rabbis of the 
(yeshiva) seeking humility and debasement.95  
 
In Sherira’s account, the exilarchs’ evil ways derived from the corruption inherent in their close 
relations with the state. They paid government officials to appoint them to their posts, and they 
used the force of the state to oppress the rabbis. Sherira’s ancestors, by contrast, repudiated this 
corrupt relationship with gentile power in favor of “humility and debasement,” and these values 
were the foundation of the geonic yeshivot. 
Needless to say, this is patently false. The geonim were eager to wield the power of the 
state whenever it could serve their interests. Only a few decades earlier, Natan Ha-Bavli had 
used the relationship to state power to legitimate the authority of the geonim.  
So why did Sherira describe relations with the state as so inherently corrupting and 
incompatible with rabbinic scholarship? The answer almost certainly has to do with the political 
context in which Sherira lived. In the decentralized Buyid polity, Sherira had no “state” to extol. 
Unlike his predecessor Saʿadya, Sherira could not invite Jews in Fustat or Qayrawan to write to 
him to intercede on their behalf before the caliph. Instead of interpreting this as a defeat, Sherira 
turned the esteem for government power on its head. Sherira’s own powerlessness was itself a 
sign of virtue and of his position as the heir to the eternal authority of the rabbis. 
This rhetoric of powerlessness was remarkably useful for the yeshiva’s title-holders 
outside of Buyid territory. Precisely because it so rejected contemporaneous politics, Sherira’s 
letter constituted a useful path for advancing the authority of rabbinic leaders in many different 
historical and political contexts. It became the foundation text for halakhic history, used by Rashi 
(France) and Avraham Ibn Dawud (Christian Spain). By the end of the twelfth century, the vast 
majority of Jews throughout the Mediterranean and Western Europe considered themselves to be 
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heirs to the Babylonian tradition as expressed in Sherira’s letter, and they understood this 
tradition to have defined itself explicitly in opposition to gentile political power throughout its 
history. 
 
“The Power and Majesty of the Kingdom” 
This tradition developed in the very specific decentralized world of Buyid Iraq. When 
political circumstances changed, such that a relationship with centralized political authority did 
in fact yield the same benefits as before, rabbinic leaders, like their predecessors during the 
united Abbasid Caliphate, glorified the gentile authorities of their own polity to those with whom 
they corresponded.  
Consider this letter from 1030 written by Eliyahu b. Avraham, Beit Din of the Yeshiva of 
Baghdad based in Raqqa, to Ya ʿaqov b. Yosef, Hạver of the Yeshiva, in Hạlab (Aleppo), in part, 
regarding the transmission of letters from the yeshivot of Baghdad to various communities in 
Syria. In 1022, the Mirdasid Dynasty, centered in Hạlab, had taken control of Raqqa, thus uniting 
the two territories in the same political realm. He began the letter as follows:  
Receive greetings…from us, the Beit Din, and from our dear Son Mar RavʿAmram 
and from our fellows, the elders of the three communities [Babylonian Rabbanites, 
Palestinian Rabbanites, and Karaites] that reside with us at the gate of our Beit Din 
to bring forth stolen objects and damages from the hands of oppressors from many 
years ago with the help of the ‘holy one, may his name be blessed’ and with the 
splendor of the Torah that has been bequeathed to us and the splendor of the 
kingdom that deals kindly with us and continues to bestow a string of kindness on 
us, before them.96 
 
This introduction is noteworthy because contemporaneous letters related to the Babylonian 
yeshivot do not make explicit references to gentile political power and, as we have seen, Sherira 
had characterized relations with gentile political power as inherently corrupting. The vast 
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majority of Eliyahu’s letter, written in literary Hebrew, extends greetings on behalf of his own 
yeshiva and the yeshivot in Baghdad to the men of Hạlab. On the back of the letter, however, 
Eliyahu explains in detail the events to which he alludes in the introduction regarding the 
kingdom’s “kindness” to him: 
We in this place need to balance between two factions of Rabbanites and the 
Karaites because they are also found in our Reshut. … Last week, we took an 
apartment from thieves among the Karaites who had stolen [from us], thirteen years 
ago today. We returned it to an orphan girl. One of the thieves began to chatter, 
exaggerating about us. His words were heard by the Lord of our land, from our 
fellow man and from some of their judges. He sent after me a police officer. So I 
went to him, since every Monday and Thursday we enter to greet the judge and the 
criminals among the gentiles and the nobles of the polity. And if there is a need or 
request for a witness among our people, no one from among the guards outside 
prevents us [from entering]. When I went to him, to the presence of the house of 
the king … he said to me: ‘What is this that we heard, that one of the [Karaites] 
cursed [you], and why did you not tell us at once to send oppressors after him to 
exile him to uncultivated land, and announce in the markets and the streets that 
anyone who conceals this individual renounces all of his possessions will be killed 
and his house and shop will be sealed.’ And when his neighbors saw that all of this 
harm came from the government, they came and placated with us [the yeshiva 
authorities] not to kill him. When I saw this, I crawled in fear. … They beat him 
with whips in public, according to their custom. So I returned to placate the lord of 
the land to repair the damage, but he told me to calm myself since by my doing this 
it gained the force of law. All of the Jews heard and were in fear and they will not 
continue to sin knowingly against you. And [now] many of the sons of our people 
are strict in bringing forth stolen objects under their hand because of the power of 
the majesty of the kingdom.97  
 
In essence, the Muslim authorities heard that an individual had cursed Eliyahu in public, and in 
retaliation, they flogged him, seized his property, and threatened to kill him and those who 
protected him. Realizing that the gentile authorities would enforce Eliyahu’s rulings, a number of 
Jews who had stolen from the Beit Din in previous years—likely when the government was 
fragmented and did not have the power or desire to enforce the rulings of Jewish leaders—came 
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forward and returned the money because they feared physical punishment at the hands of the 
gentile authorities.  
Although Eliyahu “crawled in fear” when he saw the government forces flog the thief and 
seize his property, he ultimately recognized that the people’s fear of government sanctions would 
only work to his advantage. In concluding the letter, he characterized the government’s actions 
as fulfilling God’s will, ultimately leading to a “peaceful resolution”:  
The holy one blessed be he lights up our eyes with his Torah and ensures our 
successes since this nation of prophets cannot be vanquished. And were it not for 
the glory of the kingdom we would never have found the stolen money. I told you 
this story, my dears, so that you will know of our troubles with them and the 
peaceful resolution.98 
Even as the Babylonian geonim of the Buyid period denounced involvement with gentile 
political power as inherently corrupting, oppressive, and antithetical to rabbinic values, their 
followers sought the stability and power that such a relationship could provide. 
 
Conclusion 
The political fragmentation of the Buyid period led to a proliferation of provincial courts 
throughout Iraq and the Mediterranean, many of which employed Jewish officials. Despite the 
instability inherent in their positions, Jewish jahbadhs were integrated into elite Buyid social 
networks, and they were able to network with a wide variety of high-placed individuals 
throughout the Mediterranean.  
The yeshivot, though deprived of a relationship with a centralized political power, were 
able to take advantage of long-distance mercantile networks to communicate with their followers 
in communities far from Baghdad. The geonim and their followers developed a unique scribal 
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and epistolary tradition based on a fusion of Abbasid/Buyid chancery practices and traditional 
Jewish rhetoric; in doing so, they cultivated an elite network of individuals loyal to the institution 
of the yeshiva. At the same time, the geonim networked with individuals of different 
backgrounds; they used these connections to perform favors for those with whom they 
corresponded. The connection with the yeshiva continued to yield concrete benefits for their 
followers.  
Ultimately, however, the geonim asserted that connections with gentile political power 
were irrelevant to the yeshiva’s claims to authority over Jews worldwide. This tradition, which 
reached its apotheosis in the Letter of Sherira Gaon, constituted a direct response to the political 
challenges of Buyid Iraq. It would also define rabbinic culture’s “understanding of its own 
literary formation” for centuries to come.99  
The yeshivot were revived during the Buyid era because of the persistence of ties 
between Baghdad and the Mediterranean, as well as the relative openness of Buyid political 
culture to non-Muslim participation in elite social networks. Yet by the second third of the 
eleventh century, those conditions had begun to change. The Buyid confederation, never entirely 
united, gradually lost territory to Turkish Seljuq invaders, and long-distance trading networks 
between Iraq and the Mediterranean declined. Within Iraq, Sunni Muslims objected more and 
more to what they considered a non-legitimate dynasty, and they increasingly tried to limit the 
role of non-Muslims in government. The next chapter will look at the effects of the newly-
ascendant Seljuq-Sunni state on Jewish courtiers and institutions in Baghdad throughout the 
second half of the eleventh century. 
  
 
                                                          









In 1037, the nobles, qādị̄s, witnesses, and religious scholars of the caliph al-Qā ʿim 
gathered in the guard house of the Abbasid palace. There, they summoned the jathlīq of the 
Christians (the Nestorian patriarch) and the ra ʾis al-jālūt (the Jewish exilarch) of the Jews to 
appear before them. Once the representatives of the Jews and Christians arrived, the officials 
issued a caliphal decree, ordering the Jews and the Christians to wear distinguishing clothing 
(ghiyār) as befitting their status as dhimmī “requiring them to be noticeable and humbled and 
submissive and to be distinguished from the Muslims to enhance the grandeur of Islam and its 
people." The Muslim chronicler and judge Ibn al-Jawzī copied the text of the decree in his Kitāb 
al-Muntazạm. The text that Ibn al-Jawzī recorded did not specify exactly what constituted the 
ghiyār, though it probably hearkened back to Harun Al-Rashid’s Kitāb al-Kharāj, requiring the 
wearing of a zunnār (round thick cord) around the waist and some sort of distinguishing 
headgear for men.1 According to Ibn al-Jawzī, neither the exilarch nor the patriarch raised any 
objection: “They said they heard and will obey.”2 
During the previous hundred years of Buyid rule, the caliphs had been virtually 
powerless, unable to issue any binding rulings, let alone restrictions on dhimmīs. But beginning 
in 1037, and especially after the Seljuq conquest of Baghdad, caliphs and sultans continually 
issued decrees imposing the ghiyār on dhimmīs, and the population expressed a great deal of 
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animosity towards Jews who held positions in the governmental bureaucracy. Why did the issue 
of dhimmīs become so central and problematic for the state during the Seljuq period? How did 
this impact Jewish government officials and, by extension, the communities they represented? 
This chapter examines the effect of Seljuq rule and a new Sunni ascendancy on the Jews 
of Iraq. Part I explores the social and political dynamics of Baghdad during this period, 
examining the debates and contradictions surrounding the place of non-Muslims in a majority-
Sunni society and government. Part II explores how Jewish communal leaders in Baghdad tried 
to navigate this new political context and advance their own interests and those of their co-
religionists before the state. Part III uses the fragmentary surviving Jewish sources to suggest 
how these changes created a crisis of ideals in the Jewish community, forcing them to reevaluate 
their own relationship with the state once more. 
 
Part I: The Rise of the Seljuqs 
After 945, the Abbasid caliph had been rendered nearly powerless. By the end of the 
tenth century, however, as the Buyids lost control of their armies, the situation started to reverse. 
The caliph al-Qādir (r. 991-1031) appointed his own judges, intervened in intra-urban disputes 
on behalf of Sunni jurists, and issued edicts attacking Mu’tazilites and Shiites; he required any 
Mu’tazilite to formally repent before being appointed to a religious office. On his deathbed in 
1030, he successfully appointed his son, al-Qā ʿim, as his successor. Al-Qā’im continued his 
father’s policies and further expanded his influence within the city. One of the most significant 
ways in which he asserted his prerogative as “commander of the faithful” was in issuing the edict 
requiring dhimmīs to wear the ghiyār in 1037.3  
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That same year, the Turkish Seljuqs conquered Nishapur. Typically, the Seljuqs, a 
nomadic dynasty, pillaged the cities they conquered. But Al-Qā ‘im sent messengers to them 
forbidding them from doing so, and the Seljuqs, who were Sunnis, responded favorably to his 
requests. When the Buyid’s chief official, Al-Basasiri, seemed to be acquiring too much power, 
the caliph invited the Seljuqs to enter Baghdad in 1055. By 1059, with the help of the Turkish 
Seljuqs and their charismatic leader Tughril Bek, the caliph expelled the Shiite Buyids from 
Baghdad, reestablishing Sunni hegemony in the city for the next two hundred years.  
Theoretically, the Abbasid caliphs hoped to restore the religious mores of the first century 
of Islam. Yet they found themselves ruling over a vastly different polity than the one in which 
the caliphate had been established. For one thing, Baghdad’s population had become majority-
Muslim. 4 In addition, unlike the situation in the eighth century, the caliphs did not have direct 
control of their army and were thus dependent on the Seljuq sultans for the force necessary to 
govern. And rather than serving as the saviors of the caliphs as later sources would remember 
them, the Seljuqs tried to minimize their influence as much as possible. During the next hundred 
years, the Seljuq sultans and the Abbasid caliphs, though allegedly bound to each other through a 
covenant of loyalty ( ʿahd), competed with each other for control over Baghdad’s key institutions 
and for the allegiances of its populations. 
The public sphere was transformed during this period. Caliphs, sultans, and private 
individuals endowed a great number of large-scale building projects, including the construction 
of madrasas, mosques, and palaces. Caliphs and sultans alike tried to promote Sunni-Islamic 
behavior, and, as Christian Lange argues, they transformed the position of the muhṭasib, a market 
inspector who had the right to enter private homes and regulate what took place within them 
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under the Buyids, into a more religious-inquisitorial role,.The muhṭasib of Baghdad was ordered 
to prevent women from wandering outside at night for amusement, and he flogged owners of 
bathhouses who did not ensure that men wore a loincloth inside of their establishments.5  
Brothels were banned.6 The muhtasib also outlawed public Shiite celebrations and enforced 
restrictions on non-Muslims.  
It is perhaps most useful to understand these developments in the context of the rise and 
consolidation of Sunni religious scholars, the ʿulamā ʾ, as a powerful social group within the city 
of Baghdad. During the Buyid period, most of the ʿulamāʾ in Baghdad were foreigners who 
traveled from place to place in search of knowledge. Yet as Daphna Ephrat found, after the 
Seljuq conquest, the ʿulamā ʾ increasingly settled permanently within Baghdad, a consequence of 
both the precariousness of travel and the increasingly opportunities for patronage within the city, 
especially in madrasas.7 The ʿulamā ʾ were drawn from the ranks of various segments of the 
urban population, and they thus had a great deal of influence at all levels of society. As they 
became more influential, caliphs, sultans, and private individuals all endowed madrasas to give 
stipends to them, hoping to curry their favor and loyalty.8 Gradually, individuals associated with 
the ʿulamā ʾ came to hold positions in the government bureaucracy, and religious scholars sought 
to influence the practices of governance.  
The powerful Seljuq vizier Nizạ̄m al-Mulk articulated an ideology that facilitated the 
convergence of the ʿulamā ʾ and the state. Previously, the ʿulamā ʾ had spurned government 
                                                          
5 Christian Lange, “Changes in the Office of the Hịsba under the Seljuqs,” in The Seljuqs: Politics, Society and 
Culture, ed. C. Lange & S. Mecit, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 165. 
6 Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, VIII, 225: “The brothels were banned and closed and their removal was demanded. “The 
reason for this was an abundance of depravity and drinking of wine, and a Jewish man drank while singing from the 
Quran.” 
7 On this process, see Daphna Ephrat, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000). 
8 Vanessa Van Renterghem, “Controlling and Developing Baghdad: Caliphs, Sultans, and the Balance of Power in 




service as corrupting. Yet as Nizạ̄m al-Mulk declared in his Siyasatnama, the sultan’s role was to 
enforce justice in order to create prosperity. The standard of justice “was set by Islamic law and 
its representatives”—that is, the ʿulamā ʾ. As Linda Darling explains, “On the basis of this 
integration of political ideals, religious scholars, who had previously scorned government 
service, now began writing advice literature for rulers and assuming an active role in 
government.”9  
As the ʿulamā ʾ consolidated as a group and increasingly sought government posts and 
patronage, they resented the practice of employing non-Muslims in administration. They found 
themselves competing against non-Muslims for a finite number of government posts, and they 
tried to monopolize such positions for themselves. After all, the employment of non-Muslims in 
high-level positions challenged the “visible Sunni superiority on which [the ulamā ʾ] depended 
for their collective and individual status.”10 
To both of these ends, the ʿulamā ʾ instead emphasized and disseminated an ideology of 
just government that linked the prosperity of the state to the appointment of officials with 
orthodox, “praiseworthy,” Sunni Muslim beliefs. They argued that, even if a Jew, Christian, 
Zoroastrian, or Shiite seemed to be a just administrator, he still represented a threat to the 
community of Muslim believers. As Nizạ̄m al-Mulk wrote in his “Book of Kings:” 
A tax man may be well-versed in his duties, he may be a secretary, and accountant, 
or a business expert such that he has no peer in all the world; but if he is a member 
of a bad sect or bad religion, such as Jew, Christian, or Zoroastrian, he will despise 
the Muslims and afflict them with hardship on the pretext of taxes and accounts. If 
the Muslims are oppressed by that heretic or infidel and complain about him he 
must be dismissed and punished. One must not be concerned with what his 
intercessors may say—they may say there is no secretary or accountant or tax 
                                                          
9 Linda Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2012), 92-
3. 
10 Luke Yarbrough, “The Madrasa and the Non-Muslims of Thirteenth-Century Egypt: A Reassessment,” in 
Entangled Histories: Knowledge, Authority and Jewish Culture in the Thirteenth Century, ed. Elisheva Baumgarten 
et al., (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 109. 
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collector in the world like him; they may say that if he is removed from office, the 
work will all come to grief, and there is nobody to take his place. This is all lies and 
such words must not be heeded.11 
 
In fact, Nizạ̄m al-Mulk argued that even if a given dhimmī official was most qualified for his 
position, he should be dismissed. He illustrated this principle through a story about Umar. The 
people of a given territory requested that a Jewish tax collector be replaced by a Muslim. But,  
On inspection none of the Arabs was found to possess the knowledge to fulfil the 
post, and of the Persian collectors who were Muslim not one was discovered who 
had the same ability as the Jew, nor did anybody understand as well as he the 
various aspects of the work, such as collecting revenue, developing the country, 
dealing with people, and keeping up with taxes and arrears. … Of necessity [the 
vizier] kept the Jew in the appointment. 12 
 
When the caliph heard this, he was angry and “took up his pen and wrote at the top of the letter 
in Arabic, Mata l-Yahudi,” or “Kill the Jew.” As Nizạ̄m al-Mulk explained,  
What he meant was, ‘Every man has to die, and death causes dismissal. Know that 
if a tax collector dies or is dismissed, his work cannot be allowed to lapse. In the 
end, someone else has to be appointed; why are you so weak and helpless? Suppose 
the Jew is dead.’13  
 
The vizier received the caliph’s order and dismissed the Jew and gave the post to a Muslim with 
great success: “[T]he Muslim discharged his duties even more efficiently than the Jew; and 
public works increased.”14 The moral was clear: even if a non-Muslim seemed to be a competent, 
just administrator, it was still preferable to give his position to a Muslim. 
How did these new developments impact Jewish government officials and, by extension, 
Baghdad’s rabbinic Jewish leadership? On the one hand, the efforts to create a stable financial 
system protected financial officials, many of whom were Jews, and there may even have been a 
                                                          
11 Nizạ̄m al-Mulk, The Book of Government of Rules for Kings, trans. Hubert Darke (Taylor and Francis, 2012), 170. 
12 Ibid., 170-2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 172. 
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net decrease in violence against dhimmīs during the Seljuq period.15 On the other hand, as the 
Seljuqs and the Abbasids both tried to monopolize the loyalty of the ʿulamā ʾ, they competed to 
impose humiliating restrictions on dhimmi government officials. Likely, in part due to the special 
treatment that Jewish jahbadhs received, many of these edicts had a distinctly anti-Jewish 
character. 
 
Reforming the Caliphate’s Financial System 
After 936, the centralized Abbasid treasuries had been rendered obsolete. During the 
Buyid period, jahbadhs, many of whom were Jews, acted as private bankers for individual Buyid 
amirs. The system was rather unstable, however; whenever a strongman needed money, he 
raided a jahbadh, rather than taking out a loan. The early Seljuqs continued this practice. For 
example, in 1057, right after Tughril Beg returned to Baghdad, the tax-farmer he assigned to 
Basra, Hazarasb ibn Bankir b. Iyad, “extorted 120,000 dinars from Taj al-Din ibn Sakhta the 
ʿAlid and Ibn Samhạ̄ the Jew” in order to finance military action against the sultan’s cousin.16  
By the second half of the eleventh century, the Abbasid caliphs and the Seljuqs 
understood this system to have been responsible for the failures of the Buyid state. Thus, their 
first priority after conquering Baghdad was reestablishing control over the administration and 
ensuring that it functioned properly. This meant collecting taxes regularly, establishing a stable 
currency and coinage, and most notably, ensuring that the capital treasury was always full so that 
funds were available in case of emergencies. As Nizạ̄m-al-Mulk explained,  
Kings have always had two treasuries, the capital treasury and the expenses treasury. 
As revenue was acquired, it was usually taken to the capital treasury, and seldom 
                                                          
15 Deborah Tor, Rayy and the Religious History of the Seljuq Period,” Der Islam 93:2 (2016), 395-397. 
16 C.J. Thornberg, Ibn el-Athiri Chronicon quod Perfectissimum Inscribitur (Beirut: Dar al-Sạdir, 1965-1967), Vol. 
IX, 634.Translation: D.S. Richards, The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from Al-Kāmil fīʾl-Tarīkh of ʿIzz al-
Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (New York: Routledge, 2002), 115. 
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to the expenses treasury, and unless there was urgent necessity they did not allow 
disbursement from the capital treasury. When they did take anything out, they took 
it by way of a loan, and put an equivalent sum back later.17 
 
As a result, the Seljuq financial system depended on access to loans of significant sums of 
money. Yet it was crucial that the state paid back these loans or it could find itself in jeopardy. 
As Nizạ̄m al-Mulk explained, “[i]f care is not taken in this way, the whole income of the state 
will be dissipated on expenses, and if there comes some unexpected need for money, it will give 
rise to anxiety and there will be shortcoming and delay in meeting the commitment.”18 
To avoid these issues, the Seljuqs reestablished centralized administrative offices, and 
they filled the positions in these offices with Jewish and Christian officials who had the requisite 
knowledge and connections to long distance commercial and credit networks to carry out their 
duties effectively. In particular, Abu ʿAlī ibn Fadḷān, a Jew from a family of Jewish jahbadhs, 
acted as the head of the diwān and as secretary to the Seljuq sultan’s wife (a position he likely 
achieved due to the connection between the caliph and the sultan). Similarly, he installed Ibn al-
Musilaya, from a prominent Nestorian Christian secretarial family, as head of the chancery 
(diwan al-ʾinshā ʿ). The chronicles implied that the two men filled their offices with members of 
their respective religions, and they described Ibn Fadḷān as the leader of Jews within the 
administration and Ibn al-Musilaya as the leader of the Christians.  
The wholesale dismissal of these officials would result in the collapse of an already 
fragile financial system and administration. This was a lesson that the Abbasids’ chief 
administrator Ibn al-Muslima learned the hard way in 1058. Previously, Ibn al-Muslima had 
removed the Buyids and their chief administrator, Basasiri, from Baghdad and seized Basasiri’s 
                                                          
17 Nizạ̄m al-Mulk, Book of Government, 239. 
18 Nizạ̄m al-Mulk, Book of Government, 239. 
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property. The defeat of the Shiite Buyids was a harbinger of the restoration of just Sunni 
authority. In Ramadan of that year, according to Ibn al-Jawzī,  
The common religious people, characterized by the compatriots of ʿAbd al-
Sạmād,19 strengthened their demands for requiring the ahl-dhimma to wear the 
ghiyār. A Hashemite man known as Ibn Sakrah appeared in the dīwān. So [in 
response] the Raʾīs al-Ruʾasāʾ Ibn al-Muslima made a speech addressing this. He 
spoke about how the ahl al-dhimma should not be elevated…and his words were 
vicious/coarse and he angered him. So [Ibn Sakrah] wrote to the caliph about this.20 
 
This incident took place around the time that the Buyid’s former head official, Basasiri, entered 
Baghdad in the name of the Fatimid caliph, had the khutḅa recited in al-Mustansịr’s name, and 
arrested the caliph. It would seem that sectarian tensions were particularly high, and by calling 
for the dismissal of Jewish and Christian officials, Ibn al-Muslima probably hoped to gain the 
support of sections of Baghdad’s Sunni population, particularly the ʿulamā ʾ. Yet according to 
Ibn al-Jawzī, by banning Jews and Christians from administrative offices, the administration 
came to a halt: 
There was no power to the order of Ibn Sakrah but Abi ʿAlī b. Fadḷān the Jew the 
secretary of the Khātūn, Ibn al-Muslima [caliph’s vizier] ordered him to remain in 
his house and to announce to the Jews and the people who make their livelihood to 
do like this. Likewise, Ibn al-Muwasạ̄layā the Christian secretary of the dīwān was 
ordered to do like this. So business came to a halt and slowed the kuttāb and the 
jahābadha of the diwan. As a result, he hid the matter from the caliph, and it became 
worse.21 
Although eventually Ibn al-Muslima was forbidden from banning Jews and Christians from the 
diwan and “the ahl a-dhimma began to sneak away and go to their work,” it was too late. The 
slowing down of administrative activity created an opening that allowed the Buyids’ chief 
administrator, Basasiri, to re-enter Baghdad under the banner of the Fatimids a few months later. 
                                                          
19 Tạ̄rīq ʿAbd al-Samad was a street in the east side of Baghdad, so this might refer to the followers of ʿAbd al-
Samad or the residents of this particular neighborhood. 
20 Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, VIII, 190. 
21 Ibid.  
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He arrested the caliph and took revenge on Ibn al-Muslima for seizing his property. He had Ibn 
al-Muslima paraded throughout the city (tashrīr) on a donkey and tortured to death.22 
The Seljuqs reentered Baghdad soon after. After they deposed Basasiri and the Fatimids 
and freed the caliph from prison, their first priority was establishing an effective administration 
under their own control. To this end, they tried to prevent interruptions in administration, 
regardless of who, exactly, was employed. They condemned the practice of raiding wealthy 
individuals whenever one needed money, and they tried to protect individuals who collected or 
loaned money to the state—many of whom were Jewish jahbadhs—from violence.  
The most significant example of this policy in action was related by the Sunnī jurist Ibn 
al-Bannā  ̄ʾ  (c. 1068) in his autograph diary.23 According to Ibn al-Bannāʾ some individuals 
“assaulted” the Jewish jahbadh Ibn Fadḷān in 1068, and “a Bedouin drew a knife against him and 
wanted to kill him,” apparently because he owed Ibn Fadḷān a debt and did not want to (or was 
unable to) pay him back.24 A few days later, Ibn Bannāʾ reported that the Sheikh Abu ʿAbd-allāh 
b. Jarada “adhered” to Ibn Fadlān in the dīwān that Thursday “until the end of the day.” In 
response, “the caliph issued permission that a guard be assigned to protect Ibn Fadlan, which was 
done.”25 Later, the caliph explained, “I am afraid to let go of Ibn Fadḷān for the common people 
will kill him in my precincts.”26 
                                                          
22 Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, VIII, 196-197. On the symbolism of this form of punishment, see Christian Lange, 
Justice, Punishment, and the Medieval Muslim Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chpt. 
2. 
23 Ibn al-Bannāʾ Diary, ed. and trans. George Makdisi, “Autograph Diary of an Eleventh-Century Historian of 
Baghdad,” I: BSOAS 18/i (1956), 9-32; II: BSOAS 18/ii (1956), 239-260; III: BSOAS 19/i (1957), 13-48; IV: 
BSOAS 19/ii (1957), 281-303; V: BSOAS 19/iii (1957), 426-43. Re-printed in Makdisi, History and Politics in 
Eleventh-Century Baghdad (Brookfield, Vermont: Variorum, 1990). 
24 Makdisi, “Autograph Diary,” IV, Paragraph 140. Text: 289; Translation: 301. 
25 Ibid.,  Paragraph 141. Text: 289; Translation: 301. 
26 Ibid. V, par. 152; text 426; trans. 436. 
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It might seem counter-intuitive that the caliph would go to such great lengths to protect a 
Jewish official. Yet Ibn Fadḷān played an important role in the caliphate’s monetary system. As 
the head of the dīwān and secretary to the sultan’s wife, he used his connections with merchants 
and bankers throughout the empire to advance loans to the state whenever they were needed. The 
state, therefore, despite his Jewishness, had a vested interest in guaranteeing his security and 
ensuring that debts were paid back to him in a timely manner.  
Instead, in dealing with the issue that had arisen between the Sheikh b. Jarada and Ibn 
Fadḷān, the caliph “asked him to pay down some money for Ibn Fadlan to the amount of 11,000 
dinars, of which 5,000 as an immediate payment and 6,000 deferred for payment in annual 
instalments of 1,000 dinars.”27 Ibn Jarada was happy at this development, characterizing it as  
“the exceedingly good manner in which the caliph dealt with him, and that he had exerted his 
efforts in every way possible regarding the case.”28 What was important was that Ibn Jarada’s 
debts were settled through legal means. Ibn Fadḷān could continue advancing money to the state 
whenever necessary.  
 This policy was illustrated even more through the narrative of the Jewish tax-collector 
Ibn ʿAllān. According to the chronicler Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn ʿAllān was such a skilled tax collector 
that he managed to extract much more revenue from the districts in the caliph’s private domain 
(6,000 kurrs of corn, 100,000 dinars) than his vizier. As a result, according to Ibn al-Athīr, “the 
incompetence and weakness of [the vizier] became plain, so he was dismissed” in 1062. Nizạ̄m 
al-Mulk, recognizing Ibn Allan’s skills, took him under his protection, and Ibn ʿAllan became 
very powerful and wealthy.29 According to Ibn al-Athīr, “[t]he position of the Jew had grown so 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, 116; trans. Richards, 140. 
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great, that when his wife died, everyone in Basra except for the qādị̄, walked behind her bier.”30 
In 1080, however, the sultan Malikshah arrived in Khuzistan to go hunting, along with two of his 
companions who “were both working to secure the death of Ibn Allan” in order to seize his 
money. The sultan ordered the drowning of Ibn ʿAllān and seized 100,000 dinars of his wealth. 
In response, 
[f]or three days Nizạ̄m al-Mulk withdrew from public appearance and locked his 
door. Later he was advised to appear at the ceremonial parade [for the sultan] which 
he did. He gave a great feast for the sultan, during which he presented him with 
many things but he criticized him for what he had done. The sultan made his 
excuses.31  
 
Nizạ̄m al-Mulk owed his own status to Malikshah; in expressing his objections to Malikshah’s 
actions, Nizạ̄m al-Mulk was putting himself in danger. So why did Nizạ̄m al-Mulk jeopardize his 
own career (and possibly even his life) over the death of a Jewish tax collector? After all, Nizạ̄m 
al-Mulk was no friend of dhimmī government officials, and he had even written against the 
practice of employing them. Nevertheless, in this case, he needed to make a point: no one, not 
even a sultan, had the right to kill a wealthy man in order to seize his money. Such an action, 
while perhaps temporarily enriching the sultan, could only lead to ruin.  
Overall, Nizạ̄m al-Mulk advocated protecting dhimmī financial officials, while gradually 
replacing non-Muslims with pious Muslims whenever possible. For example, the murdered 
Jewish tax farmer Ibn ʿAllān was replaced by a Muslim. Nizạ̄m al-Mulk brought in a new group 
of Sunni Muslim secretaries into the diwān al-ʾinshā ʾ who were traditionally-minded. Courtly 
culture became characterized more by hạdīth transmission than the kinds of philosophic inter-
religious disputations that had predominated during the Buyid period.32 
                                                          
30 Ibn al-Athir, Kāmil, 116; trans., Richards, 201. 
31 Ibid., see also Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, VIII, 323. 
32 Ephrat, Learned Society, 125-49. 
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 As a result, although Jewish officials continued to play a role in upholding the caliphate’s 
financial system, as they had under the Abbasids and the Buyids, and may even have been 
subject to fewer violent raids, they did not enjoy the prestige that had once come with their 
positions. Instead, the Abbasids and the Seljuqs, encouraged by the ʿulamā ʾ, tried to humiliate 
dhimmī officials as much as possible. 
 
Humiliating Dhimmī Officials 
In order to promote their own status as the guardians of Sunni Islam and gain fuller 
control over state prerogatives, the ʿulamā ʾ encouraged both caliphs and sultans to issue rulings 
regulating and humiliating dhimmīs. These directives, most of which required dhimmīs, including 
government officials, to wear distinctive clothing, became increasingly oppressive and 
humiliating during the second half of the eleventh century. The ghiyār was imposed on dhimmīs 
in Seljuq Iraq in 1056, 1058, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1095, 1104, 1121, 1131, and 1145.33 These 
rulings were often issued during times of acute political conflict between the Seljuqs and the 
Abbasids; by issuing such rulings, a given government official tried to promote himself as the 
legitimate defender of Islam and secure the loyalty of the ʿulamā ʾ.  
For example, in 448/1056, according to Ibn al-Jawzī,  
Abu Mansụ̄r Ibn Nāsṛ al-Siyāra objected to the ahl al-dhimma and commanded 
them to wear the ghiyārāt and the masḅūghāt (dyed) turbans (amā ʾim). This was 
according to the order of the sultan.34   
 
                                                          
33 Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, VIII, 171; Muntazam, IX, 14; Muntazam, IX, 38; Richards, Ibn al-Athir, 248; Ibn al-
Jawzi, IX, 55; Muntazam, IX, 91; Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazam, IX, 143; Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazạm, IX, 228; Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Muntazạm, X, 20; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīs ̣Majma ʿ al-ādib fī mu ʿjam al-alqāb, ed. Musṭạfā Jawād (Damascus: 
Wizārat al-thaqāfa wa al-irshād al-qawmī, 1962-65), Vol. III, 206. 
34 Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, VIII, 171. 
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This would have happened right after the caliph invited the Seljuqs into Baghdad, but while the 
Buyids were still nominally in control; perhaps, the sultan ordered the ghiyār in order to assert 
the Sunni character of the Seljuqs and gain the support of the population for them (over the 
Buyids).  
Similarly, the caliph issued an order “that the dhimmīs should be compelled to wear their 
distinctive dress, to wear what the commander of the faithful Umar ibn al-Khattab had stipulated 
for them” in 1091.35 This edict was issued around the time that the Seljuq sultan Malikshah 
reentered Baghdad and took interest in public works. Thus, by issuing this order—which would 
apply overwhelmingly to the administration—the caliph sought to advance his own position and 
demonstrate his continued influence, in opposition to the Seljuqs’ presence in Baghdad. 
Although such rulings had been previously issued by al-Mutawakkil and al-Muqtadir, the 
extent to which they were enforced is unclear. During the Seljuq period, however, the ghiyār was 
increasingly imposed on high-level officials, and the clothing of dhimmī officials was subject to 
increased scrutiny. For example, the Jew Ibn Samhạ̄, a financial official who also acted as a 
steward of Nizạ̄m al-Mulk, wore a particularly large turban. But according to Ibn al-Athīr, in 
1091,  
A man selling carpets met [Ibn Samhạ̄] and gave him a blow which knocked his 
turban from his head. The man was seized, carried off to the dīwān, and questioned 
as to the reason for his action. He replied, ‘He treated me as inferior to himself.’36  
 
In this anecdote, a humble carpet-seller declares himself the better of the commercial 
representative of the most powerful vizier of his age. The implication was clear; not even the 
highest ranked government officials could position themselves as of a higher-status than even the 
lowliest of Muslims. In Ibn al-Athīr’s narrative, the caliph issued the order requiring dhimmīs to 
                                                          




wear the ghiyār in response to the altercation between Ibn Samhạ̄ and the Muslim carpet seller. 
The order stressed that it applied to dhimmī government officials.37 
Both Jewish and Muslim sources indicate that the ghiyār rulings were intended to be as 
humiliating as possible, for dhimmīs in general, and dhimmī government officials, in particular. 
According to Ibn al-Jawzī, in 1091, dhimmīs were directed to wear not only the traditional 
ghiyār, but also distinguishing shoes and necklaces:   
Distinguishing signs, girdles, and a lead coin stamped with the word dhimmī around 
their necks, and the same for women when entering the bathhouse; in addition [they 
must wear] black shoes and a black robe or a red shoe and anklets on their feet.38 
The clear purpose of such a ruling was not just to distinguish dhimmīs from Muslims, but to 
humiliate them. By the time that Ovadya the Proselyte, an Italian native who converted to 
Judaism, traveled through Iraq (c. 1120), the memory of this edict was particularly potent. 
Although his account of the specific restrictions imposed on dhimmīs differs slightly from that of 
Ibn al-Jawzī, it too indicates their profoundly humiliating nature:  
The king of Adinah [Baghdad], whose name was al-Muqtadī, empowered his 
second in command, whose name was Abishuga to take discriminatory action 
against the Hebrews dwelling in the city of Adinah. He sought many times to cause 
them to perish, but the God of Israel thwarted his intent, this time also hiding them 
from his wrath. Abishuga put gleaming signs upon them, on the head of each and 
every Jew: one on the head and the other on the throat, and about a silver mithqal 
of lead hanging from the throat of each and every Jew, upon which was inscribed 
the word dhimmi—for the Jews were taxed. He moreover had a girdle placed 
around the loins of each and every Jew. Abishuga further had placed upon the 
Jewish women two signs: the shoes belonging to each and every woman had to be 
one red and the other black, while upon the throat of each and every women or upon 
her shoe was placed a small brass bell to make a noise so that one might clearly 
distinguish between the women of the Hebrews and the women of the gentiles.39  
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ʿOvadya went on to explain that the wearing of such humiliating clothing marked Jews out for 
special abuse: 
He further appointed over the Jews cruel gentile men, while upon the Jewish 
women he appointed cruel gentile women, to oppress them with every kind of curse, 
spite, and shame. The gentiles would mock them; the people of the land, both they 
and their children would strike the Jews in all the areas of the city of Adinah 
(Baghdad).40 
Both of these accounts suggest that the edicts regarding dhimmī dress and behavior issued during 
the Seljuq period were stricter and more humiliating than similar edicts issued in the past and 
were meant to apply to dhimmī government officials. Their goal, at which they succeeded, was to 
reduce the status and prestige of dhimmīs. 
 
Distinctly Anti- Jewish Edicts 
The ʿulamāʾ resented the prominence of dhimmīs in all roles in administration. They 
reserved particular animosity towards dhimmī financial administrators, particularly such money-
lenders as Ibn Samhạ̄. After all, these officials received special protection from the state at a time 
when the ʿulamā ʾ hoped to minimize the role of dhimmīs in administration. Most Jews were not 
financial officials in the government, and, presumably, some Christians served as jahbadhs. 
Nevertheless, as a consequence more of historical vicissitudes than any deliberate choices, in 
Seljuq Baghdad, many prominent jahbadhs were Jews, and the most prominent Jews were 
jahbadhs. As a result, Baghdad’s Sunni chroniclers expressed particular animosity against 
Jewish jahbadhs and against Jews, in general.  
                                                          
40 Norman Golb, "Megillat obadiah hager" ("The Autograph Memoirs of Obadiah the Proselyte"): S.D. Goitein 
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In his autograph diary, Ibn al-Bannāʾ had only harsh words for the Jewish jahbadh Ibn 
Fadḷān, who was trying to collect a debt from one of his friends. Ibn al-Bannāʾ resented the 
lengths to which the caliph went in protecting Ibn Fadḷān. He denied the claim that the Bedouin 
who assaulted Ibn Fadḷān owed him a debt, saying, “[t]he people knew that this was an 
exaggeration on the part of Ibn Fadlan, so that he could say that they attacked him with the 
intention of killing him. If this were not an exaggeration, then whoever is after him would not 
have sought him out in such a public place.” He went on to heap curses on the family of Ibn 
Fadḷān a few days later:  
On Sunday the 29th of this month [1068], a male child was born to the Saharif Abu-
l-GFhanā ʿim. … may god favor him! The brother of Ibn Fadḷān the Jew died on 
this same day (29 Safar). May God not have mercy on him! 
 
But Ibn al-Bannāʾ’s antipathy towards Ibn Fadḷān extended to all Jews, regardless of their 
relationship to finance. In a poem that he wrote celebrating the birth of a son to the caliph al-
Muqtadī, Ibn al-Bannāʾ wrote, “Glad tidings have come with this new-born child … and may the 
curse of God be on the Jews!”41 It is worth noting that Ibn al-Bannāʾ did not even mention 
Christians in his poem, let alone curse them. During a month in which the caliph had instructed a 
guard to protect a Jewish jahbadh against Ibn al-Bannāʾ’s fellow ā̔lim, Ibn al-Bannāʾ reserved 
his antipathy for Jews. 
Seljuq and Abbasid officials issued a number of distinctly anti-Jewish, rather than anti-
dhimmī edicts. For example, in 1085, another son was born to the caliph al-Muqtadī, and his 
birth was accompanied by distinctly anti-Jewish sentiments and edicts. According to Ibn al-
Jawzī,  
A son was born to al-Muqtadī and he called him Hụseyn and his kunya was Abu 
ʿAbd-allāh… And an edict was issued from the commander of the faithful 
[regarding] the situation of the Jews and their outward display of things forbidden 
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to the ahl al-dhimma. That when they violate the stipulations [of the Pact of Umar], 
they nullify the covenant and its protection will be removed from them.42 
 
In the same year, according to Ibn al-Jawzī,  
An edict was issued from al-Muqtadī revoking the high rank of the Jews. And they locked 
their doors and enjoined the community to lower their voice in the reading of the Torah in 
their dwellings and make visible the ghiyār on their heads.”43  
 
The specification of “the Torah” indicates that this ruling was specifically issued against the 
Jewish community, as opposed to against dhimmī communities as a whole.44 Three years later,  
In 480/1088 a decree was issued regarding the situation of the Jews on Tariq Khurasan and 
Bilād Ibn Muzayd, informing that they were not wearing the ghiyār and wore their hair like 
the Turks and they were calling themselves with Muslim kunyas (nicknames).45  
 
The account made no mention of rebellious Christians in this same region. 
Similarly, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, the vizier Abu Shujā ʿ issued edicts specifically 
targeting Jewish merchants who closed their shops on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath in 1095: 
[He] eliminated unlawful taxes and dressed the ahl al-dhimma in the ghiyār and ordered 
Ibn al-Kharqī the muhṭasib to discipline everyone who opened his store on Friday and 
closed it on Saturday, from among the cloth merchants and others among them. And he 
said that this is idolatry for Jews [since it violates] their remembrance of the Sabbath.46  
 
Abu Shujā ʿ explicitly stated that his instructions to the muhtasib were intended to adversely 
impact Jews, specifically.  
Moreover, in 1121, when a ruling imposing the ghiyār on dhimmīs was issued, the 
exilarch (jālūt), appeared at court alone to pay a hefty bribe to the caliph and the sultan to 
abrogate the ruling; the chronicler made no indication to suggest that the Christian patriarch paid 
a similar bribe. Similarly, in 1145, Ibn al-Fuwatī reported that the sultan’s official specifically 
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43 Ibn al-Jawzī, Muntazạm, IX, 17, lines 7ff. 
44 Hanne, Caliph, 102. 
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ordered “the Jews” to wear the ghiyār; no mention was made of whether a similar ruling was 
issued regarding Christians. 
 Overall, Muslim chroniclers did not devote a great deal of attention to events impacting 
non-Muslims. It is certainly possible that some of these rulings also targeted Christians, and 
chroniclers simply neglected to specify this because of their profound disinterest in dhimmīs. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the chroniclers’ references to such distinctly Jewish practices and 
institutions as the Sabbath on Saturdays, the reading of the Torah, and the exilarch were not 
arbitrary; rather, they suggest that Muslim elites were preoccupied specifically by Jews 
throughout the Seljuq period, a consequence, in part, of the persistence of Jewish jahbadhs in 
administration and the protection that they continued to receive. 
 
Part II: Effect on Jewish Communal Rule 
 How did this situation impact the operations of the yeshivot and Jewish communal 
leadership in Baghdad? Possibly, when Al-Qā ʾim issued the order re-imposing the ghiyār on 
dhimmīs in 1037, Jews interpreted it as a reinvigoration of the caliphate that would empower the 
exilarch, who derived his authority, in part, from his relationship to the Abbasid caliph. Indeed, 
the surviving records from the 1030s and 1040s suggest that this was the case. The exilarch 
referred to in the account was almost certainly Yehẹzqeyhu. The Cairo Geniza preserved at least 
three of his letters; in them, he promotes himself as the leader of both of the yeshivot of Baghdad 
and tries to assert their prerogatives in Egypt. Yehẹzqeyhu’s letter from 1036 to an unnamed 
communal official survived, in which he extended greetings on behalf of “the two yeshivot and 
all of the Sanhedrin and the sages,”47 and promotes himself as representing both yeshivot. In the 
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letter, he specifically solicited she ʾelot from the recipient, indicating that in this capacity he took 
on some of the prerogatives of the Babylonian geonim. In another letter, from 1040 to the 
Babylonian community of Fustat, the exilarch writes, “[w]e are stubborn in commanding your 
communities to be obedient to Mar Rav Sahlan Alluf (the leader of the Babylonian community of 
Fustat) and to heed his word, for his words are our words.”48 In another letter, he bestowed 
blessings upon the Nagid of Qayrawan, Yaʿaqov b. ʿAmram and in doing so, explicitly invoked 
the good graces of the gentile authorities: 
May he rule over many nations, and may they not rule over him; may the mercy of 
the king and his advisors and his ministers and his forces be granted to him, and 
may he become great in the king’s house, and may he become famous in all of the 
provinces.49  
 
By 1046, Yehẹzqeyhu was described as having actually taken over over one of the yeshivot, 
although the merger of the exilarchate and the yeshiva appears not to have been permanent. None 
of these letters referred to discriminatory measures in Baghdad. After Yehẹzqeyhu’s death, a 
letter from 1056 refers to a separate gaon and exilarch operating in Baghdad.  
The lack of Iraqi material found in the Geniza from the second half of the eleventh 
century suggests that there was a breakdown in relations between Jewish communities in Iraq 
and Egypt during the Seljuq period. The causes of the cessation of long-distance mercantile and 
political connections between Iraq and Egypt and its implications for Jewish communal rule will 
be discussed in Chapter 5. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the lack of Iraqi documents 
in the Cairo Geniza corpus makes it difficult to say much else about the specific operations of the 
yeshivot during the Seljuq period. Nevertheless, based on fragmentary Geniza material, Jacob 
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Mann found evidence for the continued operation of two yeshivot and the exilarchate in Baghdad 
throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries.50   
The main evidence for Jewish communal rule during the Seljuq period comes from 
historical chronicles composed by Sunni jurists. They indicate that, during this period, Jews 
continued to appeal to the state to mediate intra-communal disputes. In 1068, for example, Ibn 
al-Bannāʾ described the Jewish court banker Ibn Fadḷān as taking sides in a communal conflict 
over the selection of the exilarch:  
One of our companions…informed me that dissention has risen to its highest point 
among the Jews; and that they wanted to appoint one particular son among the sons 
of David; but that Ibn Fadḷān opposed them and wanted to appoint someone else; 
and they are now disputing about that.51 
 
Contemporaneous Jewish sources have not survived which would shed more light on this intra-
communal conflict. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Bannāʾ’s account portrays Ibn Fadḷān as acting in much 
the same way as his predecessors during the Abbasid and Buyid periods, using his close 
relationship to the state, as a jahbadh, to advocate for his allies within the Jewish community. It 
also seems Ibn Fadḷān’s rivals also had such access to the state that both rival factions could 
advocate on behalf of their respective choices for the exilarchate. Interestingly, despite his 
antipathy toward Jews in general and Ibn Fadḷān in particular, Ibn al- Bannāʾ did not interpret this 
conflict as indicative of anything negative about Jews. If anything, in his account, the fact that 
the Jewish community was divided made them more, not less, like the Christians and the 
Muslims: 
He continued: The Christians are also in disagreement with regard to a man who 
has given his daughter in marriage to someone not of his own religious community. 
The Nestorian Patriarch said: I have already excommunicated him, and his property 
has become licit for confiscation by the sultan of the Muslims. He added: And they 
are now in great difficulties. Now this is the most surprising thing that has happened 
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in one single month; namely that dissension should take place among the three 
religious communities: the Muslims, the Jews, and the Christians!52  
 
There is no evidence in either Jewish or Muslim sources for how this intra-communal Jewish 
conflict was ultimately resolved. Yet Ibn Fadḷān is the last Jewish official from the Seljuq period 
we hear of who seems to have appealed directly to the state on behalf of a faction of Baghdad’s 
rabbinic leadership. Instead, most subsequent accounts of dhimmī officials describe their 
reactions to the humiliating restrictions imposed on dhimmī communities during this period.  
 
Conversion as a Strategy of Resistance? 
Muslim chroniclers from the Seljuq period often reported and celebrated the conversions 
of Christian officials in response to anti-dhimmī edicts. A great deal of Nestorian Christian 
secretaries were reported to have converted.53 After Abu Shuja’s harsh ghiyār rulings were 
issued in response to the altercation between the Jewish jahbadh Ibn Samha and the carpet-seller 
in 1091, according to Ibn Al-Athīr, the Christians Abu Sa ʿad al-Ala ibn al-Hasan ibn Wahb ibn 
Musilaya, the secretary, and his nephew, Abu Nāsịr Hibat-Allāh ibn al-Hạsan ibn ʿAlī, the chief 
intelligence officer, both made their conversions “at the hands of the caliph.”54 After his 
conversion, Ibn al-Muslilaya was named replacement vizier for Abu Shujā ʿ. 
 By contrast, Muslim chroniclers describe no conversions of Jewish jahbadhs to Islam. 
Indeed, not long after reporting the conversions of Ibn al-Muslilaya, Ibn al-Jawzī reported, “[i]n 
Shawawal [485/1092] Ibn Samhạ the Jew was killed.”55 The identification of Ibn Samhạ as a 
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Jew, even in death, suggests that he never converted to Islam during his lifetime. All of this, 
then, raises the question of why it appears that so few Jewish jahbadhs converted to Islam to 
avoid being subject to the humiliating restrictions, when so many of their Christian counterparts 
did?  
It is possible that this is merely a consequence of the limitations of our source material. 
The orthodox Sunni jurists who wrote historical chronicles during this period (and those who 
copied them) were not overly concerned with the differences between various dhimmī religious 
groups. They might have reported the conversions of Christian officials and just happened to 
leave out accounts relating to Jewish officials. Yet for the ʿulamā ʾ, the conversion of dhimmī 
government officials to Islam was cause for celebration. It demonstrated the superiority of Islam 
and ensured that fewer dhimmīs had positions of authority over Muslims. It seems unlikely that 
the chroniclers would have discussed Jewish jahbadhs by name and then later neglected to 
mention that these same individuals had converted to Islam. 
It is also unlikely that Jews were more resistant to conversion than Christians. After all, 
there are many accounts of Jewish officials in other parts of the Islamic world converting during 
times of persecution or in order to raise their own status at court.56 Maimonides had even ruled 
that it was permissible to convert to Islam under duress, provided that one inwardly remained 
loyal to Judaism.57 The lack of accounts of Jewish conversion in medieval Iraq, therefore, is 
somewhat anomalous.  
Perhaps Jewish jahbadhs did not convert due to the nature of their work as money-
lenders, currency collectors, and mint officials. In particular, such Sunni jurists as Al-Ghazali 
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condemned Seljuq Iraq’s entire monetary system as “un-Islamic”; marketplace transactions were 
not conducted using weight-regulated currency; instead, individuals used small coins cut from 
larger weight-regulated gold and silver dinars and dirhams called quradat, as well as coins from 
different circulation zones. This was a problem from the perspective of Islamic law, since the 
same amount of precious metal could be valued at different prices in the same transaction (e.g., if 
a coin from Egypt with the same gold content was valued differently from a coin from Syria), 
thus violating the prohibition on interest (ribba).58 Yet unlike in Christian Europe, Islamic law 
did not provide a loophole allowing non-Muslims to engage in usury. The jahbadhs’ and mint 
officials’ status as non-Muslims did not make the caliphate’s monetary system any less 
problematic for Muslim jurists.59  
Rather, it was the caliph who theoretically minted all coinage. Ibn al-Bannāʾ had reported 
a religious disputation in which a preacher was asked to interpret the hạdīth “God descends at 
midnight to the heaven closest to Earth.” He replied: 
I wonder what you say when the caliph strikes the dirham and the dīnar; does one say: So-
and-so the Jewish mint official (al-yahūdī al-dạrrāb) struck them? Or does one say, ‘The 
caliph (struck them).’ They said, ‘the caliph.’ He said, thus, also, an angel descends and it 
is said: “God descends.”60  
 
It is noteworthy that here, the preacher automatically characterizes mint workers as Jews, 
suggesting that Jews predominated in this profession. At the same time, the interpretation of the 
hạdīth makes clear that, regardless of the Jewish involvement in the actual minting of coins, it is 
the caliph who is most responsible for their content. 
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According to the most virulent critics of Iraq’s monetary system, anyone, regardless of 
religion, who took part in any transaction at the marketplace using coinage with different 
metallic content theoretically committed the same sin. Because of the extent to which the issue 
affected the entire population, Baghdad’s religious and political leadership preferred to avoid 
discussing it too explicitly, as it might challenge the legitimacy of their rule. When an official in 
the Madrasa Nizạmiyya preached harshly against the use of quradat coins, he was kicked out of 
the madrasa and forced to flee the city of Baghdad.61 Despite their antipathy towards dhimmī 
government officials, the Sunni scholars did not single out dhimmī financial administrators in 
their condemnations of the caliphate’s monetary system. 
So why then did Iraq’s Jewish jahbadhs not convert during the Seljuq period? Their 
Jewishness must have continued to provide them with some sort of benefit, even during a time of 
persecution. Jahbadhs were part of long-distance mercantile networks. They needed to form 
associations with as wide a network of merchants in as many different cities as possible in order 
to maintain their wealth and access to credit. Perhaps the jahbadhs’ Jewishness played a role in 
their ability to form and maintain these relationships with merchants throughout the Islamicate 
world. 
Previous scholars assumed that Geniza merchants’ activities reflect wider practices in the 
Islamic world, that there was nothing distinctly “Jewish” about their activities. Jessica Goldberg 
and Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman’s recent work complicates this assumption. On the one hand, 
Jewish merchants did engage Muslim agents, and sometimes these relationships lasted for many 
years. In doing so, they often relied on informal, suhḅa partnerships, rather than formal written 
contracts. When they did draw up written contracts, Geniza merchants composed them in such a 




way that they could be enforced in Islamic courts, and they gave testimony before both Jewish 
and Muslim notaries. 62 Even if a given merchant converted to Islam, he could still have an 
agency relationship with others in the network and make use of Islamic courts.  
Yet Goldberg’s analysis shows a preference for agency relationships with other Jews. 
Jewish merchants brought disputes to Jewish courts; using a power of attorney, they appointed 
agents to advance their own affairs in Jewish courts in different political jurisdictions. Moreover, 
Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman argues that Jewish merchants during the Geniza period made sure 
to compose contracts according to Jewish partnership law, even when this differed from Islamic 
partnership law.63 To do this, both parties needed to appear, together, in person, at a Jewish 
court. In Baghdad, the jahbadhs had cultivated close relations with the geonim, who appointed 
judges throughout Iraq and Persia, likely helping to ensure that their interests would be protected 
in Jewish courts. The economic networks cultivated by Jewish jahbadhs thus relied, in part, on 
Jewish legal institutions, which could only be used by Jews. Jewish jahbadhs might have 
preferred to maintain these relationships with other Jewish merchants in Jewish courts, rather 
than convert to Islam and risk losing these associations altogether. 
  
Jewish Resistance Strategies 
Nevertheless, Jewish government officials in the Seljuq period did not accept the ghiyār 
rulings passively. Like their predecessors, they were skilled at navigating courtly politics, and 
they tried to use their connections with rival officials to abrogate them. Because the Seljuq 
period was marked by a great deal of competition for the control of state prerogatives—between 
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sultan and caliph and between rival officials within a given household—they had a degree of 
success. 
Sometimes, Jewish officials may have appealed for help to their individual patrons. The 
Jew Abu ʿAlī ibn Fadḷān served as jahbadh and secretary to Khātūn, the wife of the Seljuq 
sultan. In 1056, when the sultan issued a decree imposing the ghiyār on dhimmīs, according to 
Ibn al-Jawzī, “Khātūn averted it from them and she prevented the muhṭasib [from enforcing 
it].”64 It is possible Ibn Fadḷān, played a role in persuading her to block her husband’s order.  
In 1091, the Jew Ibn Samhạ̄ had complained to Nizạ̄m al-Mulk about Abu Shujā‘’s 
actions. Nizạ̄m al-Mulk wanted to advance the power of the sultan against the caliph. After 
hearing this complaint, he was able to remove Abu Shujā ʿ from office and banish him from the 
city of Baghdad. As Ibn al-Jawzī wrote, 
On Thursday, 9 Ramadan, an edict was issued removing the vizier Abu Shuja, and 
the reason for this was that compatriots of the sultan complained about him, and 
that happened to incline Nizạ̄m towards his removal. So he gave assurance to his 
associates, and the sultan wrote to the caliph complaining about him and that 
happened to anger the caliph over his actions.65  
 
In 498/1104, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, the sultan cancelled dhimmī restrictions “but the 
reason was not known.”66 This too was a time of political uncertainty; Nizạ̄m al-Mulk, the caliph 
al-Muqtadī, and the Seljuq sultan Malikshah had all been killed, creating a power vacuum. It is 
possible that dhimmī officials within the government were able to take advantage of the chaos to 
convince someone to abrogate the ghiyār ruling in secret, such that a later chronicler had no idea 
how or why the new ruling had been issued. 
                                                          
64 Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazạm, VIII, 171. 
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During a time of financial and political stress, Jewish leaders paid a great deal of money 
to the state in exchange for abrogating the ghiyār. For example, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, in 
[515/1121] “the sultan…demanded that the ahl al-dhimma wear the ghiyār, and the matter was 
resolved when they paid the caliph 4,000 and the sultan 20,000 dinars, and the exilarch (jālūt) 
appeared to guarantee it and collected it.”67 The bribe was temporarily successful, but ten years 
later, “[i]n Rajab (525H/1131) the ghiyār was imposed on the ahl al-dhimma.”68  
Sometimes dhimmī officials fled and sought refuge with rival political authorities rather 
than subject themselves to humiliating clothing restrictions. For example, in response to Abu 
Shuja’s order of 1091, according to Ibn al-Athīr, many dhimmī government officials “fled to 
various hideaways.”69 Similarly, according to a biographical account of Fakhr al-Dīn, the sāhib 
of the Seljuq sultan Mas ̔ūd, the sultan ordered the imposition of the ghiyār on dhimmīs in 1145, 
and in response, the Jews took refuge in the caliph’s palace complex (Dār al-Khilāfa). The 
people of the Dar al-Khilāfa complained that Jews were crowding the bathhouses there, but the 
caliph allowed the Jews to remain. Fakhr al-Dīn responded, “Whoever hates living with them 
[the Jews] could move anywhere he pleased.” 70 This conflict took place during a time of acute 
financial tensions between the caliph and the sultan. 71 Perhaps by granting refuge to Jewish 
jahbadhs, the caliph hoped to regain control of his treasury. The sultan’s response, encouraging 
those residing in the Dār al-Khilāfa to relocate, was likely an attempt to convince the caliph’s 
allies to join the Seljuqs.   
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Thus, Jewish government officials were able to exploit the tensions between the Abbasid 
caliphs and the Seljuq sultans to attain some of their goals. Nevertheless, the Seljuq period 
marked a significant change in the Jewish relationship to the state and the ability of Jews to 
appeal to the state in their own intra-communal politics.  
 Before the Seljuq period, when an intra-communal conflict over leadership broke out, 
officials on both sides did not hesitate to appeal to the state. This had depended on many Jews 
holding positions of prestige in the government, such that rival factions could appeal to different 
officials to intercede on their behalf before the state. Both the exilarch and various Jewish court 
bankers had acted as communal advocates, and they often ended up opposing each other when 
petitioning the state. Under the Buyids, with the decline of the caliph’s authority, the influence of 
the exilarch likely declined. Few sources from the Buyid period refer to the exilarch, yet a 
relatively large number of Jewish court bankers were employed by competing Buyid rulers and 
viziers and were able to appeal to different officials to advance their own interests. In contrast to 
the situation under the earlier Abbasids, the court bankers were increasingly marginalized and 
humiliated under the Seljuqs.  
With the decline in status of Jewish jahbadhs, the exilarch, instead, became the primary 
Jewish communal representative at court by the end of the eleventh century. He, alone, appeared 
to pay the community’s bribes to the caliph and sultan. Without the ability to appeal to court 
bankers to advocate on their behalf in the same way as before, the geonim and other Jewish 
communal leaders were entirely dependent on the exilarch to manage their relationship with the 
government, and they had no longer had any other recourse to challenge his rule.  
The unprecedented harsh treatment of Jews by the state as exemplified by the anti-
dhimmī and distinctly anti-Jewish edicts, coupled with the lack of access to state power and 
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institutions of justice, provoked a crisis of political ideals among Jews. Unable to petition the 
state to address their grievances, many rejected the political order of their present in favor of an 
eschatological future. 
 
Part III: Messianism as Political Resistance 
Messianic fervor pervaded all levels of Islamicate Jewish society throughout the Middle 
Ages. A central tenet of medieval Judaism was a belief “with perfect faith” in the imminent 
coming of the Messiah who would cast off the yolk of gentile rule and restore Davidic kingship 
in the Land of Israel. This hope represented a subaltern community’s visions of an inverted 
world order, free from gentile oppression.  
Still, messianic ideology was not necessarily indicative of a reaction to specific historical 
events, nor was messianism inherently destabilizing. As Gershom Scholem has argued, 
messianic fervor was an integral part of Jewish tradition.72 Throughout the medieval period, 
rabbinic leaders, while exhorting their flock to pray for the coming of the messiah, generally 
encouraged their followers to accept their lot in life, defer to rabbinic authority, and wait 
patiently. In this way, messianic ideology, though potentially subversive, was used to advance 
the existing social and political order. If not kept under control, however, messianic movements 
in both Islam and Judaism could also constitute an existential threat to the political order. As 
Goitein writes, “Although such movements had an essentially religious root. … their goal was 
political power.”73 The followers of a messiah stopped paying taxes and engaging in economic 
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activities. In some cases, they even gathered weapons and engaged in armed resistance against 
the state. Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Iraq all participated in these movements. 
Jewish and non-Jewish sources describe the outbreak of destabilizing Jewish messianic 
movements in Iraq during the Seljuq period. Two of the accounts were preserved in travel 
literature: the fragmentary autograph memoir of  ʿOvadaya the Proselyte found in the Cairo 
Geniza and the travelogue of Benjamin of Tudela (c. 1173). A third is found in the work of 
Samūʾal al-Maghribī, a Jewish apostate (d. 1180).74 These texts were all constructed to serve 
different polemical purposes. Whereas ʿOvadya, a Christian convert to Judaism, traveled 
throughout the Islamic world and was concerned with messianic movements and Benjamin, who 
likely heard the story from Jews who continued to believe in the veracity of the movement, 
emphasized the miracles performed by the messianic figure, Samūʾal used the narrative of Jews 
following a false messiah to emphasize the inherent irrationality of adherents to Judaism. Their 
inconsistencies aside, they attest to the existence of an actual messianic movement (or multiple 
such movements) originating in the Hakkari region of Kurdistan, in upper Mesopotamia, led by a 
certain Sulaymān ibn Ruhī and his son, Menahẹm. Norman Golb understood the movements as a 
response to the impact of the Crusader conquests in that region. Individuals may have interpreted 
the constant battles, as well as the Crusaders’ wresting of Jerusalem from Islamic rule, as 
apocalyptic events.75  
I argue that understanding these movements merely as the inevitable reaction to the 
Crusader conquests on the part of an unsophisticated population obfuscates the political logic of 
their founders. The narratives make clear that the movement was led, not by uneducated popular 
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preachers, but by individuals with deep ties to institutions of Jewish communal leadership in 
Baghdad, individuals who themselves might otherwise have had claims to communal authority. 
In Benjamin’s account, for example, the leader of the messianic movement was a rebellious 
member of the yeshiva hierarchy:  
[He] studied under Hịsday Rosh Golah and under the Rosh Yeshivat Gaon Ya ʿ aqov 
in the city of Baghdad, and he was well versed in the Law of Israel, in the Halakha 
as well as the Talmud and all the wisdom of the Muslims, also in secular literature 
and in the writings of magicians and soothsayers.76 
 
Similarly, in Samūʾal’s account, the messianic pretender was well-educated in Jewish law and 
even enjoyed relations with the local government: 
By the standards of the rank and file of Jews dwelling in the district known as 
Amadia in the country of Mosul, he was well-versed in their religion. The 
commander of a fortress there was so kindly disposed toward this imposter of whom 
he had formed a good opinion and whose feigned piety impressed him that he used 
to look forward to visiting this man.77  
 
In both narratives, the false messiahs were mounting rebellions against the Jewish authorities of 
their own day. 
Both Samūʾal and Binyamin described the movement in distinctly political terms, as 
constituting a rebellion against the state to raise an army to ultimately defeat the gentiles and re-
conquer Jerusalem. In Samūʾal’s account, “The imposter coveted the place of the governor 
whom he considered a simpleton, and imagined that he would be able to pounce upon the 
fortress and take it over, that it might become his fortified stronghold.”78 Similarly, according to 
Benjamin, “He conceived the idea of rebelling against the king of Persia and of collecting the 
                                                          
76 Translation: Adler, Travels, 50. 




Jews who live in the mountains of Khafton to go forth and to fight against all the nations, and to 
march and capture Jerusalem.”79 
These movements had dangerous consequences for the Jewish community of the 
caliphate as a whole, not just for those Jews who participated in them directly. The gentile 
authorities tried to brutally suppress these movements. In ʿOvadya’s account, around the same 
time, the caliph expelled a messianic pretender named Ibn Shaddad from a town near Baghdad 
(Ba ʿaquba) and all of his followers into prison. The manuscript is fragmentary, so it is unclear 
what happened after their arrest. In Benjamin’s account, the state also intervened to suppress 
Suleymān’s rebellion: 
The king of Persia sent word to the commander of the faithful, the exilarch, and the 
Rosh Yeshivat Gaon Ya ʿaqov to restrain [Suleymān] from executing his designs. 
And he threatened that he would otherwise slay all the Jews in his Empire. Then all 
the congregations of the land of Persia were in great trouble.80  
 
According to Benjamin, the Jewish authorities of Baghdad warned Suleymān that his visions 
were false, and they threatened him with excommunication. Still, he refused, and eventually a 
vassal of the king of Persia bribed his father-in-law to kill him. But then, 
The king of Persia went forth against the Jews that lived in the mountains; and they 
sent to the Head of the Captivity to come to their assistance and to appease the king. 
He was eventually appeased by a gift of 100 talents of gold, which they gave him, 
and the land was at peace thereafter.81 
 
 Why did the Islamic government intervene to suppress a Jewish messianic movement? 
Although medieval Islamic states used violence and the threat of violence to enforce their rule, 
they nonetheless required the assent of their population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, in order 
to govern. Messianic movements among Jews, like messianic movements among Muslims, still 
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had the potential to threaten this fragile social and political order. Jewish messianic movements, 
therefore, represented a political crisis, for the state as a whole and for the Jewish political 
leadership in Baghdad, in particular. The exilarch still depended on the state to enforce his rule 
among Jews. Although the status of Jewish court bankers had declined, their work still depended 
on the population continuing to engage in economic activities, and Baghdad’s Jewish leadership 
needed to convince their population of the futility and danger of joining messianic movements. 
This explains why the previous messianic narratives emphasized that the messianic leaders had 
not made ignorant mistakes in interpreting contemporaneous events as harbingers of the 
imminent coming of the messiah; instead, they lied to manipulate innocent victims who did not 
know better into serving their own political ends. As Benjamin wrote, “[h]e showed signs by 
pretended miracles to the Jews and said, ‘The Holy One, blessed be he, sent me to capture 
Jerusalem and to free you from the yolk of the gentiles.’ And the Jews believed in him and called 
him their Messiah.” Similarly, Samūʾal wrote,  
So he wrote to the Jews who dwelled in the various districts of the country of 
Adharbayjān and the adjacent territory, knowing as he did that the Persian Jews are 
the most ignorant of all Jews. In his writings, he mentioned that he was a leader 
zealous to free the Jews from the hands of the Muslims, and he addressed the Jews 
with various ruses and deceptions.82 
 
In this narrative, as well, the messianic pretender plots to deceive the ignorant Jews of Persia. 
 
A Tale of Relief after Punishment: Elijah and the Caliph 
Still, in order to truly suppress such destabilizing movements, Baghdad’s Jewish 
leadership needed to acknowledge the reasons why individuals might be drawn to such 
movements in the first place: the very real persecutions that the Jewish community encountered, 
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particularly under Seljuq rule, and the failure of the state to respond to their grievances. They 
also needed to reassure their followers that, even though following a messianic movement was 
dangerous, the messiah would come soon and free them from gentile oppression. 
To this end, Baghdad’s Jewish leadership disseminated a Judeo-Arabic epistle detailing 
some miraculous events that took place in Baghdad in 1121. The epistle was copied years later 
and preserved along with a shorthand Passover Haggadah in a codex found in the Cairo Geniza. 
Goitein published the text in 1952 and argued that it represented ostensibly historical events that 
took place in Seljuq Baghdad.83 As Arnold Franklin and Miriam Frenkel argue, the narrative is a 
typological retelling of the biblical Book of Esther.84 Like the book of Esther, it depicts  
the near destruction and miraculous salvation of a local community, a scheming 
government official who is responsible for the Jews’ predicament, a young and 
pious female heroine, and a wise and sympathetic gentile who recognizes God’s 
unfailing concern for the Jewish people.85 
Its preservation along with a Passover Haggadah suggests that, for medieval Jews, its 
significance lay less in its recollection of specific historical events but in its relationship to 
Jewish liturgical memory. Like the Haggadah, it recounts a narrative of oppression, salvation, 
and future messianic redemption at the hand of the prophet Elijah.  
The text’s literary character and preservation implies that it does not represent an 
accurate account of historic events. Nevertheless, as Goitein recognized, it contains the names of 
real individuals who lived in Baghdad during this period, including the vizier Abu Shuj̔ā; the 
Seljuq sultan and the Abbasid caliph; the qādị Ibn Al-Dāmaghānī; as well as a Jewish 
government official, Sahl ibn Kammūna. Although he events were largely fictionalized, the 
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writer was clearly familiar with the upper echelons of Baghdadi society, both Jewish and 
Muslim, in the early twelfth century. 
Some pages are missing, but enough of the manuscript is preserved to reconstruct the 
narrative. The text begins by asserting that it will tell a tale of “relief after the punishment that 
befell them [the Jews] in this exile [al-galut] for many years.”86 It explains that “the root of these 
calamities was an evil man named Abu Shuj̔ā,” almost certainly a reference to the vizier who had 
tried to impose the ghiyār on dhimmī government officials. The text continues, by describing 
how Abu Shujā ʿ had imposed the ghiyār on women and the Jews paid 1,000 dinars to get this 
ruling revoked. This state of affairs persisted for many years until the year 1431 according to the 
Seleucid calendar. In Elul of that year, “the pious daughter of Yosef ben al-Hạkīm (son of the 
doctor) declared that she saw the prophet Elijah in her dream, and he told her that “the 
redemption of Israel was at hand.” When the Seljuq sultan found out about this, he declared this 
a threat to the Islamic state, “because the Jews would not allow the continued existence of a 
single independent realm after the establishment of their own kingdom.” Upon hearing this, the 
caliph had all of the Jews imprisoned in the imperial mint (dār al-dạrb). The caliph declared that 
the Jews’ “time is up” unless they became Muslims or a new prophet appeared among them. But 
the qādị warned the caliph, “[n]o person who had ever done evil to the Jewish people remained 
unpunished, and the Jewish people will endure forever.” The Jews, meanwhile, remained 
imprisoned, fasting and praying for deliverance. Then, Abu Sahl ibn Kammūna appeared 
miraculously freed from prison at the house of the exilarch, who was praying and fasting. Ibn 
Kammūna was called to appear before the caliph. The caliph did not believe the story that he had 
been freed from prison through the girl’s vision of Elijah; he declared that the Jews were clearly 
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stupid if they believed the testimony of a woman, and he ordered that the girl be burned the next 
day and the Jews outlawed. But that night, Elijah appeared to the caliph in a dream, and he was 
“struck with awe.” After that, he exempted the Jews from taxes. But the Jews instead bribed the 
viziers and nobles to succeed in having their exemption from taxes kept a secret. The narrative 
concludes by reminding the Jews that “the Jizya is a benefit to them, and if it was taken from 
them it would cause them hardship.”87 
As Frenkel argues, the narrative is sensitive to messianic yearnings and treats the girl’s 
visions as authentic. Throughout this catastrophe, Elijah was working behind the scenes to save 
the Jewish people. He freed Ibn Kammūna from prison and appeared to the caliph, causing him 
to rescind his decree. In this way, the story, like others in the “relief after adversity” genre 
popular in the medieval Islamicate world, reassured its audience that the messiah’s arrival was 
imminent.88  
Stories of pious women were common during the Seljuq period, but I argue that the 
figure of the girl served another purpose as well. The messianic movements that had plagued 
Iraq’s Jewish community during the Seljuq period were led by men rebelling against the existing 
Jewish communal leadership. In composing a moralizing tale about such movements, however, 
the Baghdad leadership chose to depict the rebellious messianic preacher as an innocent girl. In 
doing so, they were able to discuss and be sympathetic to messianic movements without naming 
or even alluding to those rebelling against them. 
Indeed, Frenkel and Franklin argue that the story’s purpose was to warn its audience 
against “potentially treasonous and dangerous eschatological fantasies.” As Frenkel writes,  
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The plot as described above conveys a clear anti-messianic approach: the messianic 
uprising in the story causes significant trouble for the Jews. It was only by the 
divine interference of the prophet Elijah that the Jews were rescued from the 
annihilation that was a potential consequence of this movement. The story’s moral 
is that Jews should endeavor to maintain their present dhimmī status and to pay their 
jizya tax in order to maintain their secure lives. Any attempt to change their status 
would necessarily bring about hardship and calamity.89 
 
In advancing this narrative, Baghdad’s Jewish leadership evaluated their relationship with 
the state differently from their predecessors. Under the earlier Abbasids, Baghdad’s geonim had 
a positive view of the Abbasid caliph, and they used their close relations with the Abbasid state 
to advance their own prestige among Jews as far away as Egypt. Under the Buyids, they were 
skeptical of the corruptions inherent in relations with the state, but they did not characterize the 
state as inherently oppressive. Yet in contrast to the geonim of the tenth century, Baghdad’s 
twelfth century Jewish leaders did not celebrate their relationship with the Abbasid state or its 
ability to grant privileges and favors to Jews. Instead, under the Seljuqs, Jewish leaders 
advocated quiescence; it was best to keep a low profile and to abide by the restrictions imposed 
on dhimmīs, while knowing that the messiah would come in due time. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Seljuq period marked a turning point in the relationship between Baghdad’s Jews 
and the Abbasid Caliphate. Previously, the Jewish relationship to the state was “jagged.” Jews 
had multiple ways of accessing state power, and they often appealed to the state to petition 
against miscarriages of justice, including those performed by their co-religionists. Under the 
earlier Abbasids, the exilarch as well as various Jewish court bankers could appeal to the state on 
behalf of their allies within the community. Under the Buyids, the centralized government had 
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collapsed, but political fragmentation had worked to the Jewish community’s advantage; a 
relatively large number of Jews worked as bankers and secretaries for various rival Buyid leaders 
and continued to use these relationships to advance the interests of their allies within the Jewish 
community. But under the Seljuqs, the status of Jewish court bankers declined, as the ʿulamā ʾ  
became more prominent in state administration and tried to marginalize dhimmī government 
officials (and dhimmīs in general) as much as possible. Although they were not successful in 
eliminating Jews from financial administration, they did succeed in marginalizing them.  
By the end of the eleventh century, with the decline in status and influence of Jewish 
court bankers, the exilarch had become the definitive representative of the Jewish community at 
court. Unable to appeal to the state during times of intra-communal conflict as they once had, 
Jews expressed their political frustrations in messianic terms. The communal leadership 
responded with a clear anti-messianic message in favor of quiet acquiescence to the state.  
Many of the worst anti-Jewish measures enacted during the Seljuq period had been due to 
the competition between the Abbasid caliphs and the Seljuqs for control over key state 
prerogatives and for the ability to promote themselves as legitimate Islamic leaders. But the 
Abbasid caliphs managed to remove the Seljuqs from Baghdad by 1160, and they ruled over the 
city without any external interference until the Mongol conquest in 1258. In 1170, the Ayyubids 
of Egypt swore allegiance to the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, symbolically uniting most of the 
eastern Islamic world under the banner of the Abbasid caliph once more. How did this new 
political order impact Jews? Did the caliphs continue the anti-dhimmī policies of the Seljuq 
period? Or, without the need to compete to promote themselves as legitimate Islamic leaders 
against the Seljuqs, did “the dhimmī question” become less central to Abbasid political life? 




Chapter 4: “None of the concerns that require a king?” Jewish Political Realignment in the 
Independent Caliphate, 1161-1258 
 
 
 In the year 1209 (605H), the Abbasid caliph al-Nāsịr li-Din Allah (r. 1180-1225) 
appointed Dāniyāl b. al-ʿAzar b. Hibat-Allāh as the “Head of the Academy (yeshiva) of the 
Jews” (Ra ʾis Mathībat al-Yahūd) and issued him a document of investiture. Dānyāl then read the 
document out loud to the Jews in the synagogue in Baghdad. The document gave Dāniyāl 
authority over the Jews under his jurisdiction in “Baghdad and the districts of Iraq”: 
Let him be regarded in this capacity by all places which are customarily subject to 
his administration and disposal. He may distinguish himself from his fellows by the 
garb permitted to people of his rank. It is the duty of the Jewish community and its 
judges in Baghdad and the districts of Iraq to submit to that which he orders, to 
demean themselves according to his word in the disposition of their affairs, and to 
act according to the degree required thereby. They must allow him all those rights 
customarily claimed by his predecessors in this dignity, in all places over which his 
administration extends without opposing any resistance to him therein.1 
 
This document is rather surprising. In contrast to the negative depictions of ostentatiously 
dressed Jewish officials during the Seljuq period, it characterizes Dāniyāl b. al-ʿAzar b. Hibat-
Allah in respectful terms by referring to his “spotlessness of character” and gives him permission 
to wear special clothing. Moreover, whereas during the previous centuries of Abbasid rule, the 
exilarchs had received caliphal investiture, the geonim did not. Yet according to this document 
copied by the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Sāʿī, the gaon Shemuʾel b. ʿEli Ibn al-Dastūr and his 
successor, Elʿazar b. Hillel b. Fahd had received similar documents of investiture before.2 Arabic 
chronicles from the thirteenth and fourteenth century record documents of investiture for 
subsequent geonim. 
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 Why did the geonim begin to receive caliphal investiture during the second half of the 
twelfth century? And what implications did their new political status have for Jewish communal 
rule and the ways in which Jewish leaders came to project their authority during the final years 
of the Abbasid caliphate? 
This chapter begins with an overview of the political developments in the Abbasid 
caliphate in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. I consider how these changes might 
have led to the granting of investiture to the geonim and temporarily increased the status and 
prestige of the various Jewish officials at the Abbasid court. The next section considers the 
impact of these political and administrative changes on the operations of the Jewish community 
itself. Jewish leaders used the threat of appealing to the state as a way of enforcing their rule, 
and, in marked contrast to the situation in the past, they were able to do so without the 
intercession of such other Jewish officials as jahbadhs at court. I also consider the implications 
of this new arrangement on the way in which the geonim and the exilarch in Baghdad promoted 
their authority in relation to each other. The chapter concludes by considering how the geonim 
and their allies, now officially part of Abbasid administration, characterized their relationship to 
the Abbasid state during the final years of the caliphate. 
 
Part I: Abbasid Politics  
 
The second half of the twelfth century and first few decades of the thirteenth century 
represent a major turning point in the political and social history of the Abbasid caliphate. After 
the Abbasid caliph defeated the Seljuqs in Baghdad in 1156, he maintained full independent 
control over Baghdad until the Mongol conquest in 1258. During this period, many of the 
struggles for caliphal legitimacy that had marked the previous two centuries waned.  
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First, the Seljuq threat, both physical and ideological, largely subsided. Although the 
Seljuqs remained in Iraq until 1194, they were greatly weakened and never again received 
recognition from the Abbasid caliphs. And, perhaps most significantly, the Fatimids, who as a 
Shiite dynasty represented perhaps the greatest ideological threat to the caliphate, had effectively 
lost power. The Ayyubids officially took control of the Fatimid caliphate in 1169, and in 1171 
they had the khutḅa in Egypt recited in the name of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. Although, 
with the exception of the defeat of the Seljuqs, the Abbasid caliph did little to facilitate these 
events, they represented his biggest triumph: they both confirmed the legitimacy of his rule and 
eliminated most political and ideological alternatives.3  
 In the absence of the political and ideological challenges of the Seljuqs, and the Fatimids, 
many of the religious and social conflicts that had characterized Baghdad’s society during the 
Seljuq era lost some of their urgency. No longer did the Abbasid caliph need to compete for 
legitimacy with rival Sunni leaders (the Seljuq sultans) in Iraq. And, without a Shiite caliph to 
claim the loyalties of his Shiite subjects, the conflict between Sunni and Shiite lost much of its 
political significance. 
 Instead of devoting attention to the kinds of religious conflicts that had characterized 
their rule in the past, the caliphs during this period focused on consolidating their rule over their 
territory and population, regardless of sectarian affiliation. To the consternation of the Ayyubids, 
who sought their help in defeating the remaining Crusaders in Syria, the Abbasid caliphs devoted 
most of their military attention to suppressing rebellious Sunni Arab tribes on the eastern borders 
of the caliphate.  
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Within their territory, the caliphs sought to bring all factions of the Muslim population, 
Sunni and Shiite alike, under their direct rule and influence. For example, in 1165, the caliph al-
Mustanjid held a special meeting to bestow lavish gifts on all of the notables of Baghdad’s 
population, a practice that his successors al-Mustadī and al-Nāsịr would also follow.4 Unlike 
such ceremonies in the ninth and tenth centuries, these did not involve the declaration of Islamic 
creeds. Moreover, these ceremonies involved groups that had previously been considered 
enemies, including ʿAlids and Sufi orders. His successor, al-Mustadī, attended religious 
disputations, built mosques, and repaired Baghdad’s infrastructure. He also, for the first time, 
patronized Sufi ribatṣ.5  
The next caliph, al-Nāsịr (r. 1180-1225) took these measures even further, embarking on 
an ambitious program of administrative and ideological reforms to reestablish the office of the 
caliph as the supreme political and religious authority in the Islamic world and to promote the 
unity of Islam above all else. On the political level, he suppressed rebellious Sunni tribes and 
made strategic alliances, ultimately kicking the Seljuqs out of their last strongholds in Iraq by 
1194.6  
But it was al-Nāsir’s reforms of Iraq’s social structure that were most significant. Since 
the Buyid period, Iraq’s society had been characterized by its many social groups, such as the 
futuwwa (mystical brotherhoods) outside of the direct control of the state. Previous caliphs had 
struggled to contain these groups. But al-Nāsịr succeeded in inducting himself into the futuwwa, 
and he demanded that the government officials subordinate to him did so as well. As a result, the 
futuwwa came under the direct purview of the caliph, and they now served as an organ of his 
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rule. On the religious level, he promoted himself as a mujtahid, a trustworthy transmitter of 
hạdith, for all four Sunni madhhabs. He patronized Sufi ribats and madrasas and appointed their 
leaders.7 At the same time, he surrounded himself with Shiite leaders and cultivated their loyalty, 
promoting himself as a descendant of ʿAlī. He positioned himself as the Sheikh of certain Sufi 
orders in Iraq, and he outlawed the others.8  
In addition, Al-Nāsịr created a sophisticated spy-system to monitor his subjects.9 As part 
of his surveillance program, the caliph monopolized the breeding of carrier-pigeons, and he 
banned the shooting of the birds with pellets. This ensured that only the caliph could intercept 
any correspondence. 10 As Erik Ohlander explains, al-Nāsịr endeavored to create 
[a] unified Abode of Islam organized like the members of a Sufi ribat, the students 
of the hạlqa of a mudarris in a madrasa, or the apprentices of a master craftsmen in 
the trade markets, namely radially around a central figure, being linked to on 
another through their shared allegiance to a common master. In the case of al-Nasir, 
the center of this network was none other than the very ‘shadow of god upon earth,’ 
at one and the same time the Qurayshi Abbasid representative of the Prophet, the 
champion of the ahl al-bayt, the recognized master of the futuwwa, a master juris 
consult recognized by all four Sunni madhabs, and perhaps even a fully actualized 
Sufi, an individual whose very personhood was envisioned as a focal point of the 
collective soteriological ambitions of all those who could reasonably be 
circumscribed under its very comprehensiveness.11 
 
It is worth pointing out that al-Nāsịr’s policies were not universally accepted; many traditionalist 
Sunni jurists, for example, accused him of being a closet Shiite.12 And neither Al-Nāsịr nor his 
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successors ever fully achieved his goals of uniting all political and religious authority in the 
person of the caliph. After al-Nāsịr’s death, the caliphate slowly collapsed, and many came to 
blame his failures for the Mongol conquest in 1258.13  
Nevertheless, al-Nāsịr did succeed in reshaping the social and political life of the 
caliphate and in bringing Iraq’s myriad independent social organizations more directly under his 
purview. His reforms have tended to be discussed only with regards to Iraq’s Muslims. In the 
following sections, I consider the implications of al-Nāsịr’s ideological reforms for Jewish 
government officials in particular and, by extension, the exercise of rabbinic authority during the 
final years of the Abbasid Caliphate. 
 
Jewish and Christian Government Officials under al-Nāsịr 
The most complete and representative chronicle depiction the years of al-Nāsịr’s reign is 
that of Ibn al-Sā ̔ī (1197-1276) the librarian of Baghdad’s most important law colleges, the 
Niz ̣ạ̄miyyah and the Munstansịriyya. Ibn al-Sā ̔ī was patronized by many high-level Abbasid 
officials, including Suhrawardī, who inducted him into a Sufi order at a young age. In all of his 
writings, he was an eager propagandist for the Abbasid caliphs of his day. Ibn al-Sāʿī’s text itself 
is organized chronologically by year, according to the model of such previous annalistic 
chronicles composed by members of the ulamā ʾ as Kitāb al-Muntazạm of Ibn al-Jawzī: each 
year includes a list of events that took place followed by a list of short biographical notices of 
prominent officials who died in the same year. At the same time, Ibn al-Sāʿī wrote his chronicle 
after the Mongols defeated the last Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, effectively bringing to an end the 
five centuries of Abbasid and Islamic rule in Baghdad. Through their historical works, Ibn al-
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Sāʿī and his contemporaries sought to memorialize and extol what in essence was a lost world 
and defend its values during a time of rupture and uncertainty.14  
Historians of the Late Abbasid Caliphate have devoted little attention to the study of non-
Muslims. They describe elite courtly culture in this period as being characterized mainly by 
hạdīth transmission among the ulamāʾ and the promulgation of Sufism within the futuwwa.15 
What did this mean for mean for Jewish government officials? On the one hand, al-Nāsịr 
continued the policy of his predecessors with regards to Jewish and Christian government 
officials. He tolerated their employment while also, periodically, issuing edicts banning them 
from government offices, likely in response to pressure from the ʿulamā ʾ. On the other hand, 
contemporaneous chroniclers closely affiliated with al-Nāsịr’s ideology characterized Jewish 
government officials in respectful terms, in marked contrast from the depictions of Jewish 
officials during the Seljuq period. These accounts suggest that Jewish officials, far from being 
fully marginalized in relation to the ʿulamāʾ, took part in elite Arabic courtly culture, possibly to 
a greater degree than ever before, during the final years of the Abbasid Caliphate. 
 According to Ibn al-Sāʿī, in the year 601 (1204-1205), the caliph al-Nāsịr issued an edict 
ordering that “no one from among the Ahl al-Dhimma should be employed in the dīwān.”16 He 
reports that all non-Muslim officials in the Diwan converted to Islam at this time, including a 
certain Christian named Abu Ghālib ibn Zatị̄nā, a scribe in the Diwān al-ʿAzīz.17 Abu Ghālib 
died in the same year as the edict, and Ibn al-Sāʿī eulogizes him as a “Muslim, an excellent 
scribe and officer.”18 
                                                          
14 Julia Bray, “Introduction,” in Consorts of the Caliphs: Women and the Court of Baghdad, ed. Julia Bray (New 
York: New York University Press, 2015), xxi. 
15 Hartmann, “al-Nāsịr li-Dīn Allāh,” Encyclopedia of Islam.  
16 Ibn al-Sāʿī, al-Jami ʿ al-Mukhtasạr, 161. 




In the same year, however, Ibn al-Sāʿī reports the deaths of three other Jewish officials: 
Abu Tạ̄hir b. Shibr, jahbadh of the Diwan al-ʿAzīz who was “a chief of the Jews” (rā ʾis al-
yahud19); his son, Abū Ghālib b. Abi Tạ̄hir b. Shibr, identified as “the Jew, an official of the 
mint,”20 and a certain Abu Ghālib b. Kammūna, identified as a Jew, likely also a Jewish official 
with some relation to the mint.21 The fact that Ibn al-Sā ̔ī’ continued to identify these officials as 
Jews, even in death (as opposed to Abu Ghālib ibn Zatīna who was eulogized as a Muslim) 
suggests that these Jewish officials did not, in fact, convert. Based on the chronicler’s references 
to Jewish officials during later dates, it seems that the decree, like those promulgated during the 
Seljuq period, did not have the effect of permanently banning Jews or Christians from 
government offices. 
Why did the chronicler report the (apparently natural) deaths of three Jewish officials 
during the same year as the caliph’s decree banning them from the dīwān? It is certainly possible 
that the deaths of the three officials in the same year was just a coincidence. It is more likely that 
the chronicler included these accounts for ideological purposes. The narrative that Al-Nāsịr 
banned dhimmī government officials from the diwan and that they all converted served to glorify 
the late caliph as an ideal Islamic leader. It is possible, however, that Al-Nāsịr’s decree was 
never really enforced, and that the Jewish government officials did not die in the same year as 
the decree, but continued to serve in Abbasid administration until their deaths at later dates. The 
chronicler might have chosen to report their deaths in this particular year so as to imply that Al-
Nāsịr’s administration really was free of dhimmī officials. It is also possible that the three 
                                                          
19 Likely not a reference to a formal position like the one under the Fatimids.  
20 Ibn al-Sāʿī, al-Jami ʿ al-Mukhtasạr, 165-`66. 
21 There is a reference to Ibn Kammūna in the messianic account from the Seljuq period discussed in Chapter 3. He 
is related to the famous philosopher Ibn Kammūna (c. 1284). 
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officials were killed for refusing to convert to Islam, and the chronicler omitted this detail in an 
effort to portray the decree as having been executed peacefully.  
 Still, in contrast to the overwhelmingly negative depictions of Jewish government 
officials in Seljuq-era chronicles, Ibn al-Sāʿī and his contemporaries portrayed Jewish 
government officials in positive terms. Consider Ibn al-Sāʿī’s eulogy for the aforementioned Abu 
Tạ̄hir b. Shibr, jahbadh of the Dīwān al-ʿAzīz. His inclusion alongside such scholars indicates 
both respect and prestige—the antithesis of the depiction of Jewish jahbadhs in Seljuq sources. 
Ibn al-Sāʿī informs us that he “died at the end of the month of Ramadan in the year 601/1204-
1205. He was brought to the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem and buried there.22 This information 
about his burial was likely included to demonstrate the deceased official’s wealth, prestige, and 
honor. Ibn al-Sāʿī did not provide any additional information about Abu Tāhir’s son or his death.  
His son’s eulogy is followed in the chronicle by that of the Jewish official Abu Ghālib b. 
Kammūna: “Abu Ghālib b. Kammūna the Jew died in the same year in an underground 
prison/storeroom in Wāsit ̣. He had been counterfeiting the handwriting of Ibn Muqla.”23 Here we 
have a eulogy of a Jewish official who died in prison, likely while being punished for 
committing fraud. Yet this eulogy is included in a list intended to record the deaths of individuals 
of note. So why was Ibn Kammūna included here? The answer likely has something to do with 
the nature of his “crime.” Ibn Muqla, who lived during the tenth century, is considered the father 
of Arabic calligraphy. There are many accounts of attempts to emulate Ibn Muqla’s hand, since 
manuscripts written in his hand were very valuable. In this case, the official was eulogized for 
his beautiful handwriting—even though, or perhaps because, he used this skill to commit fraud. 
                                                          
22 Ibn al-Sāʿī, 162-163. 
23 Copies in the hand of Ibn Muqla were particularly valuable. Cf. the story in Johannes Pedersen, The Arabic Book, 
trans. Geoffrey French, ed. Robert Hillenbrand (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87. Original Source: 
Yaqut, Irshad, Vol. VI, 22. 
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But in memorializing the world of the Abbasid court, Ibn al-Sāʿī, a librarian, chose to honor 
individuals with great skills in handwriting, regardless of their religious status.  
Yet Muslim chroniclers of this period not only recorded eulogies for Jews who held 
traditional positions in the Abbasid bureaucracy, but also for two Jewish geonim, praising them 
for their skills in Arabic calligraphy, poetry, medicine, and philosophy: 
Hibat Allah b. Abi al-Rabi’ the Dhimmī who was head of the academy of the Jews. 
He was learned in medicine and in philosophy and he wrote in a beautiful hand. He 
died in Thai Al-Hija of 606/1210 and he reached the age of 60.24 
 
Another anonymous chronicler eulogized the gaon Ibn al-Shuwayikh in equally laudatory terms:  
In that year [645] Abu al-Fatah Ishạ̄q b. al-Shuwayikh, head of the academy of the Jews 
(ra’is al-mathiba al-yahud) passed away. He was generous and cultured. He wrote in a 
beautiful hand and composed good poems. He was an expert in astronomy.  He wrote to 
Tāj al-Dīn, the sạdr al-makhzan, with a request: would the makhzan issue a petition to 
some of the Jews from Hạrba [a town in central Iraq, near Baghdad]. And the official 
responded: ‘The request of his petition is granted.’25  
 
But as Ibn al-Sāʿī explained, Tāj al-Dīn granted the petition in a grammatically incorrect manner. 
He wrote a dhamma, a vowel written above a letter to indicate the nominative case, instead of a 
kasra, a vowel written below a letter indicating the genitive case. In response, Ibn al-Shuwayikh 
addressed the following lines of poetry to Tāj al-Dīn: 
Your endeavor was always to support those in need 
To bandage the broken and lift up the fallen 
In doing this, your pen on the paper simply took up your course 
So it is hardly surprising that it raised up the low.26 
 
The phrase “raising up the low” equates to Tāj al-Dīn’s generosity in granting the petition to the 
Jews of Hạrba with his grammatical mistake—raising the kasra above the letter and writing a 
                                                          
24 Ibn al-Sāʿī, 283. 
25 This chronicle was attributed to Ibn al-Fuwatti but now manuscript evidence has refuted this. But it would be one 
of his contemporaries. 
26 Ibn al-Fuwatī, al-Hawadith, 112. Trans. Joseph Yahalom, “Andalusian Poetics and the Work of Elazar ben Ya 
ʿaqov of Baghdad,” Hispania Judaica Bulletin 4 (2004), 7, and it is clearly based on a different edition of the text. 
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dhamma. The chronicler, however, does not depict this incident as one of a haughty Jewish 
official acting superior to a Muslim. Instead, he characterizes Ibn al-Shuwayikh in 
overwhelmingly positive terms.  
These laudatory biographies of Jewish government officials and their inclusion alongside 
eulogies of Muslim scholars and court officials suggests that the employment of Jewish 
government officials did not represent the same problem or challenge to the ʿulamā ʾ during the 
late twelfth and early thirteenth century as it had during the Seljuq period. In Seljuq Baghdad, in 
particular, the ʿulamā ʾ advanced this discourse to exploit the competition for power and 
authority between the Seljuq sultans and the Abbasid caliph. Ibn al-Sāʿī, however, was part of 
the most elite courtly circles and patronized by Abbasid elites. In this regard, he himself was not 
competing against Jewish and Christian officials for patronage or prestige. Moreover, al-Nāsịr’s 
reforms and those of his predecessors actually had the effect of increasing the number of 
positions patronized by the caliph. Jewish and Christian government officials did not constitute 
the same threat to the patronage of the ʿulamā ʾ as they had during the Seljuq period. This could 
explain why, in contrast to the overwhelmingly negative depictions of Jewish officials from the 
Seljuq period, Ibn al-Sāʿī and his contemporaries eulogized Jewish officials in respectful terms, 
alongside Muslim elites.  
The chroniclers’ inclusion of biographical notices about the geonim suggests that they did 
not confine themselves to the world of the yeshivot during this period. Rather, the geonim took 
part in elite Arabic courtly culture—to such an extent that they developed favorable reputations 
in these fields outside of the Jewish community. Sometimes, they even engaged in witty 
grammatical and poetic banter with high-ranked Muslim government officials.  
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Whereas chronicles from earlier periods referred to Jewish exilarchs and such other 
Jewish government officials as jahbadhs, they never mentioned geonim. The integration of the 
geonim into Abbasid courtly circles in this period should be understood, in part, as a 
consequence of the granting of caliphal investiture to the geonim. As the next section argues, that 




When did the Babylonian Geonim first receive investiture from the Abbasid Caliph? 
 A document copied by Ibn al-Sā ̔ī constitutes the earliest documented evidence attesting 
to the Babylonian geonim having received investiture from the Abbasid caliph. According to the 
document, Daniyāl was not the first individual to hold the office of Raʾis al-Mathība. Instead, it 
specifies that “he shall be appointed Rais Mathība after the fashion of the abovementioned 
deceased [Al-Azar b. Hilāl b. Fahd], in so far as Ibn al-Dastūr [Shemuʾel b. ʿEli] was likewise 
Raʾis al-Mathība.”27 Thus, the first documented evidence of a gaon having received investiture 
from an Abbasid caliph is Shemuʾel b. ʿEli (gaon from 1164-1194 or 1197). The surviving 
portion of the chronicle begins in 595 H/1198 CE, so we do not have the document of investiture 
for Shemuʾel b. Eli or Hibat-allāh. Nevertheless, Arabic chroniclers recorded documents of 
investiture for subsequent geonim during the thirteenth century. 
 Some insight into this change comes from comparing the accounts of two travelers to 
Baghdad during the gaonate of Shemuʾel b. ʿEli. Benjamin of Tudela, a Jew from Christian 
Navarre, who traveled throughout the known Jewish world before 1173 and while the exilarch 
Daniel b. Hisday was still alive. Petahỵa of Regensburg (Ratsibon), a Jew from Ashkenaz, 
                                                          
27 Ibn Al-Sā ̔ī, 267. Translation: Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life, 128. 
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traveled to Baghdad before 1175, but after Daniel b. Hịsday’s death. Both writers, in contrast to 
accounts from the Buyid and Seljuq periods, depict the Abbasid caliph as an ally of Baghdad’s 
Jewish leadership. They differ in their precise description of the structure and hierarchy of that 
leadership. 
 Benjamin, the earlier of the two accounts, depicts the head of the yeshiva, Daniel b. 
Hịsday, as the unquestionable head of the Jewish community who held investiture from the 
Abbasid caliph: 
And at the head of all of [the Jews] is Daniel the son of Hisday who is styled “our 
lord the head of the captivity of all Israel. He possesses a book of pedigrees going 
back as far as David, King of Israel. The Jews call him our lord, the head of the 
captivity,” and the Muslims call him “Saidna ben Daud”, and he has been invested 
with authority over all the congregations of Israel at the hands of the Amir al-
Muminin, the Lord of Islam…At his installation, the head of the captivity gives 
much money to the caliph, to the princes and the ministers. On the day that the 
caliph performs the ceremony of investing him with authority, he rides in the 
second of the royal equipages and is escorted from the palace of the caliph to his 
own house with timbrels and fifes. The exilarch appoints the chiefs of the 
academies by placing his hand upon their heads thus installing them in their 
office.28 
 
Benjamin is unequivocal that the exilarch is the highest ranked Jewish official and that he invests 
the heads of the yeshiva with authority.  
 Petahỵa confirms that, during his lifetime, Daniel, as Rosh Golah, was the supreme 
Jewish authority in Baghdad:  
A year before the arrival of R. Petahỵa, Rabbi Daniel Rosh Golah died. He is a 
higher authority than the head of the academy. They all possess a book of genealogy, 
up to the founders of the tribes; Rabbi Daniel descended from the house of David.  
 
                                                          
28 Benajmin, Travels, 100-1. 
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Yet Petahỵa, writing one year after the death of Daniel b. Hasday, reports that the community 
could not agree on the selection of a new exilarch, and that the caliph did not require them to do 
so: 
The monarch does not appoint a head of the captivity, save at the recommendation 
of the princes among the Jews. There is no one there eligible to be rosh golah except 
for the two princes of the house of David, and some of the princes prefer Rabbi 
David and some Rabbi Shemuʾel. They have not yet come to an understanding. 
They are both of the disciples of the wise. Rabbi Daniel had no sons, only 
daughters.29 
 
According to Petahỵa, after Daniel b. Hịsday’s death, Shemuʾel b. Eli, the Rosh Yeshiva, who 
conducted himself “like the king,” or caliph who took up leadership of the Jewish community: 
Every Jew in Bavel gives one gold coin to the Head of the Academy every year as 
a poll tax, for the king does not demand anything from them except for the Head of 
the Academy. There is peace for the Jews in the land of Bavel.30 … The head of the 
academy has many servants. They flog any one not immediately carrying out his 
orders; therefore people fear him. He, however is righteous, humble, and full of 
knowledge of the law. He is clothed in golden and colored garments like the king; 
his palace [paltin]31 also is hung with costly tapestry like that of the king.32  
 
The use of the Hebrew term paltin to refer to the gaon’s “palace” further underscores the 
political dimension of Shemu ʾel’s position.  
These two accounts, coupled with the lack of evidence for geonic investiture in previous 
periods, suggests that the exilarch (theoretically) was the only Jewish leader with caliphal 
investiture in Iraq until the death of Daniel b. Hịsday. Taking advantage of the conflict over his 
successor, Shemuʾel b. Eli began to assert certain exilarchic prerogatives for himself: he wore 
ornamented clothing, collected the poll tax, and enforced his rulings using physical force. 33 
                                                          
29 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 18-9. 
30 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 19-21. 
31 The term refers to an official of a European monarch.  
32 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 41-3. 
33 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 41-3. 
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Around this time, he likely petitioned the caliph to invest his office of Ra ʾis al-Mathība with 
direct political authority.  
Although the geonim separated themselves from politics at least on a rhetorical level, 
they had always cultivated close relations with Jewish officials at the Abbasid court. They 
depended on the power of the state to enforce their rule over the communities under their 
jurisdiction. Indeed, a similar situation had existed in Egypt, where the Palestinian gaon had 
received investiture from the Fatimid caliph since the middle of the tenth century.34 In this 
regard, Shemuʾel’s success in securing caliphal investiture for the office of gaon can be seen as a 
continuation of earlier trends of an increasing alignment between the Babylonian geonim and the 
Abbasid State. 
 I argue though that it is not a coincidence that the geonim in Baghdad first received 
investiture from the Abbasid caliph either right before or during the reign of the caliph al-Nāsịr. 
Many of Al-Nāsịr’s reforms (and those of his predecessors) endeavored to centralize the 
administration of the caliphate and bring such extra-state organizations as the futuwwa and the 
madrasas more directly under the purview of the caliph. By granting investiture to the gaon, the 
caliph ensured that Jewish organizations external to the state would also come more directly 
under his rule. 
Previously, the Jewish yeshivot did not have a direct relationship with the Abbasid state. 
The geonim administered certain territories and Jewish communities and did appoint judges over 
them; but these privileges had been granted through the exilarch or, more often since the 
exilarchs and geonim were often in conflict, through the intercession of other Jewish officials at 
court. The granting of investiture to the gaon did not preclude the granting of investiture to the 
                                                          
34 Mark R. Cohen, Jewish Self-Government in Medieval Egypt: The Origins of the Office of the Head of the Jews, 
ca. 1065-1126 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
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exilarch, nor did it prohibit other Jews from serving in in government posts. Nevertheless, by 
granting investiture to the gaon, the caliph was able to more directly administer the Jews under 
his rule.  
Moreover, as Ohlander explains, a great deal of Al-Nāsịr’s ideological reforms 
endeavored to organize all of Abbasid society radially around himself, with his subjects all 
linked to each other through their shared allegiance to the person of the caliph.35 In this regard, 
the circle of disciples (hạlqa) of a master teacher (mudarris) served as a synecdoche for the 
caliphate as a whole, as students became linked to each other and to their master, with the caliph 
positioning himself as the chief mudarris. The yeshiva itself functioned in a similar fashion as 
the madrasa. Both institutions promoted themselves as transmitters of oral tradition and religious 
law. In both the madrasa and the yeshiva, students sat in rows encircling the mudarris or gaon 
and were linked together through their own loyalty to his person and shared ideological and 
religious project. As the caliph brought the institution of the madrasa more directly under his 
control, he also incorporated the yeshiva/mathība—the Jewish madrasa—into the purview of 
Abbasid administration. 
This would also explain why contemporaneous chroniclers included biographical notices 
about the geonim; by this period, they were, in fact, part of Abbasid administration. They 
submitted petitions on behalf of groups of Jews before the caliph’s representatives. In their 
capacity as Abbasid administrators, they, like their Muslim counterparts, took part in aspects of 
Abbasid courtly culture, developing reputations in fields as varied as medicine, philosophy, 
Arabic calligraphy, and poetry. In sum, there was a shift in the status of Jewish officials at the 
Abbasid court during the second half of the twelfth century. The status of Jewish officials 
                                                          
35 Ohlander, Sufism. 
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increased, and the Babylonian gaon received investiture for the first time. Part II considers what 
this increasing alignment between the yeshivot and the state meant for Jewish communal 
administration during this period.  
 
Part II: Impact on the Exercise of Geonic Authority 
 
 The closer alignment between the Abbasid State and Babylonian Jewish leadership 
during this period would have an outsized impact on the Jewish community and the ways in 
which the geonim and their allies came to promote their authority among Jews. In particular, the 
granting of state investiture to the geonim meant that the geonim no longer had to rely on Jewish 
court bankers or the exilarch to harness the power of the state to enforce their rule. This section 
begins with an overview of the surviving documentary evidence related to the rabbinic Jewish 
community of Iraq during this period. Then, I analyze this correspondence for evidence of how 
Jewish leaders used the power of the Abbasid state to advance their own rule over the 
communities under their jurisdiction. Finally, I consider how this new political arrangement 
affected the kinds of claims to authority that the geonim and the exilarch made against each other 
during this period. 
 
Documentary Evidence for the Reshuyot of Iraq 
Two collections of copies of letters (Yevr II A 72 and Yevr II A 105) written by geonim 
of Baghdad and their contemporaries in the second half of the twelfth century and early 
thirteenth century, first published and analyzed by Simhạ Assaf, offer insight into how geonic 
authority functioned on a practical level.36 The logic by which these letters were collected is 
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somewhat unclear; they are not all written in chronological order, and they certainly do not 
represent the entire written output or correspondence of Baghdad’s Jewish communal authorities.  
In addition, around eight manuscript fragments written in the hand of Shemu ʾel b. ʿEli 
(or one of his scribes) were preserved in the Cairo Geniza. Although most were not preserved in 
their entirety, the letters are significant for their physical features: Shemuʾel b. Eli wrote in an 
elaborate hand, occasionally using Arabic vowel signs on top of Hebrew letters. He employed 
wide spaces between lines, as well as a large right margin and stacked lines. In addition, he 
began his letters with a tarjama, echoing Arabic scribal practice. In doing so, Shemu ʾel 
continued the scribal conventions employed by his predecessors in the gaonate over a century 
before him. Moreover, the majority of the letters are elaborate and ornamental; they use copious 
amounts of paper and are quite beautiful. They are the work of a wealthy, prestigious institution. 
The letters make reference to some thirty Jewish communities throughout Iraq, Iran, 
Mesopotamia, and Greater Syria. The vast majority of the letters indicate that these communities 
either paid tribute (or the gaon hoped to get them to pay tribute) to the yeshiva or the yeshiva’s 
representative in a given region. The communities in northern Iraq, for example, were 
administered by a judge, while many of those in Syria seem to have been under the control of the 
head of the yeshiva of Damascus, who himself held a title from the yeshiva in Baghdad.  
Whereas the documentary evidence from the earlier geonic period points to trans-regional 
relations between the yeshivot and distant communities under Fatimid control, the surviving 
texts from the late-twelfth and early-thirteenth centuries give more insight into relations between 
different communities and individuals within Iraq itself. Because there is almost no documentary 
evidence pointing to intra-Iraqi Jewish relations before this period, it is difficult to say with 
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complete certainty whether the letters point to a continuity in the operations of the Babylonian 
yeshivot or new developments in Jewish communal administration under the later Abbasids.  
 
“By the hand of the government”: Geonic Administration in the Late Abbasid Period 
 
The geonim relied on the state to enforce their legal rulings and contracts and assumed 
that their requests would be honored, provided they wrote documents according to Islamic law. 
In a letter from 1166 found in the Cairo Geniza, Shemuʾel b. ʿEli gave a ruling on how to divide 
up an inheritance between an orphan girl and a certain Yosef and his wife. After explaining the 
division of the estate, Shemu ʾel stipulated that the judge should record the agreement in writing: 
And he should write this for him in a legal document (shetạr) according to religious 
law (kānūn shar ʿaī)37 and whoever opposes this edict from the opposing parties, it 
will incumbent on him to be required by it, by religious law and by the hand of the 
government (sultạniya).38 
 
In composing the document in this matter, the judge ensures that should one of the parties not 
abide by the agreement, the other party could appeal to the government in order to enforce it.  
The geonim also relied on government officials to prevent Jews under their reshut 
(jurisdiction) from using other legal venues. In other words, the state enforced the “autonomy” of 
the yeshiva’s rule. In a letter from 1185, Shemuʾel b. ʿEli also warned an unnamed community 
against rakilot, or gossip. The implication is that such “gossip” refers to individuals leaving their 
own reshut and possibly appealing to the government: 
Our compatriots, to you from the people of obedience and those who obey the 
decrees of religion and law. It has come to our attention about a dispute of their 
plan that divided their hearts. And some of them pursued others with damage and 
gossip and this is one of the most severe crimes that leads to ruin and uproots houses 
and obliterates tradition, angering the creator, may he be exalted, and procures his 
punishment. Thus beware of them and beware of them in becoming accustomed to 
                                                          
37 The phrase could refer to Islamic (Sharia) law, since the gaon is directing the official to compose a document so 
that it can be enforced by the hand of the government. On the other hand, this phrase is often used in Judeo-Arabic 
to refer to Halakhah. 
38 T-S13J9.7; Gil, In the Land of Ishmael, doc. 75. 
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acting like this, and fear god and his punishment, and seek peace that if its aim is 
obtained it will be as it is written, “the lord will establish peace for us.”39   
 
At first, it might appear that the gaon is warning against the practice of informing on other Jews 
to the government. But then, he continues by warning the community that the yeshiva has 
appointed a deputy and a prince (likely a representative of the government) to ensure that any 
Jew trying to escape the bounds of his own reshut would be returned and subject to physical 
punishment: 
We have directed our deputy Mar Rav Yaʿaqov the Dayyan, the wise honored 
one … to inform us about everyone who sanctions gossip. Moreover, we have 
advanced a government official (sar) to afflict [the gossiper] quickly and inform 
us…and our compatriots [so] that anyone who does this will be returned to us from 
their reshut… but now it is necessary for them, may god protect them, to redress 
this in this year and to pay the reshut to our representative in its entirety from every 
person.40 
In this letter, Shemuʾel also demonstrates that the Jewish authorities relied on the state to 
suppress individuals disloyal to them and protect the boundaries of their reshut. The gaon writes, 
“[w]e have advanced a prince to afflict [the gossiper]” suggesting that he has authority over 
Jewish government officials and the ability to deploy individuals to regions all over Iraq to 
enforce his rule.  
Overall, the letters evoke a climate in which the centralized Jewish authorities were able 
to keep a close eye on the communities and individuals under their jurisdiction. Whenever a 
community was unfaithful—whether they did not send the requisite dues to the yeshiva or tried 
to use a legal venue outside of the yeshiva’s authority—the gaon wrote to say that he has sent a 
“deputy” or a “prince” to ensure the community or individual’s obedience to the yeshiva and 
report back to the yeshiva about any future disobedience. The yeshiva’s administration relied on 
                                                          




the faithfulness of the officials it appointed to collect dues from the various communities under 
its jurisdiction. As Shemuʾel wrote of his protégé and representative Zekharya b. Berakhel in his 
letter investing him with authority over the Lands of Syria: “whoever is close to him is close to 
us, and whoever is far from him is far from us.”41 
But what happened if one of these officials was disloyal to the yeshiva or neglected his 
duties? As the following letter demonstrates, the gaon could appoint yet another official to 
supervise the disloyal official. An anonymous gaon composed a letter to “the exalted Head 
Thiqat al-Mulk (“Faithful one of the realm”).” The title raʾis, coupled with the laqab Thiqat al-
Mulk, suggests that the recipient of the letter may himself have held a government appointment. 
After relatively brief introductory blessings and greetings, the gaon writes: 
You defaulted on us and did not appear in our council (majlis). And god knows 
how we grieved at his absence, his tardiness, his distance [from us]. If he, with his 
good fortune, chose to neglect us and our eternal correspondence …but we do not 
want to treat him as if he did that. Rather, we held our connection with him in high 
esteem and we chose to write to him, in order that he be overcome in his soul by its 
ancient love and great support.42 
 
Here, the gaon rebukes an official who failed to appear in his presence to deliver the funds that 
he (or his community) owed to the yeshiva. The gaon chooses to treat the official as if he were 
merely delayed and had not actually chosen to betray the yeshiva. It is unclear what, exactly, 
would happen if the gaon treated the official as if he had defaulted on purpose. Likely, he would 
have turned him over to the state for punishment. The letter suggests that the gaon is able to 
threaten a Jewish courtier with the use of state power—even though the individual in question 
has a title granted to him from the state. But then, the gaon continues: 
We have appointed a deputy to write to us about him, witnessing him, scrutinizing 
him, and observing him. While we inquire about him, we have persisted with 
blessings and we present him with prayers for reconciliation. And god is very 
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42 Assaf, “Letters,” II, 45. 
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exalted and his glory rises for all eternity. It is necessary to separate noble high-
mindedness from all that is facile and to execute the deeds of the Beit Din and that 
they are carried out by the hand of a faithful one. The obligation on him challenges 
him, and the eye follows him, directing him to account for the loads that are not 
complete and the provisions (important matters) that are not hidden from his 
presence and avoid negligence. In this, may god grant him success and bear witness 
to his integrity.43 
 
While the gaon might be giving Thiqat al-Mulk the benefit of the doubt here, he also takes no 
chances. Instead, the gaon has appointed a deputy to supervise him. In this regard, the reference 
to the “eye that follows him” here serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it refers to God, 
who is watching over Thiqat al-Mulk to ensure that he fulfills his religious duty. On the other 
hand, it refers to the deputy watching over Thiqat al-Mulk wherever he goes to ensure that he 
ultimately follows through on his obligation to the yeshiva.  
These references to the yeshiva’s “eyes” in distant communities echo the accounts of the 
effective spy-system that Al-Nāsịr implemented in Iraq during this period. All of these examples 
point to the relative ease with which the gaon could rely on state power to advance his rule over 
the communities in his jurisdiction, a consequence of the caliphal investiture that the geonim 
came to enjoy during this period.  
Nevertheless, the gaon was not the only Jewish authority with caliphal investiture 
operating in Iraq. He also had to contend with the exilarch, who continued to carry out his 
traditional prerogatives and administer lands under his jurisdiction. This led the two offices into 
even greater conflict with each other than ever before. The following section considers what this 
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Geonic Claims to Authority against the Exilarch 
The traditional prerogative of the exilarch, dating back to Talmudic times, was as a 
representative of Jews before the gentile authorities. The rabbis of the Talmud used their own 
rhetorical separation from state power, indeed, their powerlessness, to promote the spiritual and 
religious authority of the yeshivot, in contrast to what they characterized as the corruption 
inherent in the exilarch’s position. The geonim, who positioned themselves as the spiritual heirs 
of the rabbis of the Talmud, continued to employ this rhetoric.  
Nevertheless, during the tenth and eleventh centuries, even when the geonim found 
themselves in political conflict with the exilarch, they did not endeavor to eliminate his position 
altogether. Instead, they appealed to Jewish officials at the Abbasid court to petition the 
government to appoint an exilarch loyal to them. Consider the conflict between Saʿadya Gaon 
and David b. Zakkay during the tenth century: Saʿadya did not try to assume the exilarch’s 
prerogatives for himself; rather, he used his alliance with the Jewish court banker Sahl b. Netịra 
to appoint the current exilarch’s brother as a counter-exilarch. Saʿadya’s decision speaks to the 
importance of Davidic genealogy in constructions of Jewish communal authority in the early 
tenth century. At the same time, it suggests that the exilarch’s function was somehow distinct 
from that of the gaon—and necessary. It was his role at the Abbasid court that made his position 
invaluable to Jewish communal rule and inherently distinct from that of the gaon. 
By contrast, once the gaon received caliphal investiture as well, the political distinction 
between the two positions ceased to exist. As a result, during the late twelfth and early thirteenth 
century, the gaon and the exilarch competed for the loyalty of Jewish communities in Northern 
Iraq and Syria, and each figure tried to promote himself as the sole leader of world Jewry and 
discredit the other. In promoting his own authority as gaon and opposing the exilarch, the gaon 
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Shemuʾel b. Eli marginalized the very concept of Jewish kingship while combining previously 
separate forms of Jewish communal authority in his own person.  
 
Gaon as Genealogical and Scholarly Authority 
The relationship between the yeshiva and the communities under its jurisdiction was an 
eternal covenant binding on all parties involved for generations. This covenant was renewed 
every year when the representatives of the communities appeared at the yeshiva and presented 
the requisite dues to the gaon. In letters rebuking communities who did not send donations at the 
requisite time, the geonim invoked the eternal nature of this covenant and asserted that it 
remained binding on current and future generations. But what, exactly, was this eternal covenant 
based upon? And from what, precisely, did the authority of the yeshiva derive? The answers to 
those questions were never entirely consistent. And during the late twelfth century, Jewish 
leaders invoked new claims to authority that were different from those that they had used a 
century earlier. 
In a letter to ʿArbil before Rosh Hashana in Tishrei of 1193, Shemuʾel invoked his own 
Levitical descent as constituting the foundation of the yeshiva’s authority. In this formulation, 
God chose the Tribe of Levi to teach law and Torah to the Jewish people, and it is incumbent on 
the rest of the Jewish people to obey the Tribe of Levi, now represented by the yeshiva: 
Malachai, peace be upon him, said in his book, “I have sanctified his names, 
glorifying the tribe of Levi, extolling it as he one who was singled out by the 
covenant joining life and peace, according to the prophet the messenger, peace be 
upon him. … And everything related to this was elucidated by Moses our Teacher, 
peace be upon him, in his blessing to the tribes before his death. And that [to Levi] 
is as follows: “For they have observed your words and kept your covenant.  They 
will teach Jacob your ordinances and Israel your law.” [Deut 33:9-10]. And he 
continued after this to pray for him and against his enemies, as it is written “Bless 
lord his substance and accept the work of his hands; smite through the loins of them 
that rise up against him, and of them that hate him, that they not rise again.” And it 
is appropriate that this holy tribe, that they should be guided by him in matters 
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concerning Halakhic commandments and the divine obligations as God, may he be 
exalted, distinguished [Levi] in this, to the exclusion of the rest of the people. And 
it is incumbent on the rest of them to [obey Levi], by Halakha and moreover in 
addition to the aforementioned divine command, the covenant and oath established 
definitively by him is the covenant that we made with our compatriots and dears—
may god preserve their strength—more than thirty years ago, and the oaths that we 
made with them. We demand now especially their written correspondence with us 
about it, concerning the obligatory reverence for our tribe in general. And we 
inform them that this is necessary for them for a long period of time. One is not 
permitted to abandon it. For every covenant or oath renewed after that does not 
abrogate the covenant and the oath that came before them. Rather the preceding 
[oath] is the oath of expression, obligated by Halakhah.44 
 
In essence, the covenant between the yeshiva and the community of ʿArbil, though technically 
instantiated thirty years earlier, was actually the covenant between God and the Tribe of Levi 
because of Shemuʾel b. Eli’s status as a Levite. Arnold Franklin suggests that “Shemuʾel’s 
appeal to genealogy was tailored in response to the exilarch’s own self-legitimizing arguments, a 
reaction in kind to the rhetoric of ancestral entitlement advanced by the royal line.”45 But 
Franklin does not question why, specifically at this time, the gaon put so much emphasis on 
genealogy and the idea of priestly descent. After all, genealogy had played a central role in the 
legitimation of the Davidic line since before the tenth century, and the majority, although not all, 
of the geonim from previous years were from priestly families. Nevertheless, these earlier 
geonim did not imply that their Levitical or Kohenic descent was the basis of the authority of the 
yeshiva.46   
This rather unprecedented argument for the authority of the yeshiva should be understood 
in relation to the political ideology of the Abbasid Caliphate in the late-twelfth and early-
thirteenth centuries, which endeavored to combine the previously separate realms of political 
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power (sovereignty), religious authority (as the main transmitter of hadith), and genealogical 
authority (as qurayshi ahl-al-bayt) in the person of the caliph. During this period of 
consolidation and centralization, Jews too advanced arguments combining previously separate 
forms of authority—religious authority as the guardian of the Oral Tradition and 
priestly/genealogical authority—into the person of the gaon. The fact that the gaon now also held 
caliphal investiture meant that religious authority, priestly/genealogical authority, and political 
authority were all now combined in his person.  
Yet even though the gaon now held political authority in a more official manner than he 
had previously, he never claimed to possess Davidic ancestry (as Sherira Gaon had) or be 
entitled to exercise the prerogatives of Jewish kingship. Instead, the gaon asserted that the 
authority of the scholars and the yeshiva automatically outranked other forms of Jewish 
communal authority. In his 1186 letter to Kirkānī, a city in northern Iraq, the gaon drew on the 
Mishnaic concept of the “three crowns” of Jewish communal authority: the crown of Torah, 
represented by the rabbis (i.e., the yeshiva); the crown of priesthood, represented by those of 
Levitical descent; and the crown of sovereignty, represented by the Davidic line (i.e., the 
exilarch). In this letter written in Judeo-Arabic, the gaon uses an Aramaic passage from the 
Talmud to demonstrate that the yeshiva outranks all other forms of Jewish authority: 
The covenant with us is incumbent upon our brothers—blessings upon them—and 
to their descendants until the end of all of the generations.” But if we did not have 
a covenant with them, it would still be incumbent on them to be obedient to the 
throne of the Torah and the obligation of the Yeshiva, since the rank of the Torah 
is greater than the rank of the High Priest (Kohen Gadol) and even greater than the 
Sovereignty (Malukha). Just as within the nation four crowns that landed from 
heaven alternate. The first of them is the Crown of Torah. As the sages, may their 
memory be a blessing, said: There were three crowns. And they are: the crown of 
the Ark, the crown of the Altar, and the crown of the Table. [Yoma 27b] The ark is 
equal to the sages of Israel since it contains within it the tablets of the covenant and 
the Sefer Torah. And the Altar is equivalent to the kohanim and the table is 
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equivalent to the kings of Israel. And it is known that the ark’s rank is higher than 
the rest.47  
 
In this formulation, the yeshiva, as the crown of Torah, outranks the exilarch, the crown of 
sovereignty, and thus should monopolize the community’s loyalty.  
Five years later, Shemuʾel went even further, claiming not only that the Crown of Torah 
took precedence over the Crown of Sovereignty/Kingship, but also that the very concept of 
Jewish kingship was obsolete in the Diaspora. In a letter from 1191 to all of the Jewish 
communities in northern Iraq and Syria (specifically, the communities in Raqqa, Qal ̔āh, Sarūj, 
Manbaj, al-Bīrah, Bizā ʿah, al-Bāb, Tadmar, Hạmāh, Hạmas,̣ B ʿalbak, al-Rahā, and Hạrān) and 
all of the land of Syria, he wrote: 
Know that when Israel asked for a king in the time of Shemuʾel, you are aware of 
how angry [God] became, saying, “They have not rejected you, rather they have 
rejected me from ruling over them” (I Shemu ʾel 8:7). And they chose a king only 
on account of the need for someone to lead them in battle…But in the times of exile 
they do not have a king or war, nor do they have any of the concerns that require a 
king. Rather, they have need only for one who can guide them, impart to them their 
religious obligations, judge their cases and decide for them matters of religious 
law.48 
 
Shemuʾel argues that such a kinglike figure as the exilarch serves no function for a Jewish 
community in exile. Rather, the community only requires a halakhic guide and arbiter: the gaon 
himself. In this way, Shemuʾel promotes himself as the sole legitimate leader of the Jewish 
people. 
 
The Exilarch’s Response 
 To refute these challenges, the exilarch argued that the Babylonian geonim held no 
intrinsic halakhic authority. In doing so, he enlisted the help of Musa b. Maymūn (Maimonides), 
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who had been named Head of the Jews in Egypt in 1171, and his student, Yosef b. ʿAqnīn. As 
Sarah Stroumsa argues, Maimonides was influenced by the Almohad legal methodology he was 
exposed to in his native Al-Andalus, particularly the writings of Ibn Tūmart. He set out to 
compose a brief yet comprehensive code of Jewish law along the model of contemporaneous 
Almohad law codes; his work privileges the primary sources (usụl) of legislation over the rulings 
of later commentators and avoids mentioning the names of transmitters, arguments in support of 
each ruling, and alternative rulings.49  
Ultimately, Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, completed in 1178 in Egypt, sought to replace 
the kind of Talmudic study that predominated at the Babylonian yeshivot. Throughout his 
introducion, Maimonides bemoaned what he characterized as the poor state of rabbinic learning 
in his own day: 
And now the calamities are many and frequent, and the harsh times destroyed 
everything. The wisdom of our sages has been lost, and the intelligence of our 
scholars has been hidden. Therefore, those explanations, responses, and laws 
written by the geonim have become hard to decipher, and there are only few who 
can fully comprehend their contents. Needless to say, fewer comprehend the 
Talmud itself.50 
 
Instead, Maimonides asserted that the circumstances of his own day required a clear, lucid, and 
comprehensive guide to the commandments, the Mishneh Torah, itself: 
Because of all of that I, Moshe son of Rabbi Maimon of Sefarad, have decided to take 
action. I have relied on the creator and analyzed all these writings….All will be written in 
lucid language and few words, so that all people will be well-versed in the totality of the 
Oral law, with no questions and answers, with no “this one says so and that one says so” 
but rather clear, accessible, correct concepts, following the law distilled from all the 
books and commentaries created from the time of Rabbi Judah the Holy until today.51 
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As Maimonides explained, the Mishneh Torah was meant to replace the study of such other 
halakhic commentaries as those composed by the Babylonian geonim: 
Thus, I have called this work the Restatement of the Law [Mishneh Torah], for a 
person reads the Written Law first and then reads this work, and knows from it the 
entire Oral Law, without needing to read any other book between them.52 
The Mishneh Torah, therefore, purported to make the Babylonian yeshivot obsolete. By contrast, 
Maimonides spoke in glowing terms of the authority of the Babylonian exilarchs, asserting that 
his office commanded authority over Jews worldwide and that he, alone, had the ability to 
appoint judges.53 
With the goal of countering the Babylonian gaon’s claims to halakhic supremacy while 
advancing the authority of his own office, the exilarch invited Yosef b. Yehudah b. ʿAknīn to 
open a school in Baghdad to teach the Mishneh Torah. In a letter from 1191, Maimonides praised 
Yosef for his service to the exilarch in Baghdad, writing, “were it not for you the exilarch would 
have been in [Shemuʾel b. ʿEli’s] hands like a chick in the talons of a hawk…and would have 
torn him to shreds.”54 
It is worth noting that previous Babylonian exilarchs had accepted the Babylonian geonic 
claims to halakhic supremacy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the exilarch Yehẹzqihu had even taken 
over one of the yeshivot in Baghdad in the middle of the eleventh century and assumed the 
prerogatives of the Babylonian gaon for himself. The exilarch’s promotion of a text that denied 
Babylonian primacy in halakhic matters is further evidence of the unprecedented political 
challenge that the investiture of the Babylonian gaon represented to his office during this period. 
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Nevertheless, it would appear that neither official succeeded in monopolizing the 
loyalties of Iraq’s Jews. Two Judeo-Arabic letters on the same piece of paper composed by the 
gaon Daniel b. Elʿazar He-Hạsid regarding the administration of the Synagogue of Ezra the 
Scribe in Central Iraq survived in the geniza and give insight into the . In the first letter, dated 
1197, Daniel b. Elʿazar appoints or confirms a certain Abu al-Hạsan as the caretaker (khādim) of 
the synagogue and stipulates that his son, Abu Mansụ̄r will succeed him after his death. The 
second letter, from 1201, directs the community of Wasit and Basra to confirm Abu Mansụ̄r’s 
appointment:  
How exalted is he in religion and trustworthiness and faith and in his efforts in the service 
of the Synagogue of our Lord Ezra, the holy place! And there is no one who can take his 
place. And he has in his hand a letter from our Lord our Rabbi our Gaon Shemuʾel Ha-Levi 
Rosh Yeshiva shel Golah [b. ʿEli] and a letter from our Prince David Rosh Galuyot of all 
Israel.55  
 
In order to succeed his father at the post and gain the support of the community of Jews who 
made pilgrimages to the synagogue, Abu Mansụ̄r had obtained letters of support from both the 
gaon and the exilarch, even though (or because) they were rivals. This suggests that, despite the 
polemics previously discussed, many Jews continued to defer to multiple competing authorities.  
 
Part III: “He goes out in the splendor of the kingdom” 
 Even though he praised Yosef for assisting the exilarch in his fight against Shemu ʾel b. 
Eli, Maimonides ultimately advised him against opening the school in Baghdad or otherwise 
involving himself further in the exilarch’s affairs.  He was wary of the involvement with high-
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level gentile politics that the exilarch’s position entailed, and he declared that righteous men 
should, instead, avoid getting involved in politics, altogether: 
You undoubtedly know, my son: that the high positions of authority in government 
that some of our people occupy in our day, I do not regard as a boon or as a mark 
of good fortune. As a matter of fact, as God lives, such positions are fraught with 
no little danger inasmuch as they are debilitative and exhausting. The perfect man 
who seeks ultimate success should focus his attention on the perfection of his own 
spiritual faculties and commitments and remain aloof from an activity that 
concomitantly provokes discreditable public opinion and indecent standards.56 
Ultimately, Maimonides warned Yosef that “[i]t is far better for you to earn a single drachma as 
a weaver, tailor, or carpenter, than to be dependent on the license of the Exilarch.”57 One should 
probably not take this argument at face value, as it came from a former Head of the Jews and 
Ayyubid court physician. Still, Maimonides did recognize the extent to which the Jews of his 
day, particularly those of Iraq, sought out high level government positions and derived their 
prestige, in part, from their privileged relationship with the Abbasid caliph.  
Jewish officials in Late Abbasid Baghdad adopted and internalized the manners and 
idioms of the Abbasid court. Like their elite Muslim contemporaries, Jewish government 
officials sought the services of poets to compose panegyrics in their honor, and they adopted 
Arabic laqabs, honorific titles purportedly issued by the state and denoting the title-holder’s 
loyalty and service to the state. This phenomenon is most notable in the Diwan of El ʿazar b. 
Ya ̔aqov Ha-Bavli, a poet patronized by the Jewish elite of Baghdad, most of whom were 
affiliated with the Babylonian yeshivot. El ʿazar wrote mostly in Hebrew, although he structured 
his poems according to Arabic poetic models. He used biblical and mishnaic imagery and idioms 
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to glorify his patrons. Consider the lines that he composed in honor of the director of the mint 
(nāzịr dār al-dạrb) Shams al-Dawla ibn Kurrātha (Hebrew name Shemuʾel): 
You who look for wealth, hurry to Prince Shemuʾel, the charm of the kingdom … 
How do they envy him! It is he, the right hand of God, whom the kingdom appointed 
over the people.58 
 
“Charm of the kingdom” is an indirect translation of his laqab, Shams al-Dawla (Sun of the 
State), which very much referred to the Abbasid State. And the “kingdom” that appointed him 
over the people as the Director of the Mint was none other than the Abbasid sovereign.  
Another example is the panegyric in honor of a certain Ibn al-Harabiyah. According to 
the Judeo-Arabic introduction, Elazar composed this poem upon his return to the office of nāzịr 
dār al-dạrb (director of the mint): 
Master of the splendor of Mordekhai, faithful one of the kingdom 
And strength of princes, desired by the king and his noblemen, 
He goes out in the splendor of the kingdom 
and its poets and musicians welcomed him with songs.59 
 
The “splendor of the kingdom” might refer to the special clothing that this official was entitled to 
wear by virtue of his position in Abbasid administration, while the poets and musicians refer to 
the poets and musicians of the Abbasid court.  
And, in a panegyric to a certain Muhadhdhib al-Dawla ben Mordekhai, Elazar invokes 
the official’s service to the yeshiva and service to the Abbasid state in the same verse: 
The stars of the kingdom (kokhvey malukha) radiate on him… 
He was a master to the Deputy of the Yeshiva 
And to the kingdom and the minsters a treasure.60 
 
Similarly, the geonim regularly addressed their followers by their Arabic laqabs, often 
translated into Hebrew. In doing so, they glorified the idea of loyalty and service to the Abbasid 
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state, equating it rhetorically to other forms of Jewish authority. Consider the way in which the 
gaon addressed the Jewish official Mevorakh al-Barkulī Mu’tamid al-Dawla in a Hebrew letter 
extending greetings and blessings before Sukkot. The letter begins in Hebrew, addressing the 
official as: 
Our prince and noble one, the exalted honored prince, Mar Rav Mevorakh, Prince 
of the Party, faithful one of the kingdom (neʿeman ha-malkhut), glory of the princes, 
crown of the Levites, treasured one of the Yeshiva.61  
 
In addressing this official, the gaon invokes the “three crowns.” “Treasure of the Yeshiva” 
implies the crown of Torah. “Crown of the Levites” invokes the “crown of priesthood,” and the 
Hebrew phrase ne ʿeman ha-malkhut evokes the “crown of sovereignty” (malkhut). The phrase 
itself, however, was a loose translation of Mevorakh’s Arabic laqab, Mu’tamid al-Dawla. The 
malkhut in this formulation is the malkhut of the Abbasid State, not the malkhut of the Davidic 
line.  
 This form of address was rather common. In another letter from 1207, a gaon extends 
greetings to Al-Barkulī in almost the same way:  
The exalted honored prince Mar Rav Mevorakh, Prince of the edah (unit) and 
faithful one of the kingdom,62 glory of the princes, crown of the select Levites, 
treasure of the Yeshiva, a man with a generous soul, and a beneficent hand, and a 
noble aroma, and ample gifts.63 
 
His son, Shemu ʾel b. Mevorakh b. al-Barkulī was addressed in Hebrew in a similar fashion:  
The exalted prince Mar rav Shemu ʾ el, Sun of the Princes, glory of the select Levites, 
delight of the Yeshiva…son of our exalted prince Mar Rav Mevorakh, Faithful one 
of the kingdom, crown of the princes.64 
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Even in correspondence relating to an upcoming Jewish holiday, they addressed their followers 
by making reference to their privileged relationship with the gentile authorities. The geonim 
were officially part of Abbasid administration, and they derived their power and authority from 
the Abbasid caliph.  
 Yet in contrast to the exilarch, whose propaganda often invoked his close relationship 
with the Abbasid caliph, the geonim of twelfth and thirteenth-century Baghdad never explicitly 
referred to the nature of their relationship with the Abbasid state in their correspondence. Instead, 
they preferred to use more neutral terms like the Hebrew malkhut or malukhah to refer to the 
governing authorities. The following section contrasts the ways in which exilarch and the geonim 
characterized their relationship with the Abbasid state during this period, and it explores the 
implications of the differences in their respective approaches for understanding the exercise of 
rabbinic authority during the final years of the Abbasid caliphate. 
 
“In the Shadow of the Delight of the Kingdom”: The Exilarch and the Caliph 
In 1161, the exilarch Daniel b. Hịsday wrote a letter appointing Netanel Ha-Levi b. 
Moshe as his deputy in Egypt.65 In doing so, he also invited the Jews of Egypt to submit petitions 
to the Abbasid caliph: 
Our existence in these lands is happy. Our god has turned his favor toward us in the 
eye of the holy sublime imami prophetic pure station of Al-Mustanjida b-allah. May 
God make permanent the strength of his kingdom and raise his crown over all of 
the inhabitants of the world and may his name and his kingdom remain upright 
forever. We and the community of Israel are in the shadow of the delight of the 
kingdom, may our legs not wobble in its days. The obligation on us and on all of 
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Israel is to persist in requests and petitions via his kingdom to the god of the 
Heavens. And may the lord establish his throne forever. Selah.66 
Here, Daniel b. Hịsday depicts the Abbasid caliph, not as inherently oppressive, but as an ally of 
“the community of Israel” who responds to the petitions of the community as mediated through 
him, the highest ranked Jewish leader. In the letter, otherwise written in Hebrew, the exilarch 
invokes the traditional blessings for the Abbasid caliphs in Arabic. As Franklin argues, in doing 
so, the exilarch implicitly drew a parallel between the Davidic dynasty and the noble lineage of 
the Abbasid caliphs.67  
 Petahỵa of Regensburg visited Baghdad after the death of the exilarch Daniʾel b. Hịsday. 
In his account, the favorable situation of the Jewish community of Baghdad was due to the 
Abbasid caliph. He too portrayed the office of the exilarch as something of a parallel to the office 
of the caliph, due to the genealogical prestige of both offices: 
The monarch who reigned in the days of Rabbi Shelomoh, father of Rabbi Daniʾel 
[the exilarch], was a friend of Rabbi Shelomoh, because the monarch was of the 
seed of Muhammad and the exilarch descended from King David.68 
Although this account should not be taken literally, it represents the kinds of narratives that 
propagandists for the exilarch would have advanced. For Jews, the offices of exilarch and caliph 
had something of a dialectical relationship with each other. 
The implicit comparison between the authority of the exilarch and that of the Abbasid 
caliph is most apparent in the account of Benjamin of Tudela, who recorded a lengthy, laudatory 
description of the Abbasid caliph and the city of Baghdad: 
Thence it is two days to Baghdad, the great city and royal residence of the Caliph 
Amīr al-Muʾminin al-ʿAbbasī of the family of [Muhammad69]. He is at the head of 
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69 Benjamin uses the Hebrew term meshuga (crazy) to refer to Muhammad, a common Hebrew idiom. For Jacobs, 
the inclusion of this derogatory term alongside respectful laudatory Arabic terms for the caliph’s office “testifies to 
the dilemma faced by a medieval Jewish author who sought to pen a credible account, but was unable to 
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the Islamic religion, and all the kings of Islam obey him; he occupies a similar 
position to that held by the pope over the Christians. He has a palace in Baghdad 
three miles in extent. … There, the great king, Al-ʿAbbasi holds his court, and he 
is kind to Israel, and many belonging to the people of Israel are his attendants; he 
knows all languages and is well-versed in the law of Israel. He reads and writes the 
holy language [Hebrew]. … He is truthful and trusty, speaking peace to all men.70 
In Benjamin of Tudela’s narrative, the Jews’ favorable and close relations with the Abbasid 
caliph, the supreme religious and political authority in the Islamic world were responsible for the 
wealth, prestige, wisdom, and just rule of Baghdad’s Jewish community: 
In Baghdad there are about 40,000 Jews, and they dwell in security, prosperity, and 
honor under the great Caliph; and amongst them are great sages, the heads of 
Academies engaged in the study of the law.71 
But most significantly, it was the exilarch’s close relationship with the Abbasid caliph, and the 
respect that the Muslims gave him, that ensured the prestige of Baghdad’s Jews. According to 
Benjamin, the exilarch conducted himself like a king or high level official, wearing ornate 
clothing and sitting atop a horse: 
And every fifth day when he goes to pay a visit to the great caliph, horsemen, 
gentiles as well as Jews, escort him and heralds proclaim in advance, “make way 
before our lord, the son of David as is due unto him” … He is mounted on a horse, 
and is attired in robes of silk and embroidery, with a large turban on his head, and 
from the turban is suspended a long white cloth adorned with a chain upon which 
the cipher of Muhammad is engraved. There, he appears before the caliph and 
kisses his hand, and the caliph rises and places him on a throne which Muhammad 
had ordered to be made for him, and all the Muslim princes who attend the court of 
the caliph rise up before him.72 
                                                          
acknowledge the religious authority implied by the titles he cited.” Martin Jacobs, Reorienting the East: Jewish 
Travelers to the Medieval Muslim World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 126. This term 
might also have been introduced into the manuscript tradition at a later date. Petahỵa uses the Hebrew Mahamet ̣ to 
refer to Muhammad. 
70 Benjamin of Tudela, Travels, ed. Adler, 95-96. 
71 This is more likely a reference to the ten allufim of the yeshiva.  
72 Benjamin, Travels, 100. 
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In this narrative, the exilarch wears a chain engraved with the cipher of Muhammad and is 
placed on a throne that “Muhammad had ordered to be made for him.” Benjamin’s depicts the 
exilarch’s prestige and authority as derived from distinctly Islamic institutions of leadership.   
The fact that both Benjamin and Petahỵah recorded such laudatory depictions of Baghdad 
and the Abbasid caliph and his treatment of the city’s Jews suggests that the Jews of Baghdad 
whom they met promulgated these narratives as well—and that such claims were central to 
Babylonian Jewish claims to authority in the late-twelfth century.  
 
“By me, kings rule”: Geonic Ideology of the State 
The surviving geonic writings do not make explicit references to the Abbasid caliph in 
the same way as letters and propaganda in favor of the exilarch. Although they used the state to 
enforce their rule, the surviving geonic writings never refer by name to a specific caliph or 
invoked the traditional Arabic blessings on the Abbasid caliph. And despite Petahỵah’s account 
of Shemuʾel b. ʿEli conducting himself “like a king”, none of the surviving Jewish accounts from 
Baghdad referred to meetings between the gaon and the caliph or tried to promote the gaon as 
parallel to the caliph, as they had for the exilarch.  
It is possible that the Jews of Iraq during this period were, themselves, ambivalent about 
Shemuʾel b. ʿEli’s efforts to marginalize the office of the exilarch. After all, both offices had-co-
existed in Iraq for centuries. Maybe the geonim did not invoke their direct relationship with the 
caliph in their writings so as not to provoke supporters of the yeshivot who still revered the 
office of the exilarch.  
I argue, however, that this phenomenon is due to the ambivalence of the geonim, 
themselves, about their new political position. On the one hand, they were happy to continue to 
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use the Abbasid state to enforce their rule and took pride in positions that their allies held within 
Abbasid administration. On the other hand, geonic investiture represented a major institutional 
change that challenged the rabbis’ policy, dating back to the Buyid period or even the Talmudic 
era, of separating themselves rhetorically from the corruption of political power. As a result, 
during this period the geonim invoke their ties with the state implicitly—to enforce their rule 
over the communities under their jurisdiction, to ensure that officials remained loyal to them and 
delivered the requisite funds to which they were entitled. They declined to refer explicitly to the 
very real, subordinate relationship between their office and that of the Abbasid caliph.  
The geonim had, historically, separated themselves on a rhetorical level from the 
“corruption” inherent in politics. They asserted that any individual who held office only at the 
mercy of gentile rulers (as opposed to according to the consensus of the Jewish community) was 
illegitimate and should not command authority in the Jewish community. How, then, could the 
geonim reconcile their past scorn for investiture with their new political status that directly 
subordinated them to the Abbasid caliph? They now needed to make sure that the Jews under 
their jurisdiction did, in fact, obey the decrees of the government. 
To solve this conundrum, the geonim advanced a narrative that represented the antithesis 
of their actual political relationship with the Abbasid caliph. In this narrative, the rabbis, as sages 
of Torah, which predates the world, invest kings with authority and give them license to rule—
not the other way around. Consider Shemuʾel’s Letter to Zekharya Av Beit Din of the Yeshiva in 
Hạlab, investing him with authority over the communities there that is dated to Tammuz 1190: 
Know, our brothers, that the beloved Torah existed before the world was raised by 
His thought. [This refers to a discussion in Pesahịm 54a]. As it is written, “The lord 
made me as the beginning of His way, the first of His works of old.” [Proverbs 
8:22]. And from (the Torah) sovereignty, kings, kingdoms (are derived). As it is 
written, “By me, kings rule, and ministers decree justice. By me, princes rule and 
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nobles, even all the judges of the earth. I love them that love me, and all who seek 
me earnestly shall find me.” [Proverbs 8:15-17].73 
In this way, the geonim assert that the actual political authorities of their own day rule only by 
the Torah and according to the will of God. Rather than subordinating the yeshiva to the state, 
the yeshiva, in this formulation, subordinates the governing authorities to the will of God.  
 
“Greetings from the king who governs nations” 
 Beginning in 1186, the geonim included an additional “greeting” clause in their letters. 
This literary clause extended greetings from God and from his ministering angels, typically 
employing biblical epithets. Out of twenty four letters complete with an introduction published 
by Assaf, sixteen include a version of this clause.74 For example, the aforementioned letter from 
Shemuʾel to Zekharya drew on Psalms 103:20 to extended greetings from 
God who knows what is manifest and what is secret, who dwells in secret, and from 
his ministering angels who sing songs of praise before him, mighty of strength to 
do his will, and from the gate of the yeshiva.75  
 
Later on in the same letter, the gaon explicitly drew on Talmudic imagery (Nedarim 20a) 
to equate the rabbis of the yeshiva with God’s ministering angels: 
And [The Torah] is connected as a crown to those who occupy themselves with 
Torah for its own sake (Torah l’shma). And the beloved sages of Torah are like the 
eminent ministering angels (malakhei ha-sharet) ... as they are distinguished [in 
fine clothing].76 
Or in a letter to the community of Waqf from 1206, the gaon greeted the community on behalf of 
The king who governs nations to whom sovereignty is due, and from the angels of 
heaven, regiments of poets praising his name, and from the gate of the yeshiva.77 
 
                                                          
73 Assaf, Letters, Pt. II, 60. 
74 Manuscript I: No. 1, 4, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 35. Manuscript II: 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13. 
75 Assaf, Letters Pt. II, 60. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Assaf, Letters, II, 46. 
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Why did the geonim of the late-twelfth century include a clause extending greetings on behalf of 
God, while their predecessors in the Babylonian yeshiva did not do so? It is possible that this is 
mere boilerplate poetic language, just a metaphor to emphasize the loftiness of the yeshiva.  
At the same time, the Abbasid caliph promoted himself as “the shadow of God upon 
Earth.” Many of the epithets that the geonim used in this clause referred to God as a ruler, or 
heavenly king, enthroned by angels. Perhaps, then, the clause functioned on two levels. On the 
one hand, it did, in fact, extend greetings to the recipients on behalf of the Abbasid caliph, 
assuring them that they remained in his favor and reminding them that the gaon could intercede 
on their behalf before him. On the other hand, it allowed the geonim to assert their rhetorical 
independence from gentile political power and remind their followers that, by being loyal to the 
yeshiva and paying annual dues, they obeyed the laws of heaven, not the laws of a gentile king. 
A more systematic comparison with other geonic letters, particularly from Palestine, is necessary 
to ascertain the significance of this clause. 78 
Interestingly, in letters to disloyal communities, the gaon omitted the “God clause” in the 
introduction and only extended greetings from “the gate of the yeshiva.” For example, in a letter 
to the communities of Daqūqa, Baqasri, and Shahargad, which had apparently cut off relations 
with the yeshiva, Shemuʾel warned: 
Do they not know that the ancient ones, may their memory be a blessing, said: 
Whoever does not follow the laws of heaven is given the yolk of the government? 
We considered this for a moment until we gave up all hope of the arrival of their 
messages and letters. And we said: “Perhaps something happened to them that 
occupied them and they were turned away unexpectedly from it.”79 
 
                                                          
78 In fact, in the eleventh century, the Palestinian Gaon Shelomo b. Yehudah, who did hold investiture from the 
Fatimid caliph, included a similar clause in some of his letters, extending greetings from sụr yaʿaqov “the rock of 
Jacob,” an epithet for God. See, e.g., Letters of Shelomo b. Yehudah Gaon: Gottheil-Worrel 5r, l.5; T-S18J4.17r, l.9; 
T-S13J14.16r, l.6; Bodl. MS Heb.a3.3r, l.4; Gil, Palestine, doc. 54, 59, 74 doc. 78. Letters of Avraham b. Shelomo 
b. Yehudah Gaon: T-S13J26.1r, l.9; Bodl MS Heb c 28, f. 15, l.5; Gil, Palestine, doc. 88, 89.  
79 Assaf, “Letters” Pt. III, 40. 
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The letter draws a rhetorical separation between obedience to the yeshiva—and by extension, 
God—and being at the mercy of the inherently oppressive gentile government. By holding 
investiture, the geonim might have contributed to the caliph’s imperial project of advancing his 
rule over Baghdad’s Jews, but the geonim promoted themselves as representatives of heaven.  
 
Conclusion 
 The ideological and administrative reforms of the later Abbasid caliphs promoting 
centralized rule also had the effect of incorporating more Jewish notables into the orbit of state 
administration and Abbasid courtly life. This manifested itself, most significantly, in the granting 
of investiture to the geonim. It also impacted the internal life of the Jewish community. The 
geonim not only depended on the government to protect their own autonomy and control over 
those individuals subject to their reshut, but also relied on the state to enforce the documents 
they issued. They addressed their supporters by their Arabic laqabs and construed service to the 
Abbasid state as equivalent to service to the yeshiva. At the same time, the granting of investiture 
meant that the geonim could make the rather unprecedented argument for eliminating the 
position of exilarch altogether.  
The close ties with the state led Jewish leaders in Iraq in the early thirteenth century to 
extol the Abbasid state and those who served it. Yet in contrast to the exilarchs, who promoted 
themselves as the supreme authority among Jews due to the authority with which the Abbasid 
caliph invested them, the geonim did not explicitly refer to their political relationship with the 
Abbasid state in their writings. Instead, they rhetorically reversed the relationship to claim that 




 Overall, the sources indicate that the Jewish community of Iraq during the final years of 
the Abbasid Caliphate was wealthy, prestigious, and powerful. With the support of a temporarily 
re-invigorated and independent Abbasid caliph, the geonim re-asserted claims for Babylonian 
rabbinic supremacy in the Jewish world. Yet Jewish historiography has marginalized the 
Babylonian yeshivot of this period as institutions in decline and largely irrelevant to most Jews. 
This characterization of the Babylonian yeshivot in the later period is a reflection, less of actual 
historical events, than of medieval Jewish polemics. Chapter 5 investigates the construction of 




Chapter 5: “No Need of Babylonia”? The Construction of Rabbinic Authority in the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Century Mediterranean 
  
  
 The Babylonian Yeshivot and Exilarchate were some of the longest-lasting institutions in 
the medieval Jewish world. They came into being before the Islamic conquest of Iraq, moved to 
the Abbasid imperial capital of Baghdad in the eighth and tenth centuries, respectively, and 
continued to operate there even after the Mongol conquest of the city in 1258. Yet traditional 
Jewish historiography marks the end of the “Geonic Era” in the middle of the eleventh century, 
thus minimizing the significance of the yeshivot in later years.1 The past two chapters have 
demonstrated how the yeshivot continued to play a role in Jewish political life in Iraq long after 
Hayya Gaon’s death. Was Babylonia as irrelevant to Jewish communal life in other places as 
previous scholars have assumed? Was there a direct relationship between the collapse of Abbasid 
imperial power and the decline of Babylonian rabbinic authority throughout the Jewish world? 
This chapter investigates how Jewish communities in the Mediterranean and in Europe 
related to and characterized the Babylonian yeshivot during the late eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. Part I argues that the destruction of urban centers in North Africa and the Levant as 
well as internal turmoil in the Fatimid Caliphate during the second half of the eleventh century 
did, in fact, diminish long-distance political, economic, and religious ties between Egyptian and 
Babylonian Jews. This led Mediterranean Jewish leaders to claim halakhic authority for 
themselves without receiving titles from the Babylonian yeshivot. Yet the Babylonian yeshivot 
during the Seljuq period (c. 1055-1160) continued to command the loyalties of some Jews in the 
                                                          
1 On the evidence for the gaonate and the exilarch in Baghdad after 1040, see Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in 
Jewish History and Literature (New York: Ktav, 1972), 202-48. Also, see Gil, In the Kingdom of Ishmael [Hebrew 
or English], secs. 261-268.  
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Indian Ocean. Part II explores the implications of the renewal of trans-Mediterranean 
connections between Iraq, Europe, and the Mediterranean in the middle of the twelfth century. It 
contends that this catalyzed a halakhic and historiographic tradition either explaining the transfer 
of rabbinic authority to the west or denying the authority of Babylonia altogether. Part III argues 
that these challenges led rabbinic leaders in Babylonia to emphasize the halakhic significance of 
their location in Babylonia itself, and many Jews worldwide continued to accept and promote 
these claims to Babylonian halakhic supremacy.  
 
Part I: Babylonia and the Nagids of the Mediterranean 
As Chapter 2 argues, individuals traveled between Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and the wider 
Mediterranean constantly during the Buyid era (c. 945-1040), and Jewish notables throughout the 
region maintained a prolific correspondence with each other. A lucrative Mediterranean trade 
and the relatively porousness of the political borders between Fatimid and Buyid territories made 
this network possible. Merchants from as far away as Iran sought to penetrate Mediterranean 
trade networks, and the Fatimids and Buyids actively missionized in each other’s territories. The 
Babylonian geonim relied on these trade networks to solicit halakhic queries from and distribute 
responsa to their followers throughout the Mediterranean. A time of political fragmentation had 
actually united the Rabbanite Jewish world: by the end of this period, most Rabbanite Jews 
throughout the Mediterranean recognized the authority of the Babylonian tradition as transmitted 
through the Babylonian yeshivot.  
Jewish notables in Egypt and the Western Mediterranean often studied in the yeshivot to 
become scholars in their own right. They assumed responsibility for the day-to-day operations of 
Jewish communal institutions far from Baghdad and Jerusalem. They appealed to the Babylonian 
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geonim only for advice on particularly challenging points of Jewish law. Nevertheless, their 
symbolic relationship to the geonim was crucial for the claims to authority that they made within 
their own communities; the local leaders received titles from the Babylonian and Palestinian 
yeshivot, sent donations to them, and facilitated the transmission of geonic responsa and other 
texts throughout the Mediterranean.2  
This situation changed during the second half of the eleventh century. The Seljuqs 
conquered much of Fatimid-controlled Syria between 1050 and 1080. Recent archaeological 
studies have found that Tiberias, Ramla, and Jerusalem all experienced major decline and 
destruction during the 1050s and 1060s, a result of both the effects of the conquests and other 
natural disasters.3 In North Africa, the Zirid rulers rebelled against the Fatimid caliph, and in 
retaliation, the caliph sent the Banū Sulaym and Banū Hilāl tribes after them. They destroyed 
major urban centers and port cities including Qabes and Qayrawan in 1051 and 1057, 
respectively.  
These events appear to have caused interruptions in long-distance Mediterranean trade, 
particularly through Egypt. The vast majority of merchant letters found in the Geniza dating to 
the second half of the eleventh century dealt with trade between locations within Egypt only.4 
While trade connections between Egypt and al-Andalus were widespread during the first half of 
the eleventh century, the last documented eleventh century voyage between Egypt and al-
                                                          
2 Menahẹm Ben Sasson, “Varieties of Intercommunal Relations in the Geonic Period. 
3 For a summary of recent archaeological scholarship, see Ronnie Ellenblum, The Collapse of the Eastern 
Mediterranean: Climate Change and the Decline of the East, 950-1072 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 163-195. Ellenblum argues that the decline of urban centers was due to climate change, which also provoked 
nomadic movements and conquests, an assertion that has been challenged by Peacock and others. Overall, the 
question of “decline” or the reasons for the “decline” are not relevant to the issues of this chapter; Syria and Fustat 
became isolated politically from each other, regardless of the extent of the “decline” of its urban centers. On the 
decline in long-distance trade with Northern Syria during this period, see Goldberg, Trade and Institutions,309-12. 
4 Ibid., 300-5. Note also that southern Syria functioned as a hinterland in relation to Fustat. 
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Andalus is from 1045.5 Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman’s preliminary study of toponymic surnames 
(nisbas) in the Geniza corpus found the smallest number of foreign nisbas overall in around 
1070, suggesting that fewer foreign-born individuals traveled to or settled in Egypt at that time.6  
Because the Babylonian geonim relied on these long-distance Mediterranean mercantile 
networks to transport their letters (particularly the networks of the Ibn ʿAwkal family that were 
deposited in the Geniza), this had the effect of partially cutting off relations between the yeshivot 
of Babylonia and their followers in the Mediterranean. This also helps to explain why no Iraqi 
material has been found in the Cairo Geniza from the Seljuq period.  
When cut off from regular correspondence with the geonic centers, Mediterranean Jewish 
officials who had once needed to maintain an active correspondence with geonic leadership to 
legitimate their authority assumed most geonic prerogatives for themselves. This was a gradual 
process, exemplified by the Egyptian leadership’s changing use of honorific titles during the 
second half of the eleventh century. After 1043, the court physician Yehudah b. Saʾadya (dated 
docs 1043-1077) held the titles of Rosh Kalla of the Babylonian Yeshiva and he-hạver ha-me 
ʿulle (excellent hạver) of the Palestinian Yeshiva. He received the title of Nagid (prince) between 
1062 and 1064 from the Palestinian gaon, and he functioned as the single leader of Egyptian 
Jewry, while still symbolically deferring to the yeshiva of Palestine.7 After Yehudah’s death in 
1078, his brother Mevorakh b. Saʿadya assumed his position. Mevorakh, held the title of hạver 
of the Palestinian yeshiva, as well as alluf ha-binot, a Babylonian title.8 Mevorakh declared 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 312-9.  
6 Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman, “Jewish Onomastics, the Cairo Geniza, and Westward Migration in the Medieval 
Period”, The Twelfth Annual International Conference on Jewish Names, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 
March 2015.  
7 Cohen, Jewish Self-Government in Medieval Egypt, 160-1. 
8 Some have suggested that Mevorakh received his title from Daniel b. ʿAzarya, a scion of the Babylonian exilarchal 
family who became the gaon of Palestine in the 1060s, assuming that no yeshivot were in operation in Baghdad 
during this period. Yet Mevorakh and Daniel b. ʿAzarya’s son (David) were enemies who fought for control over 
Egyptian Jewry during the latter half of the eleventh century. Moreover, when Mevorakh ousted David b. Daniel b. 
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himself “head of the Jews” and appointed judges, assuming responsibility for the judiciary from 
the gaon of Palestine. At that point, however, he retained his title of Ḥaver of the Palestinian 
yeshiva and alluf ha-binot of Babylonia, still paying symbolic homage to the traditional centers 
even as he slowly assumed responsibility for what had previously been solely under the purview 
of the gaon. In 1082, his rival, David b. Daniel b. ʿAzarya, a scion of the family of exilarchs 
from Babylonia whose father was the gaon of Palestine, ousted Mevorakh b. Sa‘adya from office 
and declared himself “head of the Jews.” David expanded the power of the new position by 
establishing a high rabbinic court in Egypt, further appropriating what had traditionally been the 
prerogatives of the Palestinian Yeshiva.  
When Mevorakh b. Sa‘adya overthrew David and was accepted as head of the Jews for 
the second time in 1094, he took over and expanded the high court in Egypt. He appointed 
scholars as chief judges in Fustat and Cairo and accepted appeals from lower courts as the 
geonim had before. 9 To symbolize his separation from Palestinian authority, he stopped using 
his Palestinian title (hạver). Instead, he accumulated nine additional titles that represented his 
complete separation from the Palestinian yeshiva and sovereignty over Egyptian Jewry. 10 
Mevorakh had declared himself successor to the administrative functions of the Palestinian 
Gaon, yet he never went so far as to claim to have superseded the Babylonian geonim. He 
continued to use his title from the Babylonian yeshiva (alluf ha-binot) until his death, and he 
actively promoted Babylonian practices. In fact, he insisted that the Palestinian congregation 
follow the Babylonian liturgy as established by Sa‘adya Gaon.11 Mevorakh also issued his own 
                                                          
ʿAzarya from office in 1094, Evyatar, gaon of Palestine, celebrated this development because it represented the 
cessation of Babylonian exilarchal claims for authority over Palestinian Jewry. Considering that a yeshiva was in 
operation in Baghdad during this period, it is more likely that Mevorakh received the title from Hezekiah Gaon of 
Baghdad or his successor than from Daniel b. ʿAzarya. 
9 Cohen, Jewish Self-Government, 248.  
10 Ibid., 264-6. 
11 Ibid., 251-4. 
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halakhic rulings that built on geonic opinions, and he tried to obtain as many copies of geonic 
texts as possible.12  
Although Mevorah b. Sa ʿadya held a title from the Babylonian yeshiva, he made no 
efforts to obtain a similar title for his son, Moshe, who succeeded him as Head of the Jews (c. 
1112-1126). Mevorakh had assumed enough power and authority as head of the Jews in Egypt, a 
region now largely cut off both politically and economically from Iraq, that his successor no 
longer required even symbolic investiture from Babylonia. In essence, he had positioned himself 
and his family as the heirs to the intellectual, legal, and spiritual legacy of the Babylonian 
geonim. By the end of the eleventh century, Mediterranean Jews understood the geonim not as 
living authorities who issued their own rulings and granted titles legitimating the authority of 
local leaders, but as yet another layer of rabbinic textual authority for local rabbinic leaders to 
consult in order to derive Jewish law for their own communities.  
Yet Jews continued to reside in Baghdad, and a yeshiva continued to operate in Baghdad 
and appoint geonim. Although Egypt was more isolated from Syria and Iraq than it had been 
during the Buyid era, some individuals continued to travel between the two places or encounter 
individuals from Iraq in travels to the Indian Ocean. These encounters, which forced Egyptian 
rabbinic leaders to reckon with the continued existence of the Babylonian yeshivot, led to 
conflict. 
 
Rabbinic Conflict in the Indian Ocean 
Neither Mevorakh nor his successors truly succeeded in monopolizing the loyalties 
Egyptian Jews or countering the challenge that the continued existence of the Babylonian 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 247.  
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yeshivot represented. This was partially because Jews of Egypt involved in trade in the Indian 
Ocean came into contact with Jews from other parts of the Islamic world who continued to defer 
to Babylonian authority. The Indian Ocean trade represented something of a political and 
religious frontier zone, for Jews and Muslims alike. Jewish traders throughout some twenty port 
cities in the Indian Ocean deferred to the authority of the Nagid of Aden, who was also styled 
Sar ha-Qehillot (prince of the communities). Although Aden was under Fatimid rule, most of the 
cities under the Nagid's jurisdiction, including ports in the Persian Gulf and the Malabar Coast, 
were not. As a result, the Nagid of Aden needed to mediate between Jews loyal to competing 
Jewish and Muslim authorities in Baghdad, Egypt, and Syria. Rather than zealously defending 
the supremacy of their own respective rabbinic leaders, Jewish traders in the Indian Ocean often 
deferred symbolically to Jewish authorities in many different places. For example, the most 
famous Nagid of Aden, Madhmūn b. Bundār (d. 1151), received titles from both the Babylonian 
Exilarch in Iraq and the Palestinian Gaon/Head of the Jews Masḷiah b. Shelomo in Cairo. 
Madhmūn mostly tried to mediate among the various merchants by maintaining good relations 
with both centers and sending lavish gifts to the yeshivot.13  
Jewish merchants involved in trade with India traveled widely throughout the Islamic 
world and needed to ensure that the legal documents that they used were admissible in as many 
legal venues as possible. For example, the prominent merchant Avraham b. Yijū traveled 
between Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, and India.14 Ibn Yijū’s mobility explains why, in 1132 in 
Mangalore (India), he wrote a deed of manumission for his slave girl Ashū in the jurisdiction 
(reshut) of both the exilarch in Baghdad, Daniel b. Hịsday and the Palestinian gaon/Head of the 
                                                          
13 Goitein & Friedman, India Book, 283ff. 
14 Ibid., 552. 
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Jews in Egypt, Masḷiah ̣b. Shelomo.15 Goitein and Friedman suggest that Ibn Yijū freed Ashū in 
order to marry her. By using a dual-reshut clause in the manumission deed, Ibn Yijū ensured that 
the legal status of his children with Ashū would be protected, no matter where they traveled. 
Similarly, in the synagogue in Aden, prayer-leaders typically pronounced the dual-reshut 
clause in the name of the Palestinian Gaon Masḷiah b. Shelomo and the Exilarch in Baghdad.16 
Records from the India trade indicate that this practice did not go unchallenged. For example, at 
least two Geniza documents refer to a conflict over the reshut in 1134. According to a testimony 
recorded in the Beit Din of Aden, “[a] Persian man arrived in this land [Aden] … and he said that 
he was descended from the house of David and the people threw their support behind him” and 
let him lead prayers in the synagogue. He pronounced the reshut in the name of the exilarch 
(rosh golah) only. When another man led prayers and also mentioned the name of Masḷiah in the 
reshut formula, he was forced to issue a public apology and confession of sin. When the Torah 
was open, he stood up in the middle of the synagogue and declared:  
Our companions! You informed me that when I was praying on Sunday, I 
transgressed when I referred to Our Lord Masḷiah,̣ and now it has become clear to 
me, thanks to God on high and to the community that I sinned against the lord, the 
God of Israel and against you all.17  
 
It would appear that Madhmūn ceded to the demands of the faction loyal to the Babylonian 
exilarch and stopped demanding the recitation of the reshut in the name of the gaon of 
Palestine.18 The incident demonstrates that even when Iraq was much more isolated from other 
parts of the Jewish world, Babylonian rabbinic authority was not confined to Abbasid territory. 
                                                          
15 SPIOS D-55.10. The document is discussed in Goitein & Friedman, India Book, 55-7; 632-3. 
16 T-S20.37r., l.9-10.  
17 T-S20.37r., l.35-37. The events are also alluded to in T-SAr.48.270v, l.6-8.  
18 On the changing relationship between the Jews of Yemen and Jewish authorities in Egypt, see Amir Ashur and 
Ben Outhwaite, “Between Egypt and Yemen in the Cairo Geniza,” Journal of Islamic Manuscripts 5 (2014): 198-
219. Also Idem., “An 11th Century Pledge of Allegiance to Egypt from the Jewish Community of Yemen,” 
Chroniques du Manuscrit au Yemen 22 (2016), 34-48. 
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Nevertheless, the issue was far from settled. As more Jews from different regions came 
into contact with each other in the second half of the twelfth century, anxieties over Babylonian 
rabbinic authority intensified. 
 
Part II: Reestablishing Connections with the Western Mediterranean  
Various political changes during the twelfth century re-established connections between 
Baghdad, Egypt, and the wider Mediterranean, and further called into question the many claims 
to authority that Mediterranean rabbinic leaders were asserting. Most notably, the rise of the 
Crusader states, beginning in 1099, coupled with administrative changes under the Seljuqs in 
Syria, revitalized Mediterranean trade. Although southern Syria had previously functioned as a 
hinterland to Fustat and declined during the latter half of the eleventh century, it flourished 
during the twelfth century because of the renewed connections with Europe. At the same time, 
Seljuq amīrs in Syria tried to facilitate trade with the Crusader States because the tax on this 
trade was a major source of their revenue. To this end, they negotiated treaties with the Crusader 
states for safe passage for trading caravans between Seljuq and Crusader territory.19 Crusader 
Syria became a nexus of international trade, transmitting goods between the Latin-Christian 
West, the Islamicate Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean.20 
The revitalization of mercantile networks between Fatimid Egypt, Crusader Syria, Seljuq 
Iraq, and Latin Europe attracted immigrants from all over the Jewish world. Travel between the 
Crusader States and Fatimid and Seljuq territory became more common. For example, Johannes 
                                                          
19 Stefan Heidemann, “Unislamic Taxes and an Un-Islamic Monetary System in Seljuq Baghdad,” International 
Symposium on Baghdad in the Islamic Civilization (Istanbul: 2008), 499-500. 
20 On the impact of the Crusader States on Islamicate Jewry, see Brendan Goldman’s unpublished dissertation. 
Nevertheless, there were no mercantile networks in the twelfth-century Geniza corpus as large or prominent as those 
from the eleventh century. Goldberg, Trade and Institutions, 311. 
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son of Treux, the son of a baron from Norman Italy, converted to Judaism, changed his name to 
ʿOvadyah, and traveled throughout the Islamicate world in the early twelfth century. He 
journeyed to Seljuq Baghdad, where he studied in the Babylonian Yeshiva. Later, he traveled 
through Seljuq and Crusader Palestine, eventually settling in Fatimid Egypt, where he recorded a 
narrative of his journey.21 Additionally, Jews from Al-Andalus fleeing Almohad persecution 
emigrated to and settled in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the poets Yehuda ha-Levi and 
Avraham b. ʿEzra and their children. Most famously, Mūsa b. Maymūn (Maimonides), exiled 
from his native Cordoba, traveled across North Africa to Egypt, where he was declared Head of 
the Jews in 1171. The migrations meant that Jews from all over the Islamicate world found 
themselves in contact with Jews who deferred to different institutions of rabbinic authority, 
including the Babylonian geonim.  
The cessation of Mediterranean Jewry’s ties with the Babylonian centers had been 
catalyzed by the political and economic transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 
second half of the eleventh century. As individuals from throughout the Jewish world came into 
greater contact with each other during the twelfth century, they began to question how such a 
seismic shift in halakhic authority had arisen. Considering that there were geonim in Baghdad to 
whom Jews in Iraq and Persia deferred, what justified the Mediterranean Jews’ belief that geonic 
authority had ceased in the middle of the tenth or eleventh century? In a society that valued 
tradition above all else, what made this change legitimate and not heretical? To answer these 
questions, Jewish notables in the Mediterranean embarked on an ambitious historiographic 
project to construct the geonic past—or deny it altogether—and legitimate their own post-geonic 
present.  
                                                          




The End of the Geonic Period in Avraham b. Dawud’s Sefer Ha-Qabbala 
In 1160, the Spanish Rabbi Avraham b. Dawud composed his “Book of Tradition” (Sefer 
ha-Qabbala), the most significant Jewish historical chronicle produced in medieval Spain and 
one of the very few Jewish historical chronicles produced in the Middle Ages. The work sought 
to defend the truth of rabbinic Judaism against Muslim, Christian, and Karaite objections by 
giving evidence for an “uninterrupted chain of Jewish traditions who have transmitted a text on 
which all Jews unanimously agree” that had reached its apex in Ibn Dawud’s Christian Spain.22 
In justifying Spanish primacy in halakhic matters, Ibn Dawud asserted that the era of Babylonian 
geonic hegemony had come definitively to a close over a century earlier. In doing so, he 
simultaneously extolled and eulogized the Babylonian yeshivot. 
In the text, he preserved four distinct, contradictory, and largely ahistorical narratives that 
explained the “decline” and closure of the Babylonian yeshivot. The first detailed Sa ʿadya 
Gaon’s death and the decline of his yeshiva of Mata Mahsiya/Sura: 
R. Sa ʿadya passed away in 4702, when he was approximately fifty years of age, of 
black bile, having composed any number of worthwhile books and having 
accomplished great good for Israel. … After the passing of R Sa ʿadya the academy 
of Mata Mahsiya declined steadily, and R Joseph23 finally immigrated to the city 
of al-Basṛa and died there.24  
 
In this way, Ibn Dawud described Sa‘adya as the crowning glory of the Yeshiva of Sura/Mata 
Mahsiya. Consequently, any geonim who followed him were inconsequential.25  
                                                          
22 Gerson D. Cohen, Sefer ha-Qabbalah: The Book of Tradition by Abraham ibn Daud (New York: Jewish 
Theological Seminary, 1967), xxix. 
23 Joseph was appointed gaon after Sa‘adya’s excommunication by the exilarch David ben Zakkay; eventually 
Sa‘adya and the exilarch reconciled, and both Sa‘adya and Joseph received stipends from the yeshiva until their 
deaths. 
24 Cohen, Sefer ha-Qabbalah, 56-57.  
25 Ibn Dawud does mention Shemuʾel b. Họfni, who succeeded Sa‘adya as gaon of Mata Mahsiya decades later, 
saying, “[i]n those days the head of the academy in Mata Mahsiya was R. Shemuʾel  ha-Kohen b. Hofni, R. Hayya’s 
father-in-law. He too, composed many books. He passed away during R Hayya’s term, four years before the death of 
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 The second narrative of geonic decline parallels the first, heaping praise on Hayya, the 
“final” gaon of the yeshiva of Pumbedita: 
When [Sherira] saw that his life was prolonged and that his son, R. Hayya was 
worthy of being head of the academy, he stepped down in favor of his son. The 
latter was R. Hayya Gaon bar R. Sherira Gaon. He spread Torah abroad throughout 
Jewry more than all of the other geonim, and by his light walked those who sought 
the Torah from east and west. … of the geonim before him there was none like him, 
and he was the last of the geonim.26 
 
Ibn Dawud describes Hayya in superlative terms as the most learned of the geonim. Thus, his 
yeshiva (Pumbedita) reached its glory during his gaonate; after that, it ceased to be relevant for 
world Jewry.  
Yet Babylonia still would have played a central role in the Jewish world due to the 
presence of the Babylonian Exilarch in Baghdad. The exilarch was a direct descendant of King 
David and a living reminder of ancient Jewish kingship and its promised restoration in the 
messianic age. Medieval Jews held Davidic ancestry in great esteem. Yet in Ibn Dawud’s 
narrative, all of the descendants of the Babylonian exilarch fled from Baghdad: 
The members of R. Hayya’s academy appointed Hezekiah the exilarch, the 
grandson of David b. Zakkay to the see of R. Hayya, of blessed memory. He served 
for a term of two years. Then, informers denounced him to the king, and the latter 
imprisoned him, put him in chains, tortured him grievously, and left him no 
survivors. His two sons fled to Spain to R. Yosef ha-Levi the Naid b. R Shemuʾel 
ha-Nagid who had great affection for Hezekiah the exilarch and head of the 
academy. They remained there with him until the time of the massacre in Granada 
when the nagid was killed. One of the sons of Hezekiah then fled to the land of 
Saragossa where he married and had children. Afterwards, his descendants 
migrated to Christian Spain.27 
 
Thus, according to Ibn Dawud, the Davidic line was established in Spain. There was no need to 
esteem Babylonia as the seat of the exilarch when his entire family had come to reside in Iberia. 
                                                          
R. Hayya.” Note that Shemu el is described only in terms of his relationship with Hayya. Cohen, Sefer ha-Qabbalah, 
60. 
26 Ibid.,59-60.  
27 Ibid., 61-2. 
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 But what justified Spanish Jews’ decisions to stop supporting the Babylonian yeshivot? 
Ibn Da ʿud explained the process by which “the income of the academies which used to come 
from Spain, the land of the Maghreb, Ifriqiya, Egypt, and the Holy Land was discontinued.”28 
Four scholars traveling to a Kallah (rabbinic convention) were taken captive. Three were 
ransomed in Qayrawan, Cordoba, and Fustat, respectively. In each place, the scholar revealed the 
extent of his knowledge and opened up his own yeshiva that was independent of Babylonia. In 
Cordoba, in particular, the Spanish king was delighted that the Jews in his realm no longer had 
need of the Jews of Babylonia.29 
Nevertheless, might the decision to stop supporting the Babylonian yeshivot have 
amounted to heresy? Did the geonim in Babylonia excommunicate Spanish Jewry in retaliation? 
Ibn Dawud’s narrative also provided an answer to this potential objection. R. Hạnoq of Cordoba, 
one of the “four captives,” excommunicated a certain Ibn Shatnash. After that,  
Ibn Shatnash boarded a ship to the academy of Rabbeinu Hayya under the 
impression that Rebbenu Hayya would receive him and that the latter was an enemy 
of R. Hạnoq. [That impression] derived from the fact that the aforementioned four 
scholars had cut off the income of the academies, with the result that the academies 
were reduced to poverty. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Hayya let him know that he should 
not come, for if he should come he would observe the ban declared by the Rabbi. 
Accordingly, Ibn Shatnash went off to Damascus, where he died.30 
 
Thus, in Ibn Dawud’s retelling, Hayya Gaon respected the rulings of the Spanish sages, even 
after they stopped supporting him financially.  
Could one not object, however, that scholars remained in Baghdad after Hayya Gaon’s 
death? What if, by cutting themselves off from Babylonia, the Spanish scholars had lost touch 
with a more authentic rabbinic tradition? Ibn Dawud also assuaged these doubts. According to 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 63. 
29 Ibid., 64-6. 
30 Ibid., 67-8. 
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Ibn Dawud, after Hayya Gaon’s death, “all of Iraq had been left without a remnant of native 
Talmudic scholarship.” In fact, Iraq was so bereft of Talmudic scholars that a certain R. Yisḥạq 
b. R. Moshe b. Sakrī of Denia (Spain), who had never even attained office in the Cordoba 
Yeshiva, “left … for the East, where he was appointed gaon and occupied the seat” of Hayya 
Gaon.31 By asserting that the native Iraqi Talmudic tradition had ceased to exist and that a 
relatively undistinguished Spanish rabbi took over the Babylonian Yeshiva, Ibn Dawud hoped to 
silence any suspicions that Talmud scholarship in Iraq was somehow more “authentic” than that 
of the Spanish rabbis. 
 Ibn Dawud’s narrative of Babylonian decline and the transfer of rabbinic authority to 
Spain is remarkably convincing on a rhetorical level; it is also mostly contradicted by Geniza 
evidence. The alleged gaon of Baghdad, Ibn Sakrī, for example, is not attested to in any 
manuscript sources from Baghdad Most significantly, R. Hụshi ʾel (one of the captives) traveled 
to Qayrawan long before Ibn Dawud claims, and his surviving letters in the Geniza indicate that 
he was never taken captive. Nevertheless, Ibn Dawud’s account of Babylonian decline came to 
be incorporated into nearly every subsequent Jewish historical work into the twentieth century.32 
Even while acknowledging its clear literary, fictitious elements, Brody cited the text in order to 
substantiate his claim that the fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate in the middle of the tenth 
century had led to the transfer of rabbinic activity to the western Mediterranean.33 
 
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah 
                                                          
31 Cohen, Sefer ha-Qabbala, 82-3. 
32 Cohen, Sefer ha-Qabbala, xiii-xiv. 
33 Brody, The Geonic of Bablyonia, 11-14. 
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 Ibn Dawud recognized the significance of the Babylonian geonim for the halakhic past 
while denying their relevance to the halakhic present. By contrast, Maimonides instead denied 
that the Babylonian geonim had ever played an outsized role in Jewish tradition. In his 
introduction to the Mishneh Torah (c. 1178), Maimonides articulated a narrative of the 
transmission of rabbinic authority that minimized the significance of specific geographic places 
in general, and Babylonia in particular, for halakhic history:    
All of the sages who lived after the canonization of the Talmud and analyzed it, and 
made a name for themselves through their wisdom are called geonim. And all of 
these Geonim who lived in Israel, Shinar (Babylonia), Spain, and France taught the 
ways of the Talmud, revealed its mysteries and explained its matters, since its path 
is very deep. Also, it is written in Aramaic with a mixture of other languages, since 
that language was the lingua franca of Shinar at the time of the canonization of the 
Talmud; but in other places and even in Shinar at the time of the Geonim, one would 
not know this language unless it was taught to him. The people of each city would 
ask many questions of their contemporary Gaon, requesting explanation for the 
difficult matters of the Talmud, and the geonim answered in accordance with their 
wisdom. The addressee would then gather the responses into books they would use 
for studying. The geonim of each generation also wrote books to explain the 
Talmud. … This is the holy work in which all Israelite geonim were engaged, from 
the canonization of the Talmud until today, 1108 years after the destruction [1178 
CE].34 
 
In this way, the “geonim” are not confined to the Babylonian yeshivot, Babylonia, or even the 
Eastern Mediterranean. A “gaon” could be any post-Talmudic sage anywhere in the Jewish 
world. It was not simply that the Babylonian geonim had lost the halakhic primacy in the Jewish 
world that they once held; in Maimonides’ narrative, there had never been any Babylonian 
halakhic hegemony. Moreover, Maimonides’ use of the term Shinar to refer to Babylonia instead 
of Bavel allowed him to minimize rhetorically the connection between the geonim in Baghdad 
and the institutions to which they claimed to be the heirs. In Maimonides’ account, although the 
Talmud was written in Aramaic, the spoken language of Babylonia, even the geonim in 
                                                          
34 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, 38-9. 
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Babylonia were ignorant of the language unless it was taught to them. The Babylonian geonim, 
therefore, were not distinguished by virtue of their connection with the land in which the Talmud 
was written, nor should their transmission or interpretation of the law be privileged over those of 
rabbis from other lands.  
  
Part III: “The Place of Moses our Teacher” 
Yet these narratives were not universally accepted in the twelfth century. After all, there 
continued to be a gaon in Baghdad, and he continued to express traditional claims to Babylonian 
halakhic authenticity. Increasingly, these claims centered on the geographic “place” of the 
yeshiva. In contrast to Jews who claimed that the center of Torah scholarship had shifted to 
Egypt, North Africa, or Spain—or denied that it had ever even resided in Babylonia in the first 
place –the Babylonian geonim emphasized the continued primacy of Babylonia itself and its 
physical connection to the figure of Moses. As the gaon Shemuʾel b. ʿEli wrote to the 
communities of Syria: 
The Place of the Yeshiva is the Throne of the Torah in the Place of Moses our 
Teacher, may God protect him, for all time. And the name of the “yeshiva” derives 
from the biblical phrase “And Moses sat (va-yashev) to judge the people” [Exodus 
18:13], and it is the place appointed to teach Torah and Talmud, and we recite 
Halakha generation after generation all the way to Moses our Teacher about whom 
it was said: “And you should teach them the statutes and the Law (Torah) and show 
them the path that they should follow and the work that they must do.” [Ex 18:20]. 
And with that the Faith of Israel is preserved, what is in their hand from their beliefs 
is guarded, so that they do not go astray or turn away from these truths. Regarding 
this the Mishnah says: Moses received the Torah from Sinai and transmitted it to 
Joshua and Joshua to the elders and the elders to the prophets to the prophets told 
it to the Men of the Great Assembly and this forms a continuous chain all the way 
to us. Thus the yeshiva is the place of Moses our Teacher and within it the faith of 
Israel is completed and everyone who shares in it. For it is the successor of the Lord 
of the Torah, in whose place it stands, and it succeeds Moses our Teacher, whose 
throne it is.35  
 
                                                          
35 Assaf, “Letters of Samuel ben Eli,” pt. II, 51. 
  
203 
In this model, the yeshiva is not linked to Moses merely because its scholars join in a chain of 
transmission dating all the way back to Moses. Rather, the very place of the yeshiva is literally 
the “Throne of Torah in the Place of Moses.” As their counterparts in the Mediterranean tried to 
minimize the significance of the geographic place of Babylonia, the geonim instead asserted that 
their continued presence in Babylonia connected them directly to Moses himself and, by 
extension, the most authentic chain of halakhic transmission anywhere in the world.  
 Jewish travelers to Baghdad from Christian Europe accepted these claims. Both Benjamin 
of Tudela (Spain) and Petah̩ya of Regensburg (Bavaria) who traveled through the region in the 
1160s and 1170s wrote in glowing terms of Shemuʿel b. ʿEli, the gaon of Baghdad. They 
emphasized the connection between the yeshiva of Baghdad and the figure of Moses on both a 
geographic and genealogical level. These accounts not only glorified the Babylonian yeshivot 
and advanced their claims to halakhic authenticity, but also circulated in many distinct 
manuscripts throughout Christian Europe. 
In contrast to Avraham ibn Dawud, who was his contemporary from Christian Spain, 
Benjamin of Tudela did not depict the Babylonian Yeshiva as a shadow of its former self. In 
Benjamin’s account, the yeshiva continues to represent the most authentic connection between 
the Jews of his own day and the Jews of antiquity: 
At the head of the great academy is the Chief Rabbi Shemuʾel b. ʿEli. He is Rosh 
Yeshivat Gaon Yaʿaqov. He is a Levite and from the distinguished lineage of Moses 
our Teacher. … R. Elʿazar the son of Zemakh is the head of the order, and his 
pedigree reaches to Samuel the prophet, the Korahite. He and his brethren know 
how to chant the melodies as did the singers at the time when the Temple was 
standing.36 
In this narrative, the gaon himself is a direct descendant of Moses, and thus the yeshiva’s 
connection to the revelation at Mount Sinai is embodied in his very person. Moreover, in 
                                                          
36 Benjamin, Travels, 38. 
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Benjamin’s account, the yeshiva preserves the traditions of the Temple in Jerusalem—traditions 
that had been lost elsewhere in the Jewish world.  
 
Babylonian Rabbinic Authority in Ashkenaz 
Ashkenazi Jews, like their Sephardic counterparts, understood themselves to be 
connected to Babylonian Rabbinic authority. Rabbi Gershom b. Yehudah (c. 960-1040) studied 
in the Babylonian yeshiva with Sherira and Hayya Gaon. Rashi (d. 1105) and claimed “all 
members of the Ashkenazi diaspora are students of [Rabbenu Gershom],” thus connecting the 
rabbinic tradition of Talmudic learning in Northern Europe (the school of the Tosafists in 
France) to that of Babylonia.37 The Tosafist Simhạ b. Shmu ʾel of Vitry (d. 1105) included a 
prayer for the yeshivot in Babylonia and the Land of Israel in his Mahẓor Vitry, a guide to 
religious practice cited by the Tosafists throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.38 The 
Pietists of Ashkenaz, a mystical movement that believed that there was a “hidden will of God” 
far beyond the laws delineated in the Torah, described themselves as the heirs to an esoteric 
Babylonian tradition transmitted through Northern Italy by a certain Abu Aharon of the 
Babylonian yeshiva:  
[The Pietists of Ashkenaz] received the esoteric traditions about the arrangement 
of the prayers as well as the other esoteric traditions, rabbi from rabbi, all the way 
back to Abu Aharon the son of R. Shemu ʾel the Prince, who had left Babylonia 
because of a certain incident, and he was therefore required to travel  all over the 
world.39 
                                                          
37 Ivan Marcus, "History, Story and Collective Memory: Narrativity in Early Ashkenazic Culture," Prooftexts 10, 
no.3 (Fall 1990): 365-88. 
38 Neil Danzig, “Two Insights from a Ninth-Century Liturgical Handbook: The Origins of Yequm Purqan and 
Qaddish de-Hạdata,” Stefan C. Reif (ed), The Cambridge Geniza Collections: Their Conents and Significance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20002). 
39 Ivan Marcus, “"History, Story and Collective Memory: Narrativity in Early Ashkenazic Culture," Prooftexts 
10:3 (Fall, 1990), 372-373. 
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These narratives do not differ substantially from the ways in which such Sephardic Jews as Ibn 
Dawud also claimed to have received authentic Jewish tradition from Babylonia. Yet in contrast 
to their Sephardic counterparts, Ashkenazi Jews did not understand the continued existence of 
the Babylonian yeshivot as constituting a challenge to their own authority. Instead, they 
characterized the Babylonian yeshivot of their own day in overwhelmingly positive terms and 
advanced their claims to halakhic authenticity. 
 This is particularly apparent in the travel narrative of Petahỵah of Regensburg, who 
visited Baghdad in the 1170s. Petahỵa was affiliated with both the Tosafists of France and the 
Pietists of Ashkenaz. Petahỵa’s brother was the Tosafist R. Yitsḥạq Ha-Lavan b. Yaʿaqov. 
Yehudah He-Hạsid, the leader of the Pietists of Ashkenaz, was his tutor and may have censored 
or otherwise helped shape Petahỵah’s travel narrative.40 In his account, Petahỵa recorded a 
tradition linking the biblical Mount Sinai to Baghdad: “Both [Rabbi Saʿadya Gaon and Rabbi 
Hayya Gaon] are buried under a mountain. They say that from there to Mount Sinai, it is a single 
mountain. It is near Baghdad.”41 In this narrative, the Babylonian geonim are linked to 
revelation, not just through an authentic chain of rabbinic transmission, but through geography. 
The location of the yeshivot in Baghdad is metonymically linked to Mount Sinai, the place of 
revelation.  
In Petahỵah’s narrative, the Jews of Babylonia were also distinguished by their 
knowledge and piety. In contrast to European Jews, for example, they were all so learned in 
Torah that the congregation did not need to rely on a Ḥazzan to chant Torah: 
There are no ignorant Jews (ʿAmei Ha-ʿares)̣ in the whole of Babylonia, Assyria, 
Media and Persia who do not know all 24 books, and punctuation and grammar, 
                                                          
40 Jacobs, Reorienting the East, 35-7. 
41 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 22. Translation: 23. 
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and superfluous and omitted letters. For the Hạzzan does not read the Torah, rather 
whoever is called up to the Sefer Torah reads for himself.42 
As Martin Jacobs argues, Petahỵah extols Babylonian Jewish customs as a foil against the 
cultural depravity that the Pietists of Ashkenaz condemned in European Jewry.43 In doing so, he 
described Babylonia as “very much a different world” from his own: 
He stated that he did not see any woman while staying in Bavel, because they were 
all veiled and modest. Everyone has a mikveh in his courtyard. And no one offered 
up his prayer before he bathed. All travelers there travel in the night, on account of 
the heat. Everything grows there in winter as here in summer. Most of their labors 
are performed during the night. Bavel is very much a different world. The Jews 
cleave to Torah and fear heaven. Even the Ishmaelites are trustworthy.44 
Regardless of the accuracy of the customs described here, this passage is significant for our 
purposes because it demonstrates the high esteem in which the Ashkenazim continued to hold 
Babylonia and Babylonian traditions. Rather than asserting that Babylonian halakhic primacy 
had been superseded and that Babylonia was a mere shadow of its former self as Ibn Dawud did, 
Petahỵa instead looked to Babylonia as a paradigm of religious piety and authentic tradition.  
 Although the Tosafists of France differed slightly in their understanding of Jewish 
tradition from the Pietists of Ashkenaz, they too esteemed the Babylonian yeshivot and accepted 
their claims to an antique and unadulterated halakhic tradition. In the 1160s, the Tosafists of 
France wrote to Shemuʾel b. ʿEli Gaon asking him to resolve a dispute between Rabbeinu Tam 
and the other scholars of the yeshiva by clarifying “how [the text of a specific Talmudic passage] 
is copied in the books of the yeshiva,” and they asked him to specify the yeshiva’s custom 
regarding the matter in question. The gaon responded by copying what he described as “the true 
version [of the Talmudic text] … which is from our rabbis, and our rabbis from our rabbis, 
                                                          
42 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 14. 
43 Jacobs, Reorienting the East, 173-4. 
44 Petahỵa, Sibbuv, 42-45. 
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generation after generation all the way back to the sages of the Talmud [and] the versions 
verified by the ancient geonim.”45 The fact that the Tosafists chose to write to the Babylonian 
yeshivot to ascertain the “true version” of the Talmudic text indicates that they accepted the 
Babylonian yeshivot’s geographic and genealogical claims.  
Rather than posing a threat to the authority of Ashkenazi Jewish leaders, the continued 
existence of the Babylonian yeshivot connected the relatively newly-established and distant 
Jewish communities of northern Europe, particularly those devastated by the Crusades, to an 
ancient and prestigious rabbinic tradition. For many Jews during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, far from being a “backwater,” Babylonia continued to represent a link to the most 
authentic chain of Halakhic tradition and religious practices anywhere in the Jewish world. 
 
Conclusion 
 The second half of the eleventh century marked a transformation in the relationship 
between the Babylonian yeshivot in Iraq and Jewish communities throughout the Mediterranean. 
The decline of large-scale, long distance trade networks and political connections between Iraq 
and Egypt accounts for the absence of Iraqi material in the Cairo Geniza. Fewer connections and 
interactions between the two places led rabbinic and political leaders in the Mediterranean to 
refashion their own relationship to Babylonia.  
 By the end of the eleventh century, Jewish communities in Egypt and the Western 
Mediterranean had developed their own distinct institutions of rabbinic leadership. The new 
Jewish leaders promoted themselves as the successors to the Babylonian geonim, and their rule 
                                                          
 
45 Simcha Emanuel, “A Responsum of Shemuʾel ben Ali Gaon of Baghdad to the Talmudic Scholars of France,” 
Tarbitz (1996), 93-100. [Heb]. The text in question comes from Pesahim 29b-30a. 
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depended, in part, on Baghdad’s inaccessibility. This explains why the conflicts over the reshut 
clause in Indian Ocean port cities were particularly intense. In the twelfth century, connections 
between Iraq and the Mediterranean were gradually re-established, leading to even more bitter 
conflicts over halakhic authority. This catalyzed the development of a historiographic and 
halakhic tradition that explained the transfer of rabbinic authority to the West or tried to 
minimize the importance of Babylonia altogether. In response, the Babylonian geonim 
emphasized the significance of the geographic location of Babylonia, claiming direct 
genealogical descent from Moses and linking the place of the yeshiva to the place of Moses. 
Jews far from Baghdad found these claims to Babylonian supremacy compelling and useful for 
legitimizing their own communities. 
 Despite the significance of the relationship between Abbasid political power and the 
Babylonian yeshivot discussed in the past four chapters, the caliphate’s decline in the middle of 
the tenth century had not led to a decline in the authority or influence of the Babylonian yeshivot 
in the Jewish world. After all, the last Babylonian gaon revered by Jews worldwide was Hayya 
Gaon, who held the gaonate during a time of political fragmentation and was revered by Jews in 
Fatimid, Byzantine, and Umayyad territories.   
If anything, there was an inverse relationship between long-distance Abbasid political 
power or potential power and the halakhic authority of the Babylonian yeshivot. In places where 
the Abbasid Caliphate had political power or the potential to exercise such power, Jewish leaders 
opposed Babylonian authority most forcefully. Even though Egypt and some Indian Ocean port 
cities were technically under Fatimid control during the Seljuq period, they were close enough to 
Iraq that Babylonia continued to represent a potential threat to the independent authority that 
Egyptian rabbinic leaders tried to wield. Similarly, once connections between Iraq and the 
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Western Mediterranean were reestablished, Sephardic Jewish leaders responded forcefully 
against Babylonian claims. Most significantly, Maimonides articulated the strongest challenge to 
Babylonian authority in 1178 while residing in Egypt while Egypt and Iraq were united under the 
authority of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. By contrast, it was the Jewish communities of 
northern France and the Rhineland, never subject to Abbasid political rule and far from the 
Mediterranean travel zone, who most revered the Babylonian geonim and extolled their spiritual 






This dissertation has demonstrated that Jewish communal institutions and the political 
institutions of the Muslim society in which Jews lived were much more closely aligned than 
traditional historiography has led us to believe. Rather, the power of Jewish leaders depended on 
the support of Muslim leaders, and the claims to authority that Jewish leaders made held 
meaning precisely because of the relationship between these claims and the Islamic political 
milieu in which they were asserted. As we traced relations between various Jewish communal 
institutions and the Abbasid state over four successive political regimes, we have seen how 
changes in Islamic political life impacted both the points of connection between Jewish 
communal leaders and the Abbasid state and the ways in which rabbinic leaders advanced their 
own spiritual authority.  
During the first third of the tenth century, the relatively strong Abbasid state under the 
caliph al-Muqtadir facilitated the rise of a small group of Jewish jahbadhs at the Abbasid court 
who used their connections to long-distance mercantile networks to exchange different kinds of 
coins in the state treasury and lend money to the state. With their access to state power, Jewish 
jahbadhs courtiers came to accept petitions on behalf of Jews and present them before the caliph. 
They also came to play a role in the administration of the Babylonian yeshivot, interceding 
between the geonim and the Abbasid state during intra-communal conflicts. Rather than viewing 
the involvement of the gentile government as a problem, the rabbis very much took pride in their 
close relations with the state, and they used their proximity to state power to advance their 
authority and prestige among Jews outside of Baghdad.  
  
211 
The political fragmentation of the Buyid period in the middle of the tenth century led to a 
proliferation of provincial courts throughout Iraq and the Mediterranean, many of which 
employed Jewish officials. Despite their vulnerability to arbitrary raids, Jewish jahbadhs were 
relatively integrated into elite Buyid social networks, and they were able to network with a wide 
variety of high-placed individuals throughout the Mediterranean. The yeshivot, though deprived 
of a relationship with a centralized political power, were able to take advantage of long-distance 
mercantile networks to communicate with their followers in communities far from Baghdad and 
perform favors for them, ensuring that connection with the yeshiva would continue to yield 
concrete benefits for their followers. Ultimately, however, the geonim asserted that connections 
with gentile political power were irrelevant to the yeshiva’s claims to authority over Jews 
worldwide. In doing so, they derived their spiritual authority from their separation from the 
corruptions inherent in political life. 
During the Seljuq period, the status of Jewish court bankers declined, as the ʿulamāʾ 
became more prominent in state administration and tried to marginalize dhimmī government 
officials (and dhimmīs in general) as much as possible. By the end of the eleventh century, with 
the decline in status and influence of Jewish court bankers, the exilarch had become the 
definitive representative of the Jewish community at court. Unable to appeal to the state during 
times of intra-communal conflict as they once had, Jews expressed their political frustrations in 
messianic terms. The communal leadership responded with a clear anti-messianic message in 
favor of quiet acquiescence to the state. 
After the defeat of the Seljuqs, the ideological and administrative reforms of the later 
Abbasid caliphs promoting centralized rule also had the effect of incorporating more Jewish 
notables into the orbit of state administration and Abbasid courtly life. This manifested itself, 
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most significantly, in the granting of investiture to the geonim. This also impacted the internal 
life of the Jewish community. The geonim depended on the government to protect their own 
autonomy and control over those individuals subject to their reshut, and they construed service to 
the Abbasid state as equivalent to service to the yeshiva. At the same time, the granting of 
investiture meant that the geonim could make the argument for eliminating the position of 
exilarch altogether. The close ties with the state led Jewish leaders in Iraq in the early thirteenth 
century to extol the Abbasid state and those who served it.  
This diachronic analysis reveals the fluid nature of medieval rabbinic institutions of 
leadership. On the one hand, the rabbinic yeshivot and the exilarchate continued to operate in 
Iraq throughout the period discussed in this dissertation. On the other hand, there was a great 
deal of variation in how they related to each other and how they advanced claims for their own 
authority in the Jewish world a result, in part, of the changing nature of their relationship with 
the gentile state. In the early Abbasid period, for example, Natan Ha-Bavli described the exilarch 
as sitting on a throne flanked by two geonim during a dramatic ritual of investiture at the 
Babylonian synagogue. Even when a gaon and exilarch excommunicated each other, each had 
appointed a counter-exilarch and a counter-gaon, respectively. Yet during much of the Buyid 
period, only one yeshiva was in operation, and Sherira Gaon claimed the Davidic ancestry of the 
exilarch for himself. In the early Seljuq period, an exilarch took control of the yeshiva, solicited 
halakhic queries, and asserted Babylonian geonic prerogatives. Soon thereafter there was 
apparently a separate gaon once more. When the Babylonian gaon received investiture in the 
late-twelfth century, he argued against the position of exilarch altogether; in response, the 
exilarch, who had advanced Babylonian claims to halakhic supremacy, instead allied his office 
with Maimonides, who denied the halakhic authority of Babylonia altogether.  
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Yet despite this fluidity, we can make some generalizations about Jewish political life 
throughout this period. First, throughout a period of 350 years, a small group of Jewish officials, 
many of whom were from the same families, served as Abbasid financial administrators. During 
this time, Jewish jahbadhs continued to play a central role in mediating between Jews and the 
Abbasid state and in administering the Babylonian yeshivot. The relative continuity in the 
employment of Jewish jahbadhs in Abbasid administration, even when other dhimmī government 
officials converted en mass to Islam, suggests that the connections to long-distance Jewish 
mercantile and credit networks upon which Jewish jahbadhs relied may have been relatively 
stable across generations, despite the vicissitudes of pre-modern political life.  
Second, there was a “royal alliance” of sorts in the Islamic world. In all of these political 
contexts, Jews sought out relations with the highest echelons of power. In exchange for paying 
taxes, Jews expected the caliph to protect them and address their grievances. But this principle 
manifested itself in different ways in the Islamic world. Most notably, appealing to the caliph 
was not a sign of Jewish political differentiation as it might have been for Jews in Christian 
Europe. Rather, in petitioning the caliph directly in the classical Abbasid period, Jews declared 
themselves to be servants of the caliph—and in doing so, they behaved exactly like his Muslim 
subjects.  
Rabbinic leaders came to expect the state to enforce their rule and, often through the 
intercession of Jewish government officials, invited the state to intervene in intra-communal 
conflicts. Only when a centralized state was unable to or refused to do so, as during the Buyid 
and Seljuq periods, did the rabbis characterize the state and involvement in politics in general in 
distinctly negative terms.  
  
214 
Nevertheless, even when the Abbasid state was at its strongest, no individual rabbinic 
leader was able to rule over the Jewish community unopposed, nor was he able to monopolize 
Jews’ access to state power. Jewish elites were able to petition the state against their rivals 
throughout most of the Abbasid period. During the political fragmentation of the Buyid period, 
Jewish leaders were still able to appeal to various rival Muslim officials to advance their 
positions. When, under the Seljuqs, the status of Jewish government officials decreased and 
Jewish leaders may have been less able to petition the state authorities, they expressed their 
resistance in messianic terms. Even under al-Nāsịr, when the gaon received caliphal investiture 
and tried to marginalize the exilarch, the exilarch countered by arguing against the halakhic 
authority of the Babylonian gaon. 
This brings us to an important point about the relationship between Abbasid political 
power and the exercise of rabbinic authority. Even as the rabbis craved political power and the 
direct backing of the Abbasid state for their rulings, their spiritual authority was most strongly 
recognized throughout the Jewish world when they lacked such connections. The caliphate’s 
fragmentation in the middle of the tenth century, for example, had not led to a decline in the 
authority or influence of the Babylonian yeshivot. Rather, Jews worldwide accepted Sherira 
Gaon’s legitimizing chain of halakhic transmission, composed during a time of political 
fragmentation, which derived the rabbis’ authority from their conscious rejection of the 
corruptions inherent in political life. Similarly, the Jewish communities of northern France and 
the Rhineland, never subject to Abbasid political rule, revered the Babylonian geonim and 
extolled their spiritual authority in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By contrast, Maimonides 
articulated the strongest challenge to Babylonian rabbinic authority in 1178 in Egypt, during 
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which time the Babylonian gaon held investiture from the Abbasid caliph, and Egypt and Iraq 
were united in the same political realm.  
Still, a lot more research remains to be done to clarify the phenomena this dissertation has 
identified. Who precisely were the jahbadhs, what did they do, and how did this change or 
remain constant over time? A systematic study of Arabic prescriptive literature on jahbadhs and 
all of the Abbasid jahbadhs named in Muslim sources could help to illuminate the significance 
(or lack thereof) of the Jewish jahbadhs discussed in this dissertation for Abbasid political 
history. To what extent was a jahbadh a distinctly Jewish or dhimmī position in Iraq and in other 
parts of the Islamic world? What role, if any, did religious differentiation play in Abbasid 
administration, and how did this change over time? Comparisons of literary sources about 
jahbadhs from Iraq with references to jahbadhs in Egyptian papyri (particularly those from the 
Abbasid period) will yield new insights into what, exactly, a jahbadh was and how this position 
did or did not change over time and in different political contexts. 
In contrast to Jewish government officials in other parts of the Islamic world, Jews in 
Abbasid Iraq never reached the highest echelons of political power. Jews did not serve as viziers, 
and, unlike their Christian counterparts, they played a minimal role in the shaping of Abbasid 
courtly culture. A systematic comparison of Jewish and Christian government officials in Iraq 
and their relations with their respective religious communities will help to yield a more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomena I discuss in this dissertation and the extent to which they are or 
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